

TERRORISM STUDIES '18

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

TERRORISM STUDIES '18 / II. International Conference on Terrorism and Political Violence

Conference Proceedings

ISBN: 978-605-81593-0-3

Özgür Öztürk DAKAM YAYINLARI

April 2018, İstanbul.

www.dakam.org

Firuzağa Mah. Boğazkesen Cad., No:76/8, 34425, Beyoğlu, İstanbul

Cover Design: D/GD (DAKAM Graphic Design)

Print: Metin Copy Plus, Mollafenari Mah., Türkocağı Cad. 3/1, Mahmutpaşa/Istanbul, Turkey

Conference Coordination: DAKAM (Eastern Mediterranean Academic Research Center)

II. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM STUDIES

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BLACK SEA REGION, TESTING POLYGON FOR A NEW GLOBAL ORDER

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Abstract

All the specific *geopolitical turbulences* of the last few years represent expressions of the attempts of the great actors to create favorable negotiating positions for the new formats of revision of the current global order. Currently, the implicit conventions underlying the current geopolitical model seem to be exhausted. We are witnesses of the paradigm of dismantling the current global political order and creating a new global geopolitical paradigm. In our opinion, the creation of operating theaters for the formal antagonism particularizes the new geopolitical paradigm of all previous models.

Previous geopolitical models relied on the consensual recognition of a direct confrontation space/territory as a paradigmatic expression of the geopolitical model, while the new paradigms require masking/camouflage of ideological conflict territories through artificially created theaters of operations (military priority). In the epic of the new geopolitical paradigm, the tendency to artificially formalize a confrontational theater that masks the authentic intentions of the great political actors has the essential role.

The most advanced unconventional technologies for testing the new props of geopolitical negotiation seem to belong to the Kremlin. Russia moves in Syria only military but geopolitically into the wider Black Sea area. The Black Sea region has a special significance in the recent geopolitical calibration of the Kremlin. The wider Black Sea region represents for the Russian Federation the real tactical field that tests its geopolitical resistance to the Euro-Atlantic political advancement and also the strategic vector of Russia's course in the new geopolitical context, the geographical and geopolitical perimeter that decides on its future positions in the negotiations on the new world order. The replies of the other global Black Sea actors seem not to have reached the refined level of the Kremlin.

Our suggestion is that we must read the geopolitical processes taking place in the wider Black Sea area as an expression of geopolitical competition, in an unofficial perimeter, between the great political actors, with the goal of creating geopolitical dividends in ongoing negotiations for a new global order. All this geopolitical texture makes the Black Sea region the perfect polygon for new tests on the negotiations on the new global order. In the penumbra of *battles for the public*, this region will provide the alchemical combination for the new world order.

Keywords

wider Black Sea area, new global political order, testing polygon, new geopolitical architecture, geopolitical negotiation, atypical/asymmetrical confrontation spaces

Recent developments in geopolitical dynamics, from the conflict in Syria to the hybrid war in the eastern districts of Ukraine, highlight a prospective that deserves analytical deepening.

It is very possible that all the specific *geopolitical turbulences* of the last few years represent expressions of the attempts of the great actors to create favorable negotiating positions for the **new formats of revision of the current global order**.

Currently, the implicit conventions underlying **the current geopolitical model seem to be exhausted**. The principles of international law that rule the world order are faulty. Under the combined pressure of several global actors, **the current geopolitical model has reached its limits**. The right of force became the main instrument of political positioning and actions. Efforts by some of the global actors to obtain prior UN Security Council Agreements for large-scale military operations (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) today seem like old pictures, while the UN itself seems to have reached its maximum conservation capacity of the formal prestige that allowed it to exist in the geopolitical calculations of the great global actors.

We are witnesses of the paradigm of dismantling the current global political order and creating **a new global geopolitical paradigm**. Russian military intervention in Georgia, Crimean occupation and Donbas hybrid war, US unpredictability in the Trump era and its global/planetary disengagement, Brexit, political crisis inside the European Union, advancement of illiberal policies in Europe, reevaluation/review of strategic agreements in the nuclear field, enlargement implosive mix of European construction, conflict in Syria, *lone wolves'* attacks in Europe, new migration maps and policies, militarist enthusiasm and the decay of the current international law order through political actions of force without joint effective sanctions by the international community seem to be **the symptoms of the new geopolitical paradigm**.

It is obvious that the great actors are preparing/getting ready for the negotiations that will shape the future world order. To the scenarios for the preparation of a favorable negotiation position belong the large military actions, demonstration military exhibitions, testing the limits of diplomatic discourse, refining/fine tuning of the hybrid war techniques, reconfiguring ideological tools (fake news, carousel voting, poisons etc.), creating operational theaters of the formal antagonism etc.

In our opinion, this last dimension/specifity of the new geopolitical paradigm, *the creation of operating theaters for the formal antagonism*, is unconventional and particularizes the new geopolitical paradigm of all previous models. Previous geopolitical models relied on the consensual recognition of **a direct confrontation space/territory as a paradigmatic expression of the geopolitical model**, while the **new paradigms require masking / camouflage of ideological conflict territories through artificially created theaters of operations (military priority)**.

In the epic of the new geopolitical paradigm, the tendency to artificially formalize a confrontational theater that masks the authentic intentions of the great political actors has the essential role. Currently, **the conflict in Syria seems to be meeting the parties' consensus in order to be (officially) presented as a space for exploring the new geopolitical architecture**: the magnitude of the conflict, the US and the Russian Federation intervention on the ground, the new conjunctural/short term political alliances around Syria, the singular stance of Turkey, the mix of local insurgency groups, etc. seem to configure a **perfect geopolitical design for a classic theater of operations**.

But the new geopolitics are no longer built around classical policies and practices. **The authentic testing polygons of the new global order are no longer the classic confrontation spaces** but rely on them to create confusion and deviations. While conflicts are taking place in Syria, **the new geopolitical narratives essential to the design of the new global order meet and confront in atypical spaces with non-**

conventional instruments. The Syrian conflict, with all its real dramatic effects for the fate of many millions of people, can be seen, from a geopolitical perspective, in terms of a cynical political realism, as a *smoke curtain* covering unconventional narratives that prepare elsewhere the new world order.

The most advanced unconventional technologies for testing the new props of geopolitical negotiation seem to belong to the Kremlin. Its new props no longer focus on the classical preparation of a performance response in a possible direct military confrontation, but on the creation and prior exploitation of vulnerabilities in the other's ideological bone structure (architecture). The Kremlin already counts (or can count) on the election of an American president, on the ideological motivation of America's voting tendencies, on the functioning of the illiberal (and anti-European) democracies in Europe, on the boycott of functionality of the current Europe, on the increased nationalistic and anti-European rhetoric in the countries with a solid European background, on the creation of major political crises, etc. *Russia Today*, wreck troops, green men, fake news etc. have replaced tanks, strategic bombers, or nuclear submarines, kept for classical military confrontations and for the strategic reserve.

Creation of more favorable corridors in the formats that will establish the new world order currently depends less on the conventional military arsenal of the great actors than on the mobility and inventiveness of their resources to undermine the ideological bone (architecture) of the *other*. **When Americans discover that the democratic virtues they are proud of at the global level are no longer decisive nor sufficient for choosing their leader freely, the Pentagon's military arsenal (designed to create external deterrents) risks to become irrelevant.**

In this paradigmatic perspective, in today's geopolitical chess game, the players skills **to anticipate the moves of the other** are more important than ever. To anticipate the other's moves, in a game in which they respond perfectly to them remains a mere minor bet, it substantially increases the chance of victory in the game.

Where does Moscow move geopolitically at this point and where do all other world chess players move geopolitically?

In our modest opinion, **Russia moves in Syria only military but geopolitically into a symbolic territory represented by the US, Europe and the Black Sea (the Black Sea area).**

Russian Federation's military actions in Syria respond to the Kremlin's tactical needs, while **for the geopolitical moves huge laboratory resources are mobilized in many geographical areas of which symbolic and catalyst nucleus is the Black Sea space.**

The major geopolitical interest of the Russian Federation is to achieve an advancement in ideological containment/discouragement, an advancement that would make inconclusive the eventual improvement/advancement of military deterrence of Others. From this perspective, the effects of the Kremlin's geopolitical game seem to be devastating.

In the United States, Washington's political class and American public opinion face for the first time the hypothesis that the direct vote for the presidential election is a direct consequence/effect of the Kremlin's vote control. For the American public imagination, the idea that Moscow can decide the direct election champion in the United States has the devastating effects of a *tsunami* that can reduce the significant myth of American military heroism in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. to insignificant dimensions. Such an idea may create long-term demobilization and disengagement of an average American from the own American political system, and **the long-term effects of these ideological mutations may be as critical to American society as the September 11 attack.**

In Europe, the geopolitical attack by *Russia Today* and the troop army has already produced visible, quantifiable effects in the long run. With a little Russian ideological help, Europe is becoming self-disappointed, self-indulging, is reconfiguring itself (Brexit), and dissociating itself. It becomes a fragile territory, **a safe target for lone wolves or even a terrorist nursery**. Images of Brussels terrorized by its own citizens and with fully militarized streets, or a terrorized Paris (the emblematic image of a tolerant Europe, demonized/diabolized and punished for the Puritanism redundancy), have the shock wave effect, **capable of anesthetizing confidence in the European construction**. Using such breaches, it was possible and easy to construct signs of illiberal democracies in Eastern Europe, nationalist inflation in Central Europe, the skeptics and anti-Europeans, almost the majority in Brussels and Strasbourg, the Brexit (the death of the Anglo-Saxon European lung etc.).

Black Sea region has a special significance in the recent geopolitical calibration of the Kremlin. A geopolitical failure of Europe *at home*, in Europe, as an indirect effect of the unconventional movements of the Kremlin, coupled with a correlated failure of America's ambition to become great once again, leaves Russia free in a territory that for hundreds of years has had **the absolute priority of the external positioning - immediate proximity, ex-Soviet space, Caucasus, Central Asia, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea**. This territory, permanently prioritized by all Russian regimes at least since Catherine the Great, which has become the theater of confrontation between Russia's logic of maintaining its own influence and the Euro-Atlantic expansion logic in the past 25-30 years, can now be regained by Russia as a space of influence.

The most vulnerable link of this space, from the perspective of Russian strategic interests, is **the geographic line of possible NATO / EU enlargement: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia**. The regaining of this outpost requires geopolitical impact action and concentration of efforts in this direction. The Russian Federation moves geopolitically to the Black Sea region because it sees the Euro-Atlantic strategic corridor in this region as its traditional land of influence and its borders, the future threat of Russia's perfect geopolitical isolation. Unlike Central Asia or the Caspian Sea, where the geopolitical turbulence and / or the magnitude of long-term effects are much lower, **the Black Sea area is the sanctuary that must be protected from the perspective of the Kremlin's strategic interests**.

Main/first geopolitical action of Moscow in the Black Sea region is **the ideological de-legitimization and declassification of NATO and the EU**. The strategic interest of the Kremlin in the US and EU institutional debilitation seems to be directly linked to its tactical interest in producing, by this debilitation, the suspension of the Euro-Atlantic enlargement plans in the Black Sea area. Russia is geopolitically moving to Europe and the US (not only) for abstract reasons (weakening the potential of the main competitors), but additional for pragmatic reasons – the dejection of their geo-political scenarios in the Black Sea area.

For these reasons, **the Black Sea region represents for the Russian Federation the real tactical field that tests its geopolitical resistance to the Euro-Atlantic political advancement** and also the strategic vector of Russia's course in the new geopolitical context, **the geographical and geopolitical perimeter that decides on its future positions in the negotiations on the new world order**. Russia's military or image failure in Syria is much less geopolitical for Moscow's interests than capitulation in a space that can bring its rivals *ante portas*, to the gates of Moscow.

Synthetic recapitulation of Russia's main moves in the Pontic geopolitical polygon reveals **the amplitude of geopolitical play in this area**. In the wider Black Sea region, Moscow has tested the most sophisticated forms of hybrid warfare throughout modern history (*green little people* in Crimea, local paramilitary detachments of the Donbas separatists, troll's ideology of military intervention, etc.). Moscow has turned the region into an *El Dorado of separatism* and *a paradisiacal space of frozen conflicts*. The Kremlin has

canceled the obsession with regional strategic rivalry relations with Ankara, proposing **atypical reformulations of the nature of the Russian-Turkish bilateral relationship**. In this sense, by using the favorable corridor generated by Ankara's frustrations over Turkey's European integration projects for Turkey's accession to the EU, sometimes creating breaches and additional obstacles in the Ankara-Brussels dialogue, **Moscow seems to have convinced Turkey that it can function as a credible partner in the Black Sea area**. One can also highlight the unreliable capacity of Russian diplomacy to be credible and performant in dynamizing strong institutional formulas (some analysts suggest, on this background, that the rebuilding of the Russian-Turkish regional alliance could have effects on Turkey's demotivation of its own commitments as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, other analysts and even regional political leaders are already talking about a possible *Russia-Turkey-Iran axis* that complicates the Black Sea security picture). **Russia's geopolitical moves in the Black Sea seem to redesign the strategic architecture of the region**, deepening the traditional lines of demarcation, creating new designs, etc. Finally, the convincing results of the Russian ideology on the line of promoting the concept of *Novorusia*, a concept from which new hybrid wars in the region are still expected, especially at high potential eruption points, should not be underestimated. **The scenarios regarding the continuation of Russian project Novorusia, especially in the Odessa region, would be catastrophic for NATO countries riparian to the Black Sea (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey), remaining a high probability.**

Replies of the other global Black Sea actors seem not to have reached the refined level of the Kremlin. The US and NATO have responded to the concerns of some member states through the creation of an advanced presence of NATO on the eastern flank in the Black Sea region. There are prospects for talking about consolidation of the southern flank, increasing the cohesion of the Alliance in the region, increasing the naval presence in the region, etc. However, apart from purely military measures, **the geopolitical response of the US / NATO / EU in the region seems weak**. For the US, the geopolitical game in the Black Sea region, geographically far from America and its borders, with minimal risk of producing critical explosions for Washington, seems comfortable. For the European Union, any unconventional confrontation theater that can remove Moscow from direct interference with the sacred area of the Balkans is welcome. In this political design, the EU/NATO countries in the Black Sea region still have substantially unused resources (diplomatic, economic, political) to convince the EU/NATO of the need to promote **coherent geopolitical programs linking the Black Sea region to the Balkans**. An assumption of Romania on the priority of the six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union (January-June 2019), the strengthening of the European Cohesion in the Balkans and the Black Sea (2B / Western Balkans - Black Sea), would generate multiple benefits of stability and cohesion in the region. Finally, the last major global actor to count on the geopolitical equation of the Black Sea, China, is showing ever more persistent concerns about using the region as a possible *silk route* that would allow fast freight transport between China and Western Europe.

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Traditional analytical perspective has so far seen in the Black Sea region a possible military/conventional conflict theater. From this perspective, the analysis of the region's steady militarization in recent years has been essential.

Our suggestion is that we must read the geopolitical processes taking place in the wider Black Sea area as an expression of geopolitical competition, in an unofficial perimeter, between the great political actors (USA, Russian Federation, NATO/EU, at the limit and China), with the goal of creating geopolitical dividends in ongoing negotiations for a new global order.

At the moment, **Moscow seems to be in a *poll position***, which has initiated unconventional and far-reaching geopolitical scenarios in a space where it has the advantage of maximum game expertise.

Geopolitical play of the great actors in the Black Sea area overlaps with and combines the interests and political affiliations of the countries of the region. The paradigmatic effect of the local mix of interests is **the absence of a consensus of the region/countries for a common/regional priorities agenda**. For EU and NATO member countries, the region's list of priorities is generated by strengthening the security environment across the region to preserve economic and democratic gains. For countries aspiring to EU/NATO integration, the economic, legal and social reforms are a priority which can facilitate their access to the Euro-Atlantic prestigious political club, in conjunction with the Soviet/Russian de-ideologization (although *de-ideologization* is one of the basic principles of new thinking, advanced by the new post-Soviet leadership). For some countries in the wider space, the balance between the Euro-Atlantic pole and Moscow seems to be the ideal solution. Finally, for Moscow, the only global actor in the region, maintaining/resuming geopolitical control over the region is essential and priority. The competition for regional leadership, in which the main players are (or have aspirations thereof) Turkey, Ukraine, and even Romania, does not seem to generate cohesion benefits. The new regional formats (*The Wider Black Sea Region, Bucharest B9 Initiative, Intermarium, The Three Seas Initiative*) still lack clarity and consistency in the absence of a consensus on the region's priorities. Finally, the ethno-cultural mosaic of the region, the historical experience of the crises, the intersections of the North-South and East-West strategic routes, provide this space with a **high level of resilience to tests**, a compulsory aptitude for the geopolitical spaces which are not formally marked as confrontational territories.

All this geopolitical texture makes the Black Sea region **the perfect polygon for new tests on the negotiations on the new global order**. In the penumbra of *battles for the public* (Syria, the Middle East, etc.), **this region will provide the alchemical combination for the new world order**.

MANAGING CHINA'S RISE: ASIA AND THE NEED OF THE CONCERT OF POWER

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ABSTRACT

China has committed itself to the policy of 'Peaceful Rise' since a decade ago. To prove the credibility of its claims, China has to make constant efforts to mitigate the anxieties that go along with its ascending power and influence. This is especially relevant in Asia, where China's potential as a great power combined with its assertiveness in foreign policy is often perceived as a threat to regional stability. Many states fear the transcending rise of China due to some reasons, those including the rivalry between great powers to the primary concern of survivability in the anarchic world. In response to the rise of China, some states exercise the geopolitical strategy of containment towards China to assure the stability of the region and secure their interests forward. The strategy begins by letting all states which are under the threat of rising China to present themselves in the Asia Pacific region as a collective action to deter China's further decisive moves. On the other hand, China itself also needs to explicitly build a trustworthy image by managing a mutually agreeable role in the region to show its self-conceived conception of peaceful rise and reassure its neighbours of its benign intentions. The existence of the 'Concert of Powers' in the Asia Pacific region comes as a possible win-win solution to put these two interests together as well as harmonises China's and its neighbouring countries' interests.

Keyword(s): China, Asia, Asia Pacific Security, Concert of Powers

The rising of China in global politics is seen as precarious by many actors whose lives have been threatened by the so-called assertive foreign policy of China. China's advancement of military and economic capabilities put many powerful actors in danger and necessitates them to take further action in response to this power escalation in Asia Pacific region. The capacity of China as the rising global power is real and the many are in danger because of its assertive policies. At least the US had been warned since long time ago and had been preparing well to counter China's aggressive moves in the Asia Pacific, or specifically East Asia. Of course, there are plenty countries which might feel worried about the rising China same as the US, but, do they have the capacity to challenge China? Amitav Acharya (1999) introduces 'concert of Asia' in the late 90s as the term to explain Asia as the fighting arena where strong countries are able to participate, namely US, China, Japan and Russia. Acharya's idea has been echoed by Hugh White (2010) who believes that Asia is a stage for the 'concert of powers' which only invites great powers and neglect middle and weak power countries. By this restriction, undoubtedly only limited countries might enter the concert, leaving others as either neutral or bandwagoning.

Since the US has involved in counterbalancing the rising of China, it does not necessarily mean that the region now is only maintained by two powers. There are possibilities for any parties to join the concert, but the question to ponder in our discussion is that 'does Asia really need this concert of powers?'. In response to this key question, this paper argues that Asia needs this concert of powers to deal with China's aggressive strategy in the region. At this point, the article would explore actors that potentially have a constructive contribution to the concert. On the first part, we investigate individual factors, such economy and military as key drivers for a particular actor to plausibly join the concert in Asia. We might see later that the 'concert of powers' is fundamental to restrain China's ambition at regional and global level. On the second part, this paper offers a new perspective on how this concert of powers would benefit China as the central object of this strategy.

However, before proceeding to identify the argument, we need to recall what 'concert of powers' refers to and what 'power' this paper would consider. Amitav Acharya (1999) denotes that the 'concert of Asia' is a situation where many powers come into the game trying to influence the surrounding states. The concert of powers does not simply mean as the balance of power which a consortium of strong states exist to counterbalance the potential hegemon in reaching the ultimate superpower status and the maintenance of supremacy in the region (Jarvis 1992: 718), while in the 'concert of powers' no one is seeking for supremacy, lowering the intensity of competition and likelihood of war (White 2013: 81). The distinctive difference between balance and concert lie in the intention to seek power. In the concert of powers, states are required to rely more on the others because the system establishes a restraint which requires states to rely more on others and create mutually beneficial relations (Jervis 1992: 723-724). Karl Nesselrode has long before predicted the idea that Asia would be a venue for the tournament of the shadows of great powers (Raugh, 2004: 151), he believed one day that Asia would be a part of the world where many powers, global and domestic, strive to secure the region. In addition to our discussion, we consider 'power' as resources and latent capability (Goh 2016: 1) in economic and military sector, as two of our focus. Power in this sense is effectively exercised through 'influence' which enable state to making an impact upon another actor's preference in favour of its aim (Goh 2016: 1).

The Concert of Asia: A Challenge to the Asia Pacific

So, why concert of powers is needed? What is going on in Asia? The short answer is the rising of China. Perhaps because the shifting foreign policy in China from Hu Jintao who focused on domestic politics and following the international relations' status quo to Xi Jinping who tend to be more aggressive in the region

and ambitious to pursue the status of global power for China (Zhao 2015: 379). Under President Xi, Chinese diplomacy have been going so assertive in many ways, as if it attempts to challenge the status quo in the region via the escalation of tension in the South China Sea, making a firm position that China is no longer comfortable to put this dispute under the table (Yahuda 2013). However, that is not the only move that China is recently taking, China ambition as a regional and global player is manifested through both security and economic means. In economy, China's 'charm diplomacy' allow itself to expand trade and economic partnership and increase engagement with regional institution (Zhang 2015: 8) and on the other side, China's investment is omnipresent within Asia through ADB and AIIB (Rudd 2015: 1), while its newly AIIB is now become a celebrity in the region due to its sort of 'unconditional' financial aid scheme (Peng & Tok 2016).

Perhaps the most intimidating behaviour of China in the region is its military capability. China military build-up is the genesis of this prolonged conflict, exacerbated by China's assertive diplomacy in the South China Sea; those have created security concern for Asian countries. Over the last decade, China military capability raised 3.6 times to USD 129,000 million for military spending in 2014, becoming the second largest military expenditure next to the US with USD 581,000 million (Yamaguchi 2015: 291). In this respect, Yamaguchi argues that the vast disparity of military spending of the US and China should not be seen as inferiority in the military, but it must be tantamount, or at least slightly below the US, due to many factors. The point is that China's military spending might be quarter of the US but the terrifying thing is that China spurs its military capacity in just one night and the morning it is ready to take the South China Sea back, challenging many Asian countries that have been in a long hibernating dispute as well as putting regional stability at stake (Zhai 2015: 110)

Along with the rising China, more states are under threat. Some might seek for other superpowers' help, and the other might come as a newly self-claimed power. The point is that the concert of powers in Asia is taking place, and it is a necessity to bring equilibrium in the region, to keep China's behaviour away from assertiveness and lock the country from being a regional hegemon. It is true that by the China rising power, many Asian countries are happy because it might be hope for the shift from the Western-led world to the Eastern/Asian-led world. However, the more aggressive China is, the more Asian countries feel unsafe. Asian countries feel worried about the rise of China, though it offers a shifting power to Asia because China might be able to conquer other Asian countries and put them below its feet. Once China's rise is unblocked, then the absolute hegemony power might rule across Asia. Therefore, the need to have this concert is essential. In this respect, many Asian countries informally form an anti-China alliance and send an invitation to the US to begin the concert in tandem with China to counter the expanding influence of China over the region (Zhai 2015: 111; Zhao 2015: 384). Asian countries are concerned primarily with economic growth, so dealing with China is the best option, but cooperating with the US is indispensable. Therefore, Asian countries see the US and China as a fact of life that must be accommodated, benefitted from, and adjusted to as much as possible (Kang 2007: 195).

The current presence of the US in the region is not for the first time. Zhao (2015: 383-384) identifies the US involvement in securing Asia Pacific region for, at least, three times during the history of world politics, namely Cold War, Bush's War on Terror and the last Obama's pivot to Asia Pacific as well as the current Trump administration which expected to continue the pivot. For all those three, Derek McDougall (2016: 35) analyses that two of them, Cold War and Pivot to Asia, were manufactured primarily to rebalance China, and USSR primarily in the Cold War. Therefore, by historical bound, the US-China relation is inseparable, and possibly, they are born to rebalance each other. The good thing is that US-China rivalry in the region is a reciprocal relationship for the good of the region, to mutually balance each other and bring regional stability rather than predacious behaviour. Because a peaceful order in the Asia Pacific

necessitates a balance of power between the US and China to provide checks and balances (Morton 2016: 939), meanwhile it is insufficient and so to have the concert of powers is the most appropriate.

There has been a model of the new great powers relationship that enables these two powers to interact in a more constructive way which might lead to the mutual benefits. However, it begins merely as a rhetorical result because both of their mistrust continues to worsen the regional rivalry (Zhao 2015: 377). China is slowly but sure flexing its muscle, becomes more proactive and coercive in the region via the acquisition of the South China Sea (Zhai 2015: 100). While the US simultaneously raise its strategic influence by taking a long-term defence package with the Philippines and giving full support to Japan over Senkaku islands (Zhao 2015: 378) as well as increasing arms selling to Beijing's domestic rival, Republic of China's force, in Taiwan (Saunders & Bowie 2016: 675). These behaviours give impact to the infringement of the 'big power relationship model' because both parties' perception is incoherent. China perceives itself under the US containment policy because the US always blocks China's moves within the region (Zhao 2015: 382), such as building more integrated and strong economic ties with ASEAN and the exclusion of China in Trans-Pacific Partnerships while the US was the active member of the agreement (Marquina 2013: 76). Mistrust also applies within the society, while many Americans suggest China to decrease the conflict tension and its aggressive policies in the region, Chinese scholars believe that the regional stability in Asia highly depends on the US misperception and misleading policy towards China (Feng & He 2016).

China's rise is real, and its economic and military ascension is vulnerable to world stability, it does not mean that China will immediately pass superpower status because of the large disparity between China and the US capacity in many aspects, making the US certainly unchallenged (Brooks & Wohlforth 2015: 8-9). Although the US by statistic is unchallenged, but Mearsheimer (2014: 5) believes that to defeat the leading state, candidate might not have capability to conquer, the important thing is that the candidate possesses ability to turn conflict into war of attrition that leaves the leading state seriously weakened, even if this state wins the war. Giving these incentives, it is necessary for the US to join the concert, not only because of the invitation of many Asian countries and the need to protect its allies in the region but also because the US is willing to lock China's position at the regional level economically and strategically, thwarting China to make progress in achieving its rising power status.

It is true that the US has no direct link in South China Sea's dispute, the most salient issue that requires the US presence in the region, but it does have indirect interest over security and trade issues (Hossain 2013). Economically, the US aims to secure Asia as its potential market for its business because of its significant growth, especially to its Asian allies, but rising China undermines the US trade relations with many Asian countries due to the cheaper goods and faster shipping. Derek McDougall (2016: 35) identifies that the US hides economic motive which is to rebalance China's position in Asia in order to secure its trade and economic partnership with Asian countries by making secure shipping access through military deployment as well as to coerce China from monopolising regional economic activities. Faigenbaum (2017) asserts the same argument by showing the data of the decreasing US trade in Asia and the US more assertive policy to both thwart China's rising economy and challenge its monopolistic trade in the region.

In political and strategic military context, it is obvious that the US is attempting to hold China to its current position, deterring the country to move forward into a more advanced status. For instance, the US policy of freedom of navigation is not merely to assure everyone's safety, but to secure the US trade and water transportation (Hosain 2013: 108). 'Freedom of navigation' is a legal framework for the US to set up naval forces patrolling around the maritime, showing to Asian countries that the US desires for a stable region.

Concurrently, the US provides an unimpeded waterway for its trade to Asia vice versa. The US in this respect is an endeavour to shut down China's monopoly over the South China Sea waterways and strategic ports that might speed up China's economic growth and maritime security (Morton 2016) shutting down the monopolisation of China over the South China Sea's maritime access.

More strategically, the US intends to deter the China nuclear capacity, as well as its ally North Korea (Mishra 2014: 59). This issue becomes critical both for Asia Pacific countries because only China, North Korea and the US possess nuclear weapons, while among them, only China and North Korea have geographical proximity with other Asian countries, and fortunately, their relationship is as close as 'lips and teeth' (Moore 2008: 2). Reilly (2016) argues that the strong economic of China engenders on North Korea economic actor, even in many cases China had influenced and mentored North Korea's economic reform through bilateral agreement and Chinese investment. This strong relationship, along with rising China, brings instability to the Asia Pacific as a region, moreover to the US. If North Korea is considered as a politically unstable country (Marquina 2013: 73), then it is plausible if North Korea seeks to attack the US military base in Guam once it gets the support from China as its closest friend. Both China and North Korea possess a significant threat of nuclear weapons against the US, for this, the US has to mitigate first by setting up a concert of powers in Asia to put down the escalating tension between these two best friends via deterring China in the region (Christensen 2015: 104-105). Otherwise, the regional stability is at stake, not only the US but also its allies of South Korea and Japan are at the brink of war.

Both political and economic issues interplay within the US strategy in Asia to secure its interests and expand its influence under the narrative of 'balancing the rise of China' which is willing to contain China rather than balancing (Kang 2007: 189). The increasing US strategic partnership in Asia brings a relatively calm but convincing strategy for the US to balance China and maintain its influence over Asian countries. The US' strategic partnerships contain comprehensive cooperation from developmental aid to security issues, e.g. joint military training, but with less binding commitment compared to ones who have formal ties to US alliance. By doing so, Asian countries are formally free from hedging with the US (Parameswaran 2014: 264). This smart move does not cause a significant escalation of conflict in the region and still sufficient enough to hold China's position in the region. For the US, Asia is manageable, China is contained, and the US itself is maintaining its hegemony in Asia, this benefit could have been any better than other option.

There would be only balancing if the US and China are the only players in the game. To be a lively concert, Asia needs more actors to include in the stage to distribute power and create a positive mutual connection to contain China. This paper would suggest Japan and ASEAN as the emerging power in the region that are potentially become dominant regional players in the concert. The following exploration would succinctly explain both Japan and ASEAN strategy to become potential regional players, but though the debate remains still is whether these two entities are ready to face China. First, it is interesting to put ASEAN as the key regional actor into the game. Unlike Japan as individual state, ASEAN we discuss here refers to the organisation as a whole package with its 10 member countries generating a shared norms and common policy action toward specific issues. We do not recognise individual members of ASEAN as potential actors in the arena, but to have ASEAN as a single unit is necessary to put in our debate due to the collective power and influence it evoked. In this regional game, ASEAN holds the most strategic position because it might be a venue for talk and pursue a peaceful dispute settlement over South China Sea's disputants and the US as involving external actor (Hossain 2013). The various political preferences within ASEAN members and the organisation's non-alignment policy provide a favourable environment for discussion of this issue. Members of close ties with China, such Myanmar and Vietnam, and those leaning on the US, like Singapore and Philippine, give this regional body a neutral but determining position.

More importantly, ASEAN has a close relationship with both China and the US via the two distinct cooperation, economy and strategic military respectively. ASEAN as one of China's key trade partnerships and the US' non-ally strategic partner might significantly bridge the two superpowers interests and misperceptions which result in the maintenance the regional stability. ASEAN puts itself as neutral, neither hedging nor challenging both the US and China's presence in the region because they do not want to sink in the conflict of the two great powers, but they do realise that this play-safe mode would benefit them in many ways. ASEAN, by default, rejects any dominance of a single player in the region, which is why ASEAN indirectly invite the US to balance China but still manage a good economic relationship with China to avoid further absolute dominance of China or the US if the situation turns around (Acharya 1999: 86). We should not imagine that the powerful ASEAN would rise to claim the throne, but the great power they possess embedded within the neutral position they hold which enable them to play in the two sides simultaneously as well as building a stable region through internal consolidation (IISS 2016), controlling trade relation with China and bridge the US and China relations.

Secondly, Japan also holds a critical position in the concert. Unlike ASEAN, Japan would run a more strategic and active role in balancing China's strategy in Asia, if only Japan is fearless enough to release itself from the US' tight relationship. As White (2013: 85) suggests, that the concert would be more lively if Japan considers being independent. This paper sees that Japan is attempting to increase its capacity in confrontation against China and possibly able to be an independent regional power challenging China. For example, Japan intensifies activities surrounding Senkaku islands as mitigation of China's assertive movement (Yamaguchi 2015: 290), of course with confirmed support from the US (Zhao 2015: 378). But more importantly, the message that Japan wants to send to Beijing is that Japan is not afraid of China.

More interestingly, Japan under Abe administration is willing to withdraw its constitution partially, explicitly to the notion of the US protection over Japan and the restriction to establish its military power. If Abe's proposal is accepted, then Japan is going to have its military power and be slightly independent of the US. Analysts believe though it is still debatable, that the proposal would open access for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons in order to rebalance China and its ally North Korea (Marquina 2013: 78), putting Japan as a regional power that should be reckoned not only economically, but also in strategic military affairs.

Having seen the US strong involvement in Asia, the ASEAN strategic position and Japan's awakening, projecting a war in Asia as the result of the concert of powers is justifiable because of many powers are present, and resources might be available, plus the incoherent objectives of those powers and institutionalised communication. However, justifiable does not necessarily mean about to happen. The concert of powers merely works as deterrence made by many actors, preferring to have a sensible compromise rather than unrestrained competition (Gordon 2012: 39). Besides, China's ability to shape regional security is relatively limited because of its strong reliance on economic prowess and the inconsistent foreign policy over administrations (Zhang 2015: 7). This is why, though China is aggressive, it produces narration of 'peaceful development' attempting to depress the rising tension of conflict in the region because China itself understands of its capacity (Zhang 2015). Chinese scholars believe that it is unlikely for China to surpass the US in the next ten years (Christensen 2015: 63; Feng & He 2016: 707), so peaceful development with rhetorical behaviour would be the best option.

The Concert of Asia: A Great Opportunity for China

As a non-democratic communist regime, China's rise into one of the most significant players in international system attracted certain degrees of fear among observers. Scholars who supported the

notion of China's rise as a threat argue that with the power and influence that China accumulated through its rise, China could endanger the status quo of the liberal world order. Guo Baogang, a Chinese Politics specialist from Dalton State College, attributed the strong belief in "democratic peace" theory to the development of this threat perception. Guo argues that the belief that peace only exists among democracies gives doubt to any non-democratic countries' pursuit of peace. As regime's nature is considered to be unstable, it is seen to be always in pursuit of its legitimacy and will always prioritise it over the aspiration of peace (Guo S. 2006: 39-40).

China understands the situation that they have to face. Threat perception that China faces prompted some scholars like David M. Finkelstein (2005) to associate it with the development of Chinese 'New Security Concept.' Finkelstein sees the changing of China's security strategies after the Cold War as a manoeuvre to counter the theory of China as a threat. 'New Security Concept' or '*xīn ānquán gàiniàn* (新安全概念)' was a phrase that is frequently used among Chinese scholars to refer to the new features of China's security strategy in the post-Cold War era. It was developed after the collapse of Soviet Union, in which China moved to set its eyes on pursuing a 'security of sustained development,' changing the landmark, expanding it to include the 'economic security' as part of 'high politics' (Wu 2001: 278). China believes that sustainable economic growth could only be achieved optimally in a peaceful environment, hence the traditional realist's power politics security approach that characterized by the 'one-sided security' pursuit should be substituted with a new strategy that focused on seeking 'common security through mutually beneficial cooperation' (Foreign Ministry People Republic of China 2002).

According to the published white paper on China's defence in 2004,

"Security should be based on mutual trust and common interests. We should promote trust through dialogue, seek security through cooperation, respect each other's sovereignty, solve disputes through peaceful means and strive for common development."

Through this snippet, we can see how Chinese government espouses the new security concept on characteristics such as equality, dialogue, cooperation and multilateralism. It is worthy to note that this concept has been consistently voiced from the past to the present time by the administration, as this can be traced back to 1998 where these exact same phrases appeared in China's defence white paper (Ministry of National Defense 1998). Meanwhile, the current president Xi also shows his adherence to this concept as shown in his fixation on using the term 'Community of Common Destiny' (*mingyun gongtongti*, 命运共同体) to describe China's relations with others, especially its neighbouring countries. China Global Television Network (CGTN) reported that within three years after the 18th CPC National Congress in 2012 in which this term gets its prominence, President Xi has mentioned the term 62 times, pushing forward 'win-win solution', inclusive development, and equal partnerships.

It is also important to mention how this new security concept of China shares some characteristics with the idea of the concert of powers. Concert of powers, as it has been noted before in the previous part of this analysis, deals with power distribution of the region through the involvement of many mutually beneficial players. It encourages the concertation of the decision-making process, which means that harmonising differences is central to achieve a common goal. Concert of powers is an approach that suits China's proclaimed new security concept, mainly for three main reasons.

First, as China put hegemonism and power politics as 'the main source of threats to world peace and stability,' (China Permanent Mission to the UN 2004) multipolarity is a power trend that China could and should welcome in Asia, for it is suitable to provide China with better lasting peace that it needs for its economic growth. For China to develop peacefully, it needs the concert of powers in the region. China sees the globalisation to be the main contributing factor for the emergence of economic security as more

important subject, as it renders the growing economic interactions between nations and make it more vulnerable to outside influences and impacts (China Permanent Mission to the UN 2004). The entanglement with global constellation that great powers now have to face in this era, calls for them to forsake their unilateral approach and be involved in a more coordinated and collective measures to deal with the challenges that come, such as global financial crisis, humanitarian crisis, global war on terror, climate change and global warming. A policy paper published by Peace Research Institute Frankfurt on Concert of Powers in 2014 stated that; while existing international institutions exist and provide forums to deal with such issues, due to the lack of cooperation by great powers and their tendency to act with purpose to bolster their own interests and influence, attempts to address these issues have often failed to be done effectively (The 21st Century Concert Study Group 2014: 21). This is the reason why, promoting multilateral approach should also be accompanied by a ‘habit of collective consultation and cooperation’ to increase more frequent interaction, cultivating a stronger shared sense of responsibility for global affairs, and resulting in a more stable working relationship between nations that ensure lasting peace (The 21st Century Concert Study Group 2014: 21).

Second, the concert of powers presents a stage in which China could counterbalance the threat perception that has been developed against its proclaimed peaceful rise. As some researchers noticed, Chinese new security concept had shown up at the end of 20th century as a continuation of Deng Xiaoping's concept of keeping a low profile (*taoguang yanghui* -韬光养晦). To present itself and be addressed not as a superpower, this policy of maintaining low profile guide China to act modestly, never take the lead, ‘bidding its time’ while ‘getting things done’ (Shirk 2007:105). With these guiding principles, Chinese diplomacy – that promote the expansion of trade and economic ties and engagement with regional institutions in the region – under the ‘peaceful development’ rhetoric was perceived to be successful in improving China’s ties with its neighbour in the Asia Pacific (Kurlantzick 2007). While laying low and pursuing ‘common development’ may sound like good strategy and cause, some observers have come forward to criticise China’s aggressive behaviour in the region that is deemed counter-productive to its campaign on the peaceful rise (Tuan 2014).

The fear of strong China to threaten the regional stability through its rise and domination is the very narrative that China tried to avoid with its new security concept. China today is too embedded in the global economy to be a threat to the stability of the region making the threat perception to be arguably exaggerated (Kennedy 2003: 156). In order to shed this threat perception, China has to take down its assertiveness in the region a notch. China's assertiveness in the region on a certain subject such as South China Sea conflicts has prompted some countries to develop suspicions and fear towards China's growth. The historical legacy of Cold War in Asia has left many countries in the region in distrust over China's interest. China's intervention and revolutionary agendas in the past have dominated this perception (Glosny 2007: 160). China in the past were able to compromise its abhorrent border and territorial disputes with Russia and India in order to provide a stable and friendly international environment for their economic growth. As Xi Jinping seemingly trying to push China's power further and more central in the world with his administration's multbillions trade initiatives such as Asian Infrastructures Investment Bank (AIIB) and Belt and Road Project, China will need the political stability to manage its development effectively. By managing a more consistent policy on its foreign policies, holding more firmly its ‘peaceful development’ narrative, committed to equality, collaborative, and cooperative approach, China could show its benign posture and comfort the insecurity of its neighbours, therefore avoiding the instability that could hurt its development.

Third, by allowing concert of powers to develop in the region, China could advance its view on multipolarity and its influence in the region, while avoiding the aggressive power balancing against and from the US. Since the introduction to Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening-up in 1978 and the successful economic growth that follows in the decades after, China had also begun to foster the understanding that its role has increasingly become more important in the world. China asserted that it needs to move beyond the victim mentality that it had held for a long time, to play more active and self-assured role as a responsible global power (Lampton 2008: 4). China economic model has elevated China to the status of great power while simultaneously tied global economy tightly with China. While as it has been mentioned before that this produced worry and fear from its neighbors, this system also made many of China's trading partners asymmetrically dependent on China, in a way compelling them to be more obedient to China's geopolitical interests as it intertwined with their own growth and development (Chambers 2006: 76; Blackwill & Tellis 2015: 12-13).

China with its new security concept is trying to neutralise its periphery from the US by delegitimising alliance system in Asia. Using its economic strength, China presents itself as a new security provider as Xi Jinping argues that "development is the greatest form of security" (Cohen 2014). The existence of the Concert of powers in Asia would support this cause by allowing more interactions among countries and institutions to be involved in the region as active players that do not need to be dependent on great power such as the US to be heard by China and vice versa in a decision making process.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a concert of powers does not trigger a war, and its fundamental goal is to block China's aggressive strategy and keep China away as singular hegemony in the region. This paper considers that the single power existence is bad for the regional dynamics because it might generate a more assertive and intimidating environment toward other countries (see Zhao 2015). The US in this situation might be an equal power to balance the China's position, but admittedly, the US is an external actor. It is highly demanding for ASEAN and Japan to take a further role in the region as the true-blood of Asians. Fortunately, these two actors are playing in the direction that this article has suggested, be a strong neutral party for ASEAN and act as a real power country for Japan. All these powers are able to hold China's position in military and economic sectors by making the concert of powers livelier.

On the other hand, as the concert of powers serves the interest of the other countries in the region to contain China, China contrastingly could also benefit in the existence of such power constellation. China has clearly understood the threat perception that developed around it since the economic reform bore its fruit of success for China. China needs to explicitly build a trustworthy image by managing a mutually agreeable role in the region to show its self-conceived conception of peaceful rise and reassure its neighbours of its benign intentions. The new security concept and the concept of maintaining the low profile which currently being replaced by the concept of common destiny show China's efforts in building these peaceful narrative surrounding its rise. Since concert of powers and China's new security concept suit each other with the application of more interactive and collaborative multilateral approach, therefore it is wise for China to allow the existence of concert of powers in Asia. China should welcome and even encourage the presence of 'Concert of Powers' as it comes as a possible win-win solution to harmonise China's and its neighbouring countries' interests.

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THE CHALLENGES OF CHINA'S COOPERATION AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING WITH CENTRAL ASIA: THE CASE OF CHINA IN THE SCO

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Abstract

Central Asia's drug trafficking issue has been one of its biggest problems since many decades ago, and with globalization and China's re-emergence in the international arena, it is becoming an increasingly important topic to address. The SCO appears as the best scenario for both the Asian giant and the Central Asian countries to deal with such a complex topic, but so far it has had a low success that can be explained not only in the relative youth of the organization but also in the characteristics of its own structural framework, the nature of China's relations with its members, the presence of Russia, and the relative low priority of the drug trafficking issue compared to the main ones inside the SCO (the fight against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism) as well as new ones such as access to resources and the expansion of markets. Co-leading the organization is not very easy for China and it poses certain limits its international cooperation, and although emerging and re-emerging countries like China and India are re-shaping globalization, they are not being full leaders when it comes to global governance, because a Realist influence permeates Chinese diplomacy and international politics.

Introduction

China's growing role in the international arena is a straight result of its gigantic economic growth for the past 30 years. During this process, the Communist Party regime has become more linked not only to the sustainability of this growth but also to China's engagement in international organizations, as well as the embrace of new responsibilities as a returning key player in global and regional dynamics. As a result, China's international cooperation through international institutions has become more important in the country's grand strategy, especially in issues related to maintaining internal stability, expanding comprehensive national power and creating a favorable international environment.

There are several drivers behind Chinese foreign policy and international cooperation, such as looking for more energy resources, investing in several types of projects and industries, securing international support inside big international organizations, dealing with new threats to security, or building a better international image both globally and regionally. This paper is focused on the Chinese international cooperation against drug trafficking in Central Asia, in a context where international terrorism seems to be sprouting harder in several countries around the world and inside that region, and where organized crime has developed branches at social, economical and even governmental levels.

Central Asia shares borders with China's Xinjiang Province, which is in an area particularly difficult to control for its topography and its distance from Beijing, and is populated mainly by the Muslim Uighur ethnic minority. The borders with Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan are becoming geographical "hot spots" that the Chinese government is trying to engage with in a diligent and cooperative way.

Central Asia is considered the world's biggest producer of opium, as well as the focus of heavy production, processing and traffic of opioids and other types of illegal substances. Since drug trafficking is considered a transnational crime, it requires the cooperation of the affected countries in order tackle the issue in a much more efficient way. This is being achieved inside the Asian regional cooperation architecture, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the main framework to work with in Central Asia. The organization has developed tools and has performed some anti drug collective actions, but unfortunately, drug trafficking has not decreased and the new menace of synthetic drugs lures strongly over the region.

This paper will try to examine China's cooperation against drug trafficking in the SCO and to assess the reasons behind the lack of major and visible achievements. The hypothesis suggests that this low success is caused by the limiting structural framework and limited resources of the region and the SCO as an institution; the desire of China to avoid clashes with the other leader of the organization; an apparent contradiction between China's role inside the organization and China's real actions inside the SCO; the prevailing lack of trust inside the group; the influence of regional realities and dynamics; the relative low priority of the drug issue and its subsidiary nature to greater topics such as terrorism; the development of parallel or alternative cooperation mechanisms that overlap or replace the SCO initiatives; the approach and discourse to tackle the biggest drug producer in the area; and the influence of cultural factors and economical elements that hinder the results of cooperation.

The document starts with a brief introduction to the context of the illegal drug issue in Central Asia, showing up the interconnections between drugs, security, terrorism, health and social issues. Then, it describes the main cooperative tools and actions that China and the SCO have developed to address the problem, followed by some recent statistics about anti drug actions and specific information about each Central Asian country. Next, the main difficulties and challenges faced by China's anti drug cooperation in the SCO will be identified. And finally, the paper will make some remarks about China in the SCO, arguing two things: one, that even though countries like China are re-shaping globalization, they are not being full leaders when it comes to global or regional governance, since a Realist influence permeates Chinese diplomacy and international politics;

and two, that the SCO is not living up to the expectations it created 18 years ago, generating some doubts about its real impact in the region.


Contextualizing the illegal drug issue in Central Asia

The Golden Crescent is an area located between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, known for its vast production of illicit opium since the 1950s, but with a global impact since the 1980s, during the invasion of Afghanistan by the Former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Russian Soviet system, the new countries created in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan) had to deal with the problematic issue of the drugs coming from their neighbor Afghanistan, the heart of the Golden Crescent.

Since 1990, the governments of the Central Asian countries have tried to approach cooperation against drug trafficking, taking into account that they all shared intra regional trade, spoke a common language (Russian), had cultural affinities (because of the Russian influence and their own historical links), shared

some ethnic migrations, the borders between them were (and still are) very porous and their law enforcements bodies were (and still are) prone to corruption. All of these features made the drug trafficking of Afghan opioids relatively easy in the region.

MAP 1. Trafficking flows through the northern route in 2010



Source: UNODC 2012

Besides the Afghans, the Tajik drug clans were interested in selling opium and heroin to Europe, so they began using a northern route, instead of the typical drug routes that went through Pakistan and Iran, in part because the Iranian borders were being more tightly controlled. Map 1 summarizes the greater picture of the situation. The growth of drug production in Afghanistan was a response to the increased demand of it in Europe and Russia; and to the poverty of countries like Afghanistan and Tajikistan that pushed many of its citizens to enter the drug production and trade.

Since the problem was focused in Afghanistan, the Central Asian countries were not ready to deal with this new drug consumption, the drug traffic problems and other new issues that emerged like the spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, or the appearance of new synthetic drugs. Some of the raw materials needed to process opium, like natural ephedrine, can be found in Central Asia, pushing the region to have a more active role in the drug production and trafficking businesses.

The region also cultivates its own drugs, although not in the same volumes as in Afghanistan. Illegal opium poppy started to be harvested in Central Asia by the year 1999, in small quantities with crops of less than 10 hectares in size. Surprisingly, it was Kazakhstan, considered the most economically successful and

politically stable of the central Asian countries, the other country that started to have its own illegal drugs production, with 400.000 hectares of cannabis crops by 1999 (Olcott, Udalova 2000: 9).

MAP 2. Drug routes and transportation corridors in Kazakhstan



Source: UNODC 2012

That same year, UNOCD -formerly known as the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP)- had proof of seven land drug routes that went through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. The northern route was managing almost half of the Afghan drugs: almost 50% through Turkmenistan and almost 50% through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with some making their way to the Kirgiz-Tajik border. Turkmenistan has coasts in the Caspian Sea so transportation gets cheaper and faster there. And probably all Kazakhstan is a traffic zone because of the routes that go to Russia and the Caucasus, as it is seen in Map 2.

Between the years 2000 and 2005 the situation in Central Asia got worse. Besides being a transit zone for drug trafficking, the region also became an active consumer of heroin, with one third of the drugs that transited Central Asia being consumed there. Since 1990, Central Asia has had the fastest growth of drug addicts and abusers in the whole world, shifting from hashish to opium and heroin (Olcott, Udalova 2000: 14-15). Having the largest producer in the world right next door made the drugs cheap, with Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan having the highest growing number of drug users in the region.

The drug addiction growth is directly linked to the growth of the trafficking routes through the countries north of Afghanistan; so cooperation on the drug issue in Central Asia should tackle both anti-narcotics efforts and education to reduce drug consumption. In addition to the drug dependency issue, another public health matter surfaced: since 1997, there have been HIV outbreaks in some cities of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan, because of the use of injected drugs (Avert 2016).


The Batken region, between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and populated with people of Uzbek ethnic origins, with links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), has become the “hot spot” where the largest

drug seizures have taken place and where the links between drugs and terrorism appeared for the first time among the five Central Asian states.

The IMU is a major player “in the drug traffic between Afghanistan and Central Asia and is considered the most serious violent non-state actor in the region” (Cornell 2004: 1) and it shows the convergence between Islamic radicalism and organized crime in Central Asia, posing a serious threat to the countries of the region and to neighbors like China. It is very difficult to control all the trucks and vessels that go between Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and the movement of vehicles in the Batken region is particularly big, creating a perfect scenario for the IMU to work relatively undetected and without much problems.

One feature of the illegal drug trafficking issue is that some countries like Turkmenistan do not share enough information; therefore, national statistics of some countries are not reliable and force researchers and institutions to work on projections that have a bigger than average margin of error. Also, most drug-related crimes are not reported to the authorities in many countries, especially in Turkmenistan, making it even more difficult to make assessments.

MAP 3. Heroin Seizures in Central Asia 2010-2011



Source: UNODC 2012

Since 1993, the heroin seizures in Central Asia have increased 30 times, and in 2003, Tajikistan took the fourth place worldwide. There has been an alarming growth in the seizures of heroin between 1995 and 2001: before, they were 3% of all opiate related products seizures, and after it was 90% of the total opiate seizures. Tajikistan has been the Central Asia country with the most captured opiates, with more than

9.000 kg of seized material at the Russian border in 2003, and 5.600 kg of heroin also captured that same year (The Economist 2012), as it can be seen in Map 3.


Turkmenistan is the second “hot spot” for drugs seizures. 4.6 tons of opium were seized there in 1999 and 77% of the heroin captures in Central Asia around that year were carried out in this country. 198 tons of chemicals and precursors for drug processing were seized here between 1995 and 2000. (US Department of State 2016). The country is also very problematic, not only because the number of drug related crimes has increased over the past 15 years, but also because it does not provide much data on drug seizure since the year 2000. However, since 2015 there seems to be a slow change in the country’s attitude, in as much as President Berdimuhamedov has shown more interest in cooperation (more in the bilateral dimension) and has provided some insights about the health dimension of the drug issue in the country, as well as a harder legal stance towards drug offenders.

A common thread that bonded all Central Asian countries by the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, was the inefficiency and inaccuracy of legal tools to punish drug related crimes, in as much as they targeted small individuals and were not focused or applied on larger criminal groups, which are until now difficult to detect. By the 1990s, small criminal groups with particular interests and local influence started to appear all over Central Asia. Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan have small groups trafficking with drugs, whereas in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan there seem to be bigger crime mafias, which are dangerously connected to high level government officials (Peyrouse 2009: 2), showing a trend of corruption that is difficult to fight almost anywhere in the world.

The Central Asian countries that share borders with Afghanistan show active presence of big drug mafias, which have better structure, more discipline, superior strategies, more sophisticated equipment for communication, are better armed and show better signs of sustainability and physical training to evade the authorities and smuggle the drugs successfully. Tactics like distracting, using decoys and misinforming the border guards are very common, and it was only a matter of time for armed clashes to begin along the Afghan border, killing anti drug policemen in the process.

The weapons these drug traffickers started to carry were of mid range scope, which means they can be used for terrorist activities, like antiaircraft rockets, jet shells, tank shells, mines and grenades (OSCE 2002). Besides drugs, the seizure of explosives has also increased over the past two decades along the borders of Afghanistan and its northern Central Asian neighbors.

MAP 4 Drug Routes and Transportation Corridors in Kirgizstan




Source: UNODC 2012

Tajikistan has become a country where drug traffickers confront the law enforcement without any hesitation no matter if it is night or day, and customs like leaving property or people as guarantee to drug traffickers has become quite popular (Engvall 2007: 840), showing the way the drug crime has permeated the daily lives of people in this country and the weakness of its own government to eradicate this type of behavior, which has become part of the grassroots population.

The general picture in Central Asia is that there are not too many big cartels working in the region, but mostly, there are micro groups working at a local level. Since the drug trafficking is a very lucrative business, corruption appears as an important factor that facilitates the drug issue activities in countries like Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, which goes from bribing and covering up the illegal activities on the streets and in the illicit labs, to reselling the drugs that were captured in order to get some profit out of them, tampering legal documents when captured criminals are being prosecuted, staging false crimes and framing innocent people into drug related crimes.

Tajikistan seems to be the poster case for most of the violence and corruption issues that have sprung from the drug trafficking issue. Not only important government officials have been suddenly found with big amounts of drugs, but also its diplomats have been involved in the drug traffic illegal business. In the beginning of the 2000s, the Tajik ambassador to Kazakhstan was twice caught with heroin, as well as the Tajik trade representative. And in 2002, a former Tajik deputy defense minister was sent to jail for using an official military helicopter for drug trafficking purposes (Kusera 2014). These corruption episodes are not exclusive to Tajikistan, and some reports and news show that Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan do not escape this phenomenon.

MAP 5. Drug routes, insecurity and vulnerable sections of the Tajik-Kirgiz Border



Source: UNODC 2012

Cooperative actions against drug trafficking between China and Central Asia, mainly through the SCO

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the main scenario for China-Central Asia Cooperation. Six countries created it in June 2001: China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as a follow up to the Shanghai Five group (that did not include Uzbekistan), which was founded in April 1996, when the members signed an Agreement on Enhancing Trust in the Military Sphere in Border Area. In August 1999, the Shanghai Five adopted the Bishkek Declaration, which mentioned the “Diplomacy of the Silk Road” and focused on economic development, the preservation of peace and stability.

In the Bishkek Declaration, the five countries were quite clear to emphasize the importance of countering terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal migration and other forms of transnational organized crime. They expressed their intention to promote the interaction of relevant agencies from each country, which included consultative meetings and joint activities.

The SCO has China and Russia as leaders, each one with its own vision of the organization: China sees it as a platform towards a diversification of topics for cooperation, while Russia has a more conservative view and prefers to see the SCO as a forum to discuss mainly military issues. The SCO has recently included India and Pakistan as full member states. It has 4 observer states (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia) and 6 dialogue partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey).

It was initially created to address traditional security concerns, specifically what the organization calls the “three devils”: terrorism, separatism and extremism. Nevertheless, it has evolved and grown into other areas of cooperation like economy, culture, education and energy. Non-traditional threats to security are part of its agenda, and the SCO has made efforts to make the Central Asian countries work closer in order to tackle the drug issue.

The SCO has emerged as a cooperative mechanism that has defined illicit drug production and trafficking as serious threats to regional security, international peace and stability. In order to address this issue, the organization has published a few documents to support its statements:

The 2004 Agreement on Cooperation Between the SCO Member States in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors, signed in Tashkent.

The 2005 Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the SCO, signed in Astana.

The 2011 MOU between the SCO and UNODC.

The 2015 Statement by the Heads of the SCO Member States on the Drug Threat.

Since the SCO is quite young and is transitioning from (but not abandoning) the “three devils” to more diversified topics, the approach has been to sign agreements with other organizations to help with the drug issue. The MOU signed between the SCO and UNODC allows the group to develop joint expert analysis and information work, and participate in joint anti drug activities. It also allows SCO representatives to be involved in all activities of UNODC and work in several areas that include global health, safety and security.

The joint work between the SCO and UNODC also involves some efforts with the SCO counterterrorism structure, since the threat of terrorism and violent extremism lingers the region, particularly in areas close to the borders with China. Opium cultivation, production and trafficking has become a funding source of violent groups, therefore the interest of UNODC to work closer with the SCO, in order to tackle the links between drugs and terrorism.

Thanks to UNODC, Central Asia has 13 Border Liaison Offices (BLO) between Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan, and now with Kazakhstan, who joined the programme in 2016. In that year, the UNODC organized 8 training courses to 26 law enforcement officers, 4 operations that led to the capture of 83 kg of drugs, and 3 joint operations in Tajikistan, next to the Afghan border. Also, the region has 9 Port Control Units (PCU) to control and check containers that come and go out of the region (UNODC 2016).

Besides the obvious close collaboration with the UNODC, probably the most important agreement is the one signed between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in October 2007, in order to broaden cooperation on issues like drug trafficking, security and crime, with joint actions plans ready to be discussed by 2008.

The CSTO was founded in 1992 as the Collective Security Treaty, and was renamed in 2003. It is leaded by Russia and was born in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It is focused on the promotion of peace, international and regional security, stability, and collective defense. The CSTO has several already established means for countering threats like drug trafficking, including the activities of specific law enforcement agencies and the collective rapid deployment of forces in Central Asia.

In addition to these two helping organizations, the SCO also relies on the information provided by the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center (CARICC), which is located in Almaty, capital city of Kazakhstan.

Going back to the SCO and the way it handles cooperation against drug trafficking, the organization has a three-tier mechanism to do so. The group makes practical operations, and for some experts, the involvement of the new two members, India and Pakistan, will broaden the organization anti drug potentials and opportunities. Between 2011 and 2017, several special anti-drug operations were done inside the SCO territories, confiscating 160 tons of heroin, 1400 tons of marijuana, 1500 tons of hashish, and 300 tons of opium, which constitutes approximately 38% of the heroin and marijuana, 26% of hashish and 9% of the opium confiscated in Eurasia. These numbers roughly represent 14% of the confiscated drugs worldwide during that period of time; and that is without mentioning the seizure of 75 tons of precursors used in the processing of illegal drugs (Alimov 2017).

Dealing with the drug issue in Central Asia is not just about the traffic routes that pass through the SCO members, or the small production of drugs and materials needed to process opium into heroin. It has to do with Afghanistan, the world's largest producer of opium poppy, and how to contribute to its stabilization and reconstruction. The SCO has expressed clearly its intention to build an anti-drug belt around Afghanistan to fight against drug smuggling; and conduct anti-drug cooperation with Afghanistan using the framework created with the SCO-Afghanistan Liaison Group.

Chinese leaders acknowledge that drug crimes are a major source of money for terrorism and extremism activities. Therefore, fighting against drug trafficking is a way to limit the actions of possible terrorist groups in the region and near the borders with Xinjiang province. The fear of contact between members of the Uighur ethnic minority and this drug dealing groups is a major concern for the Chinese government, in as much as it threatens Chinese internal stability and territorial integrity, which are at the core of its domestic and international politics.

Between 1990 and 2000, the most captured drug by the authorities was opium, between 2003 and 2004 it was heroin, but in the last five years, the trend has shifted towards marihuana and hashish: 4 tons were seized en Central Asia at the beginning of 2017, while the size of the heroin and opium captured in the same period of time was of 1 ton (UNOCD 2017).

The share of cannabis-type drugs in the total amount of drugs seized went from 65% to 90% between 2001 and 2016 (UNODC 2017), coming mainly from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Most of the cannabis seized both in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is of Afghan origin. Afghan cannabis, mostly hashish, reaches Russian drug market through the Northern route, but this statement needs to be verified, since reliable data about afghan cannabis is very little.

The fact that the quantity of heroin seizures in the Russian Federation in the last seven years is higher than the regional seizures made in the Central Asian countries, shows that there are stable suppliers in Central Asia and stable clients in Russia, making the northern route more important and Kazakhstan the only country with visible big organized drug crime groups. By 2005, Kazakhstan reported 14 interconnected organized criminal groups involved in drug trafficking (UNODC 2008: 39).

Some data shows certain progress in the joint actions against drug trafficking, but at the same time poses various uncertainties. For example, the number of reported drug-related offences in Central Asian has decreased steadily since 2010. In 2016, there were almost 13,600 reported offences. However, the share of smuggling offences increased from 4% in 2010 to 9% in 2016, and 46% of the people arrested for drug related crimes were charged for drug trafficking. The number of people arrested for drug-related crimes in Central Asia was decreasing between 2010 and 2015. But In 2016, the number of people arrested increased again, summing up 12,400. (UNODC 2017).

This information can be read in two ways: they could be signs of early success in the joint drug interception operations, or they could be signs that more people are trying to smuggle drugs, meaning that while more people are getting caught smuggling drugs, more people are successfully doing it.

Recent data from each country in Central Asia

In the last few years, there seems to be a trend in most of the Central Asian countries: the volume of heroin seized has slowly decreased. However, experts indicate that this is not directly a result from the SCO's actions against drug trafficking, but more the result of the use of alternative routes by drug traffickers, like through South Asia and the Balkans; as well as the result of bilateral cooperation with the US, and joint work with other organizations like the CSTO, the CIS and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (EAG). In addition to that, there has been a significant increase in the amount synthetic drugs seized, showing that there is a growing demand for these types of substances inside and outside the region.

In Kazakhstan, there has been a little increase in the amount of drug seized: 36.7 metric tons in 2016 compared to 35.9 metric tons in 2015, with more hashish and marihuana but less heroin and opium. The country registered 3657 drug related crimes in 2016, a little bit more than in 2015 (3513); 260 cases of drug smuggling, opposed to the 250 cases registered in 2015; 2213 cases related to drug sales (2160 in 2015); and 50 drug related crimes by organized criminal groups in 2016, a bigger number than in 2015 (21). Kazakhstan performed 30 controlled delivery operations in 2016 (24 in 2015), which included eight in cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, capturing 288 kg of narcotics that included 28 kg of heroin. And in 2016, 201 drug related crimes were committed by law enforcement officers (US Department of State 2017: 200-201).

In Kyrgyzstan, the total amount of illegal drugs seized was 16.18 metric tons in 2016 and 28.18 metric tons in 2015, showing a decrease. Nevertheless, there were 1458 drug related criminal cases in 2016, compared to the 1423 registered in 2015, showing a slight increase and proving that corruption is a problem in the country, in as much as the government does not implement law effectively (US Department of State 2017: 202). Overall, there was a decrease in the detection of drug related crimes and seizures, which could be the result of better smuggling routes and procedures from drug traffickers than of actual results of police enforcement and joint cooperation. The lack of information and the lack of resources from Kyrgyzstan have made cooperation against drug trafficking quite difficult for the SCO, so there is room for a lot of improvement for cooperation and for China to lead those efforts.

Tajikistan captured 3.43 metric tons of illicit drugs in 2016, while in 2015 the number was 4.70 metric tons, showing a decrease. This decrease was significant in opiates and cannabis but there was an increase in the amount of synthetic drugs seized, 19% more than in 2015, with 13.100 tablets of MDMA captured, up from 11.233 in 2015. Heroin seizures declined 82% while opium seizures did the same in 43%. 89 kg of heroin were seized in 2016, while in 2015 the number was 499 kg. Cannabis and hashish seizures dropped 4% and 32%, but the number of marijuana plants seized in 2016 increased 66% compared to 2015 (US Department of State 2017: 257). The decline of plant-based drug traffic is surprising, and the reasons could be better border management, the use of alternate routes by traffickers and the unstable internal situation of Afghanistan. Also UNODC has several programs in Tajikistan and probably they have had some results.

Turkmenistan data is quite scarce and it is only recently that the government began sharing meaningful information. In the first half of 2016, Turkmen authorities seized 174.2 kg of illicit drugs, which was less than in the first six months of 2015 (195,8 kg), being opium the most seized drug captured. There is no

evidence of synthetic drug production in the country and only three groups of organized crime were arrested and followed by the local media (US Department of State 2017: 276). The new president of the republic seems to be more opened for better international cooperation against drug trafficking, but since the country is not a member of the SCO, the door is opened for the US to improve its bilateral engagement. Perhaps the SCO can find a window to approach the country through the UNODC and the CARICC.

Finally, Uzbekistan has a very porous border with Afghanistan, making it very vulnerable to drug trafficking. The country is not a big producer of illicit drugs, and in 2015 uncovered 1.049 cases of illegal drug cultivation. In the first half of 2016, the government captured 196.1 kg of marijuana, 957.7 kg of opium, 282.5 kg of hashish and 88.9 kg of heroin. Compared to the first half of 2015, there was a huge increase in the amount of seized opium, which was of 565 kg (US Department of State 2017: 284). The country is also worried about the traffic of synthetic drugs, which could be a specific issue that the SCO and China could address in order to improve anti drug cooperation.

Difficulties and Challenges experienced in China's Cooperation against Drug Trafficking inside the SCO

Not enough information shared (or available)

Since the re-branding of the organization happened not so long ago, it is quite understandable that some results have not been achieved, especially in specific areas like cooperation against drug trafficking. However, when doing research and looking for sources, it was very surprising to see that the organization discloses to the public only a few statements, press releases, joint communiqués and agreements per year. 2015 was the year with the most amount of official documents released (9) and looking at every year since 2001, the average of documents published is around 5. This situation has drawn some criticism towards the SCO, with experts saying that the organization is not as efficient as it wants to be seen, and only releases certain data in the topics that are the priority, which are terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Nevertheless, this lack of information may not be entirely the SCOs fault, since it seems to be a trend that many countries in Central Asia follow, so the organization cannot publish much information because it does not have enough resources from its member states. And there is the matter of Turkmenistan, a country that is not part of the SCO and until recently has refused to share data about illicit drugs to any other international organization. Informal evidence can be found in every Central Asian country, but they cannot be completely trusted or used for official purposes. The countries are more focused on policing small businesses and individuals, which most of the times are not involved in the illegal drug trafficking. The only country where data about organized crime is available is Kazakhstan, providing more specific information about drug related crimes, drug smuggling cases and drug sales cases, among other particular items.

This is not a good situation for China, who wants to engage better in world affairs and embrace her new responsibilities as a regional leader and economic power. If China wants better engagement with the Central Asian and wants to show the world the success of the SCO, it needs to encourage the publication of more official documents, and the sharing of information among its members.

Article 4 of the Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors states that all members should share information to fight the drug issue, but the reality shows that this paragraph is not enforced, since all countries are free to share what they want.

And there is also the fact that countries like Uzbekistan are members of the CARICC, work with the UNODC and with the EU; however, cooperation is focused on programs rather than operational activities or intelligence exchanges.

Over-reliance on the UNOCD in drug issues

This lack of direct information confirms the fact that China and the SCO need extra help to deal with the drug trafficking issue. The SCO proposed some areas of cooperation in the Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and Precursors:

Analyzing the crime related to illicit trafficking of narcotics and their precursors;

Establishing strict control over the circulation of narcotics and their precursors;

Exercising agreed measures to implement the provision of the conventions and other international treaties aimed at combating illicit trafficking of narcotics and their precursors;

Organizing the cooperation between the competent authorities of the Parties in fighting against illicit trafficking of narcotics and precursors;

Developing joint programs to counter drug addiction and illicit trafficking of narcotics and precursors;

Improving the legal basis for the cooperation among the Parties in fighting against illicit trafficking of narcotics and precursors; harmonizing national legislation in this field in line with international treaties;

Preventing drug addiction; developing and utilizing new methods of treatment, social and medical rehabilitation of drug addicts;

Banning propaganda and advertising promoting the spread of drug addiction.

However, the organization has not developed the mechanisms to achieve all these points. For now, the SCO is focused on basic seizing and capturing activities, and the rest of the points depend on the joint work with the UNODC. Practically all of the information concerning drug production and traffic in Central Asia comes from the US Department of State and UNODC, not from the SCO. And all the programs related to the areas proposed in the Agreement come from the UNODC as well.

The SCO needs the resources, expertise and already established anti drug structures of the UNODC. The MOU between both organizations opens the door for this Central Asian organization to learn procedures and techniques from the best possible source. But this should not be done for a very long time. It has been 14 years since the Agreement related specifically to drugs was signed, and most of its principles and ideas still cannot be carried out by the SCO itself.

China seems to be fine with the situation, probably for several reasons. One, she can focus on other areas of cooperation like trade, military and energy, which are at the top of the priorities and are more inline with main components of its grand diplomatic strategy, like maintaining its internal stability and expanding its comprehensive national power.

Two, China does not want engage deeply in the drug issue since dealing with Afghanistan is too complicated and requires a lot of time, investment, coordination with the SCO members and other actors involved in the region, as well as research. Three, China wants to learn more from the experience and resources of the UNODC so it wants to stretch the MOU as long as possible.

For some experts, over-reliance on external institutions to fulfill the group's principles is a sign that the SCO has failed to project the image of an effective regional organization and is seen more as a discussion forum to promote confidence and good relations among neighbors.

However, from another perspective, it can also be said that there seems to be an asymmetrical mutual need between the SCO and UNODC. The SCO needs the tremendous expertise and structures of UNODC, but in order to do the job better (sometimes in hostile environments) UNODC needs the security structures that the SCO has developed over the past 17 years. Who needs more of who? Probably the SCO needs more on the UNODC; however, depending on the context and specific situations, UNODC can also see its job compromised if it does not have the help of the local actors of the SCO.

Afghanistan is not in the top priorities

The SCO has the potential to play an important role in Afghanistan's reconstruction and recuperation. This country's stability is a major challenge for the whole international community. But in order to do that, the group's focus should partially shift from economic, trade and traditional security issues in the Eurasian region, and put its eyes in Afghanistan, something that might not happen at least in the short term.

Since 2008, the organization has announced some commitments towards the Afghan issue; however, its economic limitations, structure and budgetary restrictions limit its engagement with Afghanistan. Russia and China still prefer to handle Afghanistan from a bilateral approach, being Russia the leader who is most involved with the Afghans and has more input in the drug trafficking issue inside that country.

The SCO-Afghanistan Liaison group was established in 2005 in order to draft recommendations and proposals on SCO-Afghanistan cooperation in areas of mutual concern. However, this group seems to have a more nominal task than anything else. The desire to a better engagement with Afghanistan has not transcended the realm of words inside the SCO. Unless something really strong happens with Afghanistan, China will not push better initiatives inside the SCO.

Very low levels of trust

Turkmenistan is not part of the SCO and does not share much information about drug trafficking to other organizations. Uzbekistan seems to limit its cooperation on programs rather than operational activities or intelligence exchanges. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan seem to work better and more with the US and UNODC than with the SCO. That leaves only Kazakhstan as a significant example of cooperation with the SCO. If some of the members prefer to work with other organizations and in a bilateral level, the whole chain of trust of the group is affected. It seems that most members of the SCO have a hard time when it comes to exchange information about external threats or new technologies.

Russia is very aware of the Chinese growing influence at the international and regional arenas, and this has led to discussions inside the group that show how mistrust is gaining strength. Since the SCO wants to create a good neighborhood environment, these signs of low levels of trust do not play well for the organization itself and for China, as a leader who is having a difficult time bringing together all the countries involved.

Cultural and sovereignty factors

Inside Central Asia there are two cultures that are very different from the Buddhist or the Chinese ones: The Russian culture in public life and the Muslim Culture in religious, public and private lives. First of all, there is a recognizable cultural influence of Russia in the region, as a legacy that goes beyond the Soviet times, and makes Russian a more common language of use than Chinese.

Russia seems to have a better cultural advantage as a leader inside the SCO, in as much as many of the citizens from all member countries are bilingual in their local languages and Russian. The exposure to the language gives also an exposure to culture, and Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kirgiz and Tajiks develop a more natural acceptance to the Russian values and ways of being than to the Chinese. Kazakhstan is probably the country that showcases slightly more Russian features in its culture, since it inherited most of the good infrastructure from the Soviet Union times.

On the other hand, Islam is the most widespread religion in Central Asia, and its costumes are inevitably present in all spheres of life. China's relations with Muslim countries are good, but the situation of the Muslim minorities inside the country has been a matter of discussion outside of China, taking into account that the Chinese Government needed to apply some legitimate preventive laws and norms in the western Xinjiang Province, which shares borders with most of the Central Asian countries and where most of the Muslim population in China lives.

Since many Uighurs have connections on the other side of the border and some of the population of Xinjiang has Tajik, Kirgiz and Kazak ancestry, China is concerned that civil unrest might be sparked and sponsored by individuals and illegal activities coming from those countries.

It can be said that culture is both a barrier for a better approach between China and the other SCO members, but also one of the reasons why China is engaging Central Asia and trying to have a leadership position inside the SCO, to keep an eye on a very complex area of the world that has cultural links with people inside her territory.

Sovereignty is also an important element that is supposed to unite the members of the SCO, since China promotes the respect of national sovereignty above all things. However, sovereignty is also keeping the SCO to go beyond rhetoric because its members sometimes choose not to share information or join an activity that could benefit them all, for national interest reasons. This applies to all members of the group, since national interest seems to be one of the main drivers of every country's international politics.

Central Asian countries are relatively new, and their feelings towards sovereignty might still be too strong, particularly after being part of the Soviet Union and experiencing disadvantages during those times. Their engagement to the SCO could be merely symbolic, and the few war games and military drills that the organization performs could be seen more as a platform for their sovereignty and pride as independent states, no matter how corrupt or poor or untrusting they are.

Functional restraints and lack of capital

The structure of the SCO is probably one of the main constraints to cooperation against drug trafficking. It is composed by the following main bodies: the Heads of State Council, the Heads of Government Council, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of National Coordinators, the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), the SCO Secretariat, the Business Council, and the SCO Interbank Consortium (SCO IBC). The most important bodies are the Heads of State and Business Councils, the RATS, and the SCOIBC. There is no body or sub-body specifically designed for the drug traffic issue, so there is no official way to directly promote the topic but through one of the main bodies.

Next to this structural issue, there is the visible problem of funding the SCO budget. Finding an exact number is quite difficult, but the annual budget of the organization could be on the range of 3-4 million USD, and from those, 50% or more goes to the Secretariat and the rest to the other permanent bodies, being the RATS the one with a priority.

This situation poses very practical limitations in the overall capacity of the organization. With such a small budget not so many things can be done, and considering that more than half of it goes to basic operational expenses, the real impact of the SCO is quite little. The multilateral exercises and military drills do not reflect the capacity of the SCO to guarantee security, and the low numbers of drug seizures led by the SCO only show that there are not enough resources to tackle the issue properly and without the help of the UNOCD.

Terrorism first, drugs second (or even third)

Drug trafficking is mentioned briefly in a handful of official documents of the SCO, but it is only the main topic of two of them (three if one counts the MOU between the SCO and UNODC). Drug trafficking is attached to the terrorism topic; therefore the drug issue tends to be overshadowed most of the times. It seems to be that drug trafficking, despite being a big problem, ends up being a “subsidiary issue”.

Since the UNODC is the one that handles the real cooperative actions against drug trafficking, the SCO focuses its more tangible efforts in economic, cultural and energy cooperation, topics that are much more urgent to China in the context of the One Belt One Road Initiative.

The SCO does not have the capacity to engage the issue in an efficient way, so the presence of the UNODC is more than welcomed. But the over-reliance on this organization might be affecting the perception of the SCO and China towards one part of Central Asia's truth. Drug trafficking is a reality in Central Asia and the SCO should be already dealing with it in its own way, adapting what they have already learned from other cases and institutions.

China's role as a leader in the SCO: is it real?

Why China, as a leader, is not investing more in the SCO general budget? Why is China not engaging more in the cooperation against drug trafficking? First, China's most ambitious plan, the One Belt One Road Initiative, demands a lot of its diplomatic and political attention, as well as an enormous amount of economic and financial resources. If one thinks that more investment means more engagement, China is not showing real signs of leadership in the group beyond the words and the rhetoric that comes with the meetings and joint communications.

The SCO has achieved some milestones, like attenuating border tensions, establishing procedural mechanisms of cooperation and developing a common discourse against terrorism, separatism and extremism. But bigger concrete actions are yet to be seen and the organization is on the verge of being perceived just as another discussion forum to promote confidence and good relations. It seems that the SCO has developed itself more as a platform for China, Russia and the rest of Central Asian countries, to preserve the status quo by accommodating the ambitions of the two bigger regional powers.

Since there is another regional power co-leading the organization, China perhaps feels that the financial burden should rely more in the hands of Russia, taking into account that all the Central Asian countries have historical, cultural and political ties with Moscow even after their independence 18 years ago. Since cooperation in drug trafficking seems to be quite immature and cooperation in military issues seems to be very complicated, China's option is pursuing more economic and cultural exchanges.

Since leadership inside the SCO has come with some difficulties, China has opted to work with some of the SCO members inside a different tool: a four party mechanism for consultations on security matters, which includes China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Russia is not present, but three important countries

in the drug trafficking issue are participating. This parallel mechanism could bring new opportunities for anti drug cooperation and it would be ideal that in the future, it could be adapted by the SCO.

It is a little bit ironic that China could actually display better leading actions, but prefers not to do it, probably because it does not fit her interests in this particular moment, or because it does not have the capabilities to do so, especially in the drug trafficking issue. For now, there is no official evidence of big amounts of Central Asian drugs going inside Chinese territory, and the precursors and chemicals needed to process heroin are brought mainly from Russia; so China does not see the urgency to engage deeper in the drug issue in Central Asia yet. Nevertheless, information is quite limited and the geographical area is too big and difficult to control thoroughly.

Or perhaps because she does not want to have unnecessary clashes with Russia, which can affect her interests in other topics and scenarios like the UN.

Russia

The SCO seems to be the perfect place for China and Russia to converge. The documents and statements released by the organization mention many areas of cooperation and joint work. But the slow pace of implementation of these proposals could be the proof that such convergence is not happening.

China's and Russia's interests align in the macro topic of the "three evils" and in the creation of the RATS, as well as in the construction of oil pipes from Central Asia to Mainland China. But many things beyond them have not met the same welcoming. A free trade zone raised the fears of every country to be flooded by Chinese goods and products. The regional bank was highly supported by China but not Russia, who put forward many conditions that China did not approve; therefore China moved on to bilateral credits with most of the Central Asian countries. And China only accepted the entrance of India in the SCO if Moscow accepted the entrance of Pakistan, their respective allies in South Asia Subcontinent.

Russia seems to not have overcome its fears about the rise of China and its growing influence inside Russia's traditional zone of interest. So, the slowness and limitations of the SCO could be purposely encouraged by Moscow, in order to control the influence of China in Central Asia. Russia even has proposed a partnership called "Greater Eurasia" in order to balance or limit the scope of the One Belt One Road and the New Silk Road initiatives.

Conclusions

As a type of transnational crime, drug trafficking requires cooperation from the countries affected by it. However, achieving cooperation is not a simple process. Looking at cooperation against drug trafficking inside the SCO, China seems to be following mainly what scholars would call Neo Classical Realist behavior, with some Liberal and Institutionalist attributes.

Cooperation against drug trafficking in the SCO has been difficult to implement and maintain; depends on each country's will to engage; is influenced by domestic factors from each member country, as well as by systemic variables in the region; and is vulnerable to perceptions and misperceptions. But in the end, it still aims for overall stability inside the whole region.

Unfortunately, this cooperation has not been entirely successful. In spite of all the good intentions and the ideas proposed in the organization's joint declarations, their execution and implementation has found both internal and external factors that have forced China not to quit cooperation in the drug trafficking issue, but to adapt it to the conditions.

It seems that cooperation against drug trafficking is still quite primitive inside the SCO, compared to other neighboring areas like South East Asia and with other organizations like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The SCO is an interesting cooperation framework, but it might be losing momentum and the internal struggles between China and Russia have taken a toll on the organization, making it less operational than it was expected a decade ago. For China, cooperating on such a complex topic has not been easy and the outcomes have fallen short when compared to the urgency that such an issue generates.

China has shown the will to cooperate and to be part of a regional cooperation structure, but its realist tendencies and national strategic interests inevitably surface and push for a different dynamic. China's apparent passive leadership in the SCO shows that the country is re-shaping but not entirely leading global and regional governance trends, following a pragmatic way of cooperation: choosing where to engage more, in which topics and with whom.

As for the SCO, when it was founded, it seemed to be a good place for convergence and a new alternative to old cooperation mechanisms. But after 18 years, the group's ambitious proposals have not been implemented properly and more critics are pointing out the defects of a once promising organization.

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LANGUAGE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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RIR7013.YK 2017 Conflict analyses: Approaches and Cases

Course paper, Fall 2017

Abstract

The human mind has its limitations; therefore, the Artificial Intelligence (AI) helps in conflict resolution. The role of language in conflict resolution is more than commonly spoken language. Good knowledge of English language does not help the negotiations if the cultural understanding of words is different. In order to be successful in negotiations, language as a wider concept helps to understand the social nuances. Across languages and cultures, the balance between spoken language and cultural behaviour go hand in hand. In this analysis, AI is as an important communication tool to communicate with different parties of the conflict. As a case study, Hebrew language is analysed using the artificial intelligence system cogSolv to understand how people from other groups see the world. With the knowledge of the real world and stimulating reactions, it is possible to find negotiation win-wins, enhance the outcome, and avoid language-based offenses.

Keywords: language, artificial intelligence, linguistic communication, Hebrew, conflict resolution

Introduction

"Language and culture are inseparable; language reflects culture and culture is reproduced by language". (Cohen, 2001, p. 29) Future and the world are of our making, and for those purposes, we need understanding of the world using artificial intelligence to process and save information using algorithms. Should we be afraid of artificial intelligence? With the help of Artificial Intelligence (AI), it is possible to find balanced understanding of linguistic communication. If human mind is not large enough to process and store information, the AI helps us how to get along better with each other.

In this paper, the focus is on the spoken general language how to understand each other better linguistically. Words meanings are different for people, even for same language speakers. A quote from Professor Timo Honkela (2017) why we need artificial intelligence to build a common ground: "These tools help us to communicate and understand discussion and bring harmony and understanding. It takes hundred years to demilitarise nations and to take steps towards better mutual understanding. In the future, we could put people to negotiate among themselves and unite the talk" (Honkela, 2017)

Humankind through technological evolution will divide power and not only world leaders negotiate but citizens who are affected by the conflict. Goals in Honkela's Artificial Intelligence testament are world peace, understanding between people, emotions and economic aspects. Linguistic misunderstandings happen when the common language's nuances are not known well enough causing the mutual understanding to suffer. Analysis starts with the understanding of speech and how language is used in conflict communication moving on to words and different meanings. As a case study, Hebrew language is being analysed from negotiation point of view. A native speaker checks all Hebrew words and references.

In conclusion, linguistic understanding is important and seeing beyond the spoken words, technological advances are giving more opportunities to understand each other and strive for peaceful existence.

1. War of words

In this chapter, the role of spoken language is the main aspect in a conflict resolution. Being linguistically talented and fluent in several languages is in many societies a common skill. Commonly spoken English is not enough to be successful in negotiations and interpreting the world from its linguistic viewpoint. Could the computer language become the new lingua franca? Algorithms that are sensitive enough to interpret not only the language but also cultural behaviour and tone of speech. First, to define conflict resolution, according to Manning (2011):"It can be argued that conflict has its origins in objective and subjective causes such as competition for external resources (e.g. power, land or status) or it can arise when there is a clash between the internal beliefs, values, and interests of two parties". (Manning, 2011, p.2) Parties pursue to resolve the conflict for example by engaging in legal action, mediation and negotiation. In this research paper, the conflict in question has linguistic problems and with the help of advanced artificial intelligence system, the dispute is possible to resolve. Mediator is an English-speaker and one of the conflict party is a Hebrew-speaker. With the non-violent process, it gives the opposing parties an opportunity to resolve their differences collaboratively. (Manning, 2011, p. 4) Moving on from conflict resolution to a definition of artificial intelligence.

The creation of intelligent machines that work like humans, AI is an area of computer science that include for example problem solving, learning and planning. Machine learning without supervision is making the use of AI a tempting tool in conflict resolution since machines can often act and react like humans (Techopedia). The machine learns from examples, rather than being explicitly programmed for a particular outcome. Do computers learn faster than humans do? Can intelligent machines have inside information about language or use of language in the cultural context without help of translators and fixers? If AI were able to think like a human, it would need to have feelings and associate words to a memory. Especially

with Hebrew, the machine would learn words from Biblical Hebrew, words that have a different meaning in the Modern Hebrew. Coding of words from dictionary requires also knowledge of historical background and level of importance in use of military language or in negotiations.

This is an important break from previous practice. For most of the past 50 years, advances in information technology and its applications have focused on codifying existing knowledge and procedures and embedding them in machines. (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2017) The Artificial Intelligence is more than a dictionary, translator or a native speaker working as a fixer. AI is the next step of linguistic development because it is more adjustable learner than human, since robot never gets tired or needs to eat to continue. Still, the area of computer science still needs humans to develop it and like to a child, speak as much as possible in order to teach a new language.

What is the role of spoken language in a negotiation stage? Without commonly spoken language, the conflict resolution would fail. The sensitivity of AI helps to interpret the nuances of different languages and to be prepared to different outcomes of debates. Definitely, AI system has the potential to become the new lingua franca if it provides its users simple user methods. To speak fluent computer language would be the future scenario of negotiations, there would be no need for old-fashioned communication and misunderstandings.

In conclusion, in order to have a successful communication with conflict parties, the change of commonly understood words among participants is vital. The Artificial Intelligence is neutral, knowledgeable and works as an icebreaker. Next, how words have a different commonly understood meaning from the original environment.

For my security

Words are easily adapted from one language to common speech all over the world, forgetting the language restrictions. From Besserwisser to Nazi, words start to live a new life in a different concept and possibly carry a historical meaning. To some extent, in Middle Eastern languages all words have a root in one combination of letters or sounds. If Google translator is untrustworthy, how could any other man made machine become more talented and better programed in interpreting a language? In sum, the Hebrew language in negotiations is influenced by biblical terms; it shares common features with other Middle Eastern languages. Words with double meaning can be difficult to relate as an English-speaker.

How Hebrew words can be interpret in negotiations is analysed on the third chapter. Having a war of words, I will concentrate on key words in negotiation such as peace, negotiating position and mediator. Next, Modern Hebrew and Biblical Hebrew influence the words used in negotiation. According to Cohen (2001 a): "How we negotiate is influenced by our understanding of what "concession", "compromise" and other key terms imply". It takes more than language understanding to understand the conflicts in the Middle East; however, Cohen is makes a valid point with the key terms he is using in his examples. If it takes an AI to introduce the key terms and historical roots of words in Hebrew to a negotiator, then creating an AI system meant for Middle Eastern conflict makes sense.

In conflict resolution, the communication is among conflict participants whom have different approaches to the key words used in negotiation. For example, in Hebrew, the word for negotiating position, emda (or amda), is the same as that for a fortified outpost or "stand," as in "Custer's last stand". (Cohen, 2001, p. 42) This word needed double-checking since it was lost in English translation of the first vocal, since amda

is pillar in biblical meaning. In Passover song Vehi Sheamda (Alesky), in Hebrew **והיא שעמדה**, has the meaning of standing. In my opinion, one of the main problems with Hebrew is finding the word's root and how it is spelled with correct vocals. Can the AI find a transliterated word that is not in its original root

form of two or three 'consonants'? Even the previously mentioned word emda needs five-minute long explanation of its meaning and origin. Some other words mentioned by Cohen (2001, p. 42) are bitachon, meaning both "security" and "certainty," is a supreme national shibboleth, presumably because of past persecution and continuous vulnerability and "Minister of defence" translates into Hebrew as "minister of bitachon" (security). In sum, words like emda and bitachon are easier for an Arabic-speaker to understand and relate to the multiple meaning than an English-speaker.

With Cohen's examples, the comparison is missing and the use of selected words is simplistic. As he has summarised on etymological way, for example for "solution," Hebrew has the Biblical word pitaron and in Biblical Hebrew, pitaron means the interpretation of a dream, as in the story of Joseph at Pharaoh's court. (Cohen, 2001, p. 42) It seems he has chosen the most historically complexed words in his study and it creates an image of a much wider linguistic understanding gap between Hebrew and English speakers. In conclusion, the language used in conflict resolution is important and to use direct translations without knowing the linguistic history is difficult. Having a simplistic and general view on a language, excludes the natural grow and adaption to outside influences of a spoken language. In my opinion, the generalising approach to any language is the wrong way to interpret linguistic meanings. Next, to the new methods the AI is providing.

2. New solutions to old problems

In this chapter, the power of AI is needed to use the power of accurate, culturally aware to understand and reason about. AI methods have developed from techniques in military defence to conflict resolution. Is it possible to use programming in conflict negotiations and develop from contributing to avoiding wars?

It provides new methods for preventing and calculating possibilities for solutions. "To deeply dive into human data; it seems possible we could understand others more profoundly. We find new solutions to problems that have eluded us in the past". (Olsher, 2015, p. 291) Conflicts are different from each other and past outcomes are adjusted to the then present time and environment. Even with more sensitive AI such as Olsher's Artificial Intelligence cogSolv (Olsher, 2016), the previous data from conflicts is not based on the same interests that scientists now have. The focus on previous conflicts were less on linguistic and behavioural aspects than it is now. Does it mean that now this generation knows how to find keys to peace? If we become more sensitive with the use of language, is win-win situation closer? To find new solutions to old problems sounds too good to be true. To interpret language as part of society's bigger environment, data should be gathered from culture, beliefs and values that have made the language in question richer in use. Next, the role of AI from replacing battlefield soldiers to soft approach of conflict negotiations.

Humans with their expectations

In this chapter, we have a deep desire for peace and AI is our last hope. The expectations of negotiators are clashing since there is no efficient communication and humans, unlike machines, have fear of losing. People need high expectations of the future development of technology in order to become interested of changing the familiar pattern.

As the term artificial intelligence is middle age, predictions of its power and capability have created an improving tool. In 1957, the economist Herbert Simon predicted that computers would beat humans at chess in ten years, an achievement that actually took 40 years. (Bjornjofsson and McAfee, 2017) In my opinion, it will take as long for an AI system to become efficient in conflict resolution tool. Nevertheless,

what can AI do today and how has it developed to help humans in their knowhow field: language and communication. As Honkela (2017) with his future predictions of understanding between people, economic balance and harmony, seem futuristic expectations from a science fiction movie. One could argue that he as an Artificial Intelligence expert is ahead of his time. Are AI related goals real-world objects and processes like Olsher (2016) comments: "the traditional approaches to AI have been unable to model nuanced, holistic, imprecise data such as the nature of real-world objects/processes, cultures, beliefs, values, needs, and goals to be able to fully meet this potential". No matter what are the expectations of state heads, army leaders or citizens, the lack of AI users will slow the technological advantage process down. Robotics need users and developers in order to function properly, and conflicts to test the ideas of conflict resolution. To change the role of robotics from non-speaking to human-like one seems like a big leap. Robots would have a voice and knowledge of a language beyond any other participant.

According to Trappi (2006), the previous role of AI was mainly aimed at replacing soldiers in battlefields and at improving military decisions. Having two sides with the same linguistic capability to communicate and make a stand, would be the modern way of warfare. Opposing sides would have the same 'weapons', words with common meaning, and 'battlefield', the AI system. Due to lack of communication, proper words and understanding, the conflict resolution needs an efficient solution to the existing communication problem. When opposing sides are unprepared to the conflict negotiations or expect different kind of content, the traditional AI systems were not able to sense the expectations. Traditional AI systems often utilize statistical analytics that only generate correlations and do not address or support cause and effect, cannot address situations that are not pre-programmed or use knowledge in unanticipated ways, and do not support cultural sensitivities. (Olsher, 2016) Humans with their high expectations are still needed in the process of conflict resolution, with or without the help of AI. As long as there are humans, there are also differences in opinions, historical disputes and other conflict situations to solve. We have to learn from our past mistakes and successful outcomes to develop modern AI system to advance the peace negotiations.

In summary, as a part of learning process, the traditional AI systems concentrate on the algorithms and past conflicts' outcomes, developers and scientists use the previous data to analyse future outcomes. Artificial Intelligence capabilities provide decision-makers with critical tools for making socially nuanced life-or-death decisions. (Olsher, 2015, p. 284) Modern AI should be more than a dictionary or an efficient conflict mediator with cultural knowledge. Next, to the conclusions and recommendations of conflict resolution with the help of an AI in Hebrew language.

3. Shalom (Conclusions)

In this chapter, using the AI system cogSolv's idea of positive and negative words, Hebrew is used as an example language (see 'word clouds' on images 1 and 2). In the word cloud 2, the key terms to understand during negotiation are the semantic definitions of peace, commonly used synonyms of leaders and historical associations. In this chapter, the Hebrew term peace is widely understood and reflects how complicated the peace negotiations are in the Middle East.

Across languages, these spreads of meaning occupy different semantic fields, though they may well coincide and overlap in certain places. Speakers of Hebrew and English may talk of "peace", using the word in appropriate contexts, and referring to the same legal precedents. However, what they mean by peace depends on the definition of the word; "peace" refers in English freedom from war and violence. (Cambridge Dictionary) Hebrew word for common greeting "Shalom" shares in the Biblical vision of

universal accord but lacks the legal features that "peace" acquired in the European state system from centuries of diplomatic practice; shalom importantly means "health, welfare, greetings, and safety". (Cohen, 2001 a) In addition, in context of location, the "be" (in) with "shalom" means safe and sound, not the location of peace. "The common Israeli army bulletin broadcast after a military operation: "All our planes returned b'shalom to base". (Cohen, 2001 a) Peace, as example words mentioned earlier in this study reflect the conflict in languages when translating word by word. The meaning is more important than finding the corresponding word in another language. A skilled translator is someone who is able to translate the meaning in culturally and linguistically correct.

In this last chapter, the conclusions are that the use of an AI is an exciting new method in conflict resolution; it is based on the linguistic challenges between English language and Middle Eastern languages (Farsi, Turkish, Arabic and Hebrew). It is not necessarily the salvation of negotiations since it still technologically being developed and unknown method in conflict resolution.

Up in the clouds

Next, I will create a word cloud to present the negative and positive negotiation words in Hebrew. Language as a useful tool can be used in a cloud form, as an example is cogSolv system and its Deep MindMaps (Olsher, 2015, p. 285), it include aspects of US, Chinese, and Iranian cultures, African conflict

and peacekeeping models, Corporate Social Responsibility and HIV prevention.

**Linking Of Development Assistance
Colonialism Masculinity
Human Rights Discourse
Empathy Justice
Christianity Local Dignity
Tolerance Religion
Equality Outsider Interference
Christian Values
Local Cultures**

Newly developed system for field users is attractive because it was logical and similar to mind map concept. In conflict contexts, conflict models provide a simple means of informing the system about the specific content of the conflict at hand. (Olsher, 2015, p. 285) Words used in Deep MindMaps are in general emotionally charged and do not tell anything new about the conflict in question. As a first step towards a peace-negotiating robot, this system is creative and sees the world from the

language's point of view.

Image 1: In this example from an African conflict, 'word clouds' are shown with concepts in red and green text. Red-coloured text indicates concepts that have negative energy, and green-coloured text the reverse. Words are sized in proportion to the energy they have received (Olsher, 2015, p. 287, 290).

Next, to the second image of Hebrew words and words related to Israeli culture. In this example, I am trying to implement the positive and negative word associations that certain words have. On purpose, the word cloud is small and has translations since the idea is that a user can quickly learn the new words. It is good to have some key points before entering a heated debate or negotiation with a Hebrew-speaker, but I am hesitant that this concept of word cloud would provide necessary information about the language and culture.

Problems with conflict content and narrowing the issues at hand into few relatable words is challenging. It was difficult not to make my example look like a dictionary and it is bilingual word cloud, since some words need the original version to have a better understanding. When trying to decide the goodness and

badness of words, I realised that concept of good and bad is culturally bound and these colours reflect my visions of Hebrew and peace. In conclusion, word clouds are sensitive to political and cultural changes and should be used only in specific cases. If a conflict resolution would be a negotiation with workshop situation, then this tool would be perfect to reflect conflict opponents' languages. It highlights the cultural thinking of good and bad, having deeper meaning of mediation and communication in the group.

pitaron (solution) **Trump** **bitachon** (security)

emda (position) **shalom Judaism** **Social identity**

Medinat Jisra'el (state of Israel) **sarar** (rule)

language l'fanot (evict) **here there Racism**

tachlis (attitude) **After Netanyahu**

Image 2: In this imaginary example from a conflict with Israel, words used are from my knowledge of Hebrew and comments from a Hebrew teacher. The idea behind social identity is the way Israelis see different Hebrew speakers and dialects. Hebrew-speakers with Russian origin (and often with heavy accent) seem to be in my opinion not respected. If mediators are Americans who speak Hebrew or can use individual words, then 'social identity' would be a positive word and they would be respected for their linguistic knowledge. Here-there –thinking reflects the 'we versus them' thinking and is on the same level with racism. The root concept in Hebrew is in the origin of (state of) Israel, as verb 'to rule' has the same root than the modern 'Israel'.

Next, to the end conclusions.

Lost in translation

When languages are in conflict, the mutual understanding of negotiating parties is difficult. In order to have a successful communication, the linguistic communication is crucial. Non-violent methods of conflict resolution, according to Adejimola (2009), includes communication and the use of language. It seems that verbal communication and the use of language in negotiations is a neglected research area. When comparing Adejimola's language as a non-violent method to warfare, it is none physically violent method. I disagree it being a non-violent method since language has the ability to move on from war of words to battlefields. Technological advances help in communication and especially in understanding of symbolic meanings. According to Cohen (2001), communal life is possible when members of community have shared meanings of the world; the mother tongue is the main communication tool. Other systems of symbolic meanings are religion, popular culture and nonverbal behaviour. (Cohen, 2001, p. 26) Negotiation skills and equitable language skills do not necessarily go hand in hand. Human error in language translating and data gathering is understandable, extra memory space is needed in the form of an AI system.

In conclusion, to the case study of Hebrew language in conflict resolution, due to the religious aspect words have a deeper meaning than in English. If a Hebrew speaking negotiator is excluded from the conflict discussions due to poor level of foreign language, an AI system could provide the needed aid. In my opinion, different characters and opinions clash more than languages; therefore, in a discussion situation no AI can save the poor communication among people. Computer systems do not replace negotiators and people who are disagreeing because conflicts are between actual living people. The use and development of any AI system should be used as a tool in conflict resolution, not as a technologically advanced soldier.

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Image 1 (Olsher, 2015, p. 287, 290)

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INDONESIA'S ROLE IN THE FIRST CONCENTRIC CIRCLE OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY, THE ASEAN

MÁTÉ SZAKÁLI

Prioritization in Indonesian foreign policy is defined mainly by geography, and best articulated in the "concentric circles" approach that bases the importance of countries on their geographical proximity. Jakarta accords a higher priority to relations with countries closest to its own national boundaries, primarily for political and security reasons, yet economic considerations have become increasingly important. Countries with similar importance are grouped into the same concentric circles which are, in turn, put into hierarchical order. The first concentric circle is Southeast Asia, the home region of Indonesia, consisting of the 10 countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Due to its large population, strategic position and natural resources Indonesia has often been discussed as the natural leader of ASEAN. This characterization of Indonesia as de facto leader of the Association has been traditionally accepted both in policy circles as well as in the academic literature. The recurrent concepts of "ASEAN centrality" and ASEAN being the "cornerstone" of Indonesian foreign policy have been used by Indonesian policy-makers and academics to shape the understanding of Indonesia's role in ASEAN, domestically and internationally. Consequently, parallel to the country feeling entitled to a position of leadership, Indonesia has generally been recognized by the other ASEAN members as first among equals.

Obviously, Indonesian foreign policies have reflected an intention to shape the organization in a manner most ideal for the country's interest. The current Jokowi presidency (2014-), however, has taken a broader than ASEAN regional view in its foreign policy spectrum and for this Indonesia may pay less attention to the cooperation within ASEAN what may hinder the development of the organization. Thus it is crucial to further understand in what nature and to what extent has Indonesia led ASEAN in the past, and what are Indonesia's prospects in leading the Association in the near future. This study aims to contribute to this undertaking by examining the role of Indonesia in the development of cooperation within the framework of the ASEAN Community's first pillar, the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC).

After the description of the main steps and achievements of building a regional community in the fields of politics and security since 1998, the paper seeks to identify the reasons of difficulties to deepen integration, with special regard to the role(s) of Indonesia. The paper also deals with the newest developments in the Indonesian foreign policy that may have a negative effect on the future development of this integration. The paper's analytical approach is twofold: the analysis seeks to determine whether Indonesia has indeed acted as an agenda-setter; and tries to assess whether the country has implemented regional agreements domestically. The study concludes that Indonesia's role tends to differ considerably from one policy field to the other. Nonetheless, large parts of Indonesia's political elites share the view that Indonesia's global standing and influence is closely tied to its regional leadership position. Moreover, because of Jakarta's self-portrayal as the regional primus inter pares and the present continuities in Indonesia's role in ASEAN, any notable foreign policy revision regarding ASEAN seems unlikely for the time being.

GENDER, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF NORTHERN IRELAND'S ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFLICT

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Abstract

This PhD research, through gendered concepts and tri-theoretical engagement, seeks to address the barrenness of the strategic literature in relation to the gender dimensions of intra-state wars, specifically ethno-national conflicts. Accordingly, this research looks at the impact of British counterinsurgency/counterterrorism (i.e. counter-resistant) practices and policies in Northern Ireland during 'The Troubles,' the peace process and the post-peace era. It primarily seeks to determine the impact of British military operations on Irish Catholic women by considering the differential interactions of both republican female and male combatants with Britain's national security polices and its counterterrorism regime as well as the interface of republican female and male combatants within the regime. More specifically, this research strives to identify *which* counter-resistant military strategies and tactics were significant factors in motivating Irish Catholic women to take up arms against the British state as resistant republican combatants.

Keywords: Gender, Counter-Terrorism, National Security, Ethno-National Conflict, Security Theory, Security Policy, Clausewitz, Caygill, Northern Ireland, Resistance, Counter-Resistance, British Army, Irish Republicans

Introduction

The prolonged and sometimes bloody conflict in Northern Ireland between 1969 and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998, widely known as ‘The Troubles,’ claimed the lives of roughly 3,700 people and witnessed an extensive violent campaign instigated by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) that was unparalleled in its hostility and fierceness in the history of Western Europe since the Second World War (Finegan, 2016). The British experience in Northern Ireland, especially its battle against PIRA, is a classic case study among terrorism scholars; and, British intelligence successes and failures in Northern Ireland are often used as a reference point in contemporary intelligence-based counterinsurgency operations (Finegan, 2016). It is therefore noteworthy that Northern Ireland provides an indispensable academic portal to the study of contemporary counterterrorism. The Northern Ireland context is particularly useful in relation to the shortcomings of British anti-terrorist legislation, discourse, and policies in relation to gender (Ní Aoláin, 2013). To illustrate, although there is a presumption of gender neutrality associated with anti-terrorist legislation in Britain (as in most other western nations), in reality, counterterrorism practices and policies are imbued with highly gendered assumptions about violent actors. This is also evident in counterterrorism research, state conflict-management, and counterterrorism strategizing, where men remain the central and visible perpetrators of terrorist acts, while women perpetrators of terrorist violence are predominately overlooked or fetishized (Ní Aoláin, 2013). To illustrate further, the British have never assessed the gender implications of their legislation and its impact during ‘The Troubles,’ and in the post-peace era, there has been a slippage of external counterinsurgency frameworks (ex. National Security laws aimed at global terrorist organizations) into ordinary law, which raises additional questions about the gender dimensions of counterterrorism norms (Ní Aoláin, 2013). In addition, numerous international human rights institutions, including the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and various other prominent international nongovernmental organizations, have regularly found Northern Ireland’s draconian legislation measures to be in breach of the United Kingdom’s international human rights treaty agreements (Ní Aoláin, 2013).

Purpose of the Research

This PhD research through gendered concepts and tri-theoretical engagement, seeks to address the barrenness of the strategic literature in relation to the gender dimensions of intra-state wars, specifically ethno-national conflicts. Accordingly, this research looks at the impact of British counterinsurgency/counterterrorism (i.e. counter-resistant) practices and policies in Northern Ireland during ‘The Troubles,’ the peace process and the post-peace era. It primarily seeks to determine the impact of British military operations on Irish Catholic women by considering the differential interactions of both republican female and male combatants with Britain’s national security polices and its counterterrorism regime as well as the interface of republican female and male combatants within the regime. Conceptually, differential interactions relates to the idea that some people or groups are treated differently than others in specific contexts (Koopman, 2017). Consequently, I define differential interactions as being sensitive not only to differences of gender (ex. gendered thinking), but also to disability, sexual orientation, or generation (Koopman, 2017). Regarding the interface of male and female combatants within the regime, I also consider the intra-individual causes behind decision-making processes that are associated with demographic characteristics, such as age, religion, employment status, gender, level of education, and family and social history (Ferguson, 2009). Above all, this research strives to identify *which* military strategies and tactics were significant factors in motivating Irish Catholic women

to take up arms against the British state as republican combatants. As military doctrine makes clear, for every action there is a reciprocal reaction from opposing forces, which, depending on the action chosen, leads to an escalation of violence—though the route violence takes is sometimes unpredictable due to chance, unforeseen obstacles or the potential of a situation (Caygill, 2013). To what extent then do counterinsurgency/counterterrorism norms (as well as anti-terrorist legislation), which are presumably gender-neutral, lead to “sub-optimal enforcement?” by state actors; or, to what extent do these norms activate violent, resistant non-state actors or perpetuate the conflict cycle (Ní Aoláin, 2013)?

Conceptual Background of the Research

Two concepts are especially useful in addressing these questions: counter-resistance and resistance. In the contemporary era, these concepts have traditionally received much attention in the social science literature, specifically works relating to civil resistance, and social movement and revolution (Schock, 2013), but their provenance belongs to the discourse of force and the opposition of forces indicative of Newtonian mechanics and later on electromagnetics, and to the military doctrine of resistance pioneered by Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (Caygill, 2013). Accordingly, and pivotal to this research, is Howard Caygill’s book, *On Resistance*, which weaves the militaristic doctrine of General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) in *On War* into a political reassessment of the theory and practice of revolutionary and peoples’ war, including anti-colonial resistance (Dillon, 2013). Significantly, the concept of resistance, as Caygill demonstrates, is dependent on the discourse of force and opposed forces, illustrated by Clausewitz’s observation that the opposition of forces unequivocally entails the exercise of violence (Caygill, 2013). The equivocal nature of force and therefore resistance, however, makes the concept of resistance difficult to define (Caygill, 2013). But, as Caygill argues, reducing the practices of resistance to a single concept is undesirable because resistance is continually being reinvented; rather, one should seek to identify certain consistencies in the practices of resistance in order to understand “its history of inventions” (Caygill, 2013). Further, for Caygill, any philosophy of resistance must begin with the historical and philosophical work of Clausewitz, who, as Caygill affirms, is the first theorist of the war of resistance—a crucial point for strategic thinkers that lays the groundwork for examining the strategic interplay between resistance and counter-resistance, one of the primary considerations of this research (Dillon, 2013).

Refined by Caygill’s philosophical analysis, Clausewitz’s theory of the war of resistance and its relationship to other classical and modern military strategists, such as Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong or Frantz Fanon, is especially well-suited to this research. Thus, for the purposes of this research, the concepts of resistance and counter-resistance will be characterised and defined in Clausewitzian terms. For Clausewitz, resistance and counter-resistance are two very different forces, which is reflected in his characterisation of their peculiar properties, and, in his concise, but resourceful definitions of them. Based on his observations of the new forms of violence that emerged in the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and drawing on the doctrine of the four elements, Clausewitz characterises resistance, or ‘People’s War,’ as a vaporous force (i.e. air) that must be like a “cloudlike being” if it is to resist the liquid or solid force of the counter-resistant enemy—whether revolutionary (i.e. water) or imperial (i.e. earth) forces (Caygill, 2013). However, in Clausewitz’s mind, this vaporous force cannot remain continually suspended in the air, rather it must “condense at certain points and for[m] threatening clouds from which powerful bolts of lightning can emerge (i.e., guerrilla warfare)” (Caygill, 2013). Resistance is therefore effected by means of unpredictable manifestations, surprise, threat, and disappearance, which saps the initiative of counter-resistant forces and undermines its military momentum, transferring the conduct of war from the

battlefield to the domain of politics (Caygill, 2013). Affirming their differences, Clausewitz views *resistance* as “a clash of forces understood in terms of relations of enmity,” while *counter-resistance* is seen as “rendering the enemy incapable of further resistance”(Caygill, 2013).

Clausewitz also saw the relationship between resistance and counter-resistance as reciprocal rather than dialectical insofar as resistance lacks a ‘positive’ purpose (Caygill, 2013). This is a result of Clausewitz’s distinction between ‘positive’ war-directed at destroying the enemy’s capacity to resist—and ‘negative’ war directed at exhausting or eroding this capacity (i.e. protraction) (Caygill, 2013). Consequently, while positive war may be characterised as dialectical because it is “dedicated to achieving a result through sublation in battle,” negative war may be characterised as reciprocal because “its objective of preserving the capacity to resist undermines rather than sublates.” To clarify, for Clausewitz, resistance is negative war, wherein the “ultimate aim can only be to prolong the duration of the action and so exhaust the enemy [both morally and materially]” (Caygill, 2013). In addition, as Caygill, explains, the aim of exhausting the enemy as opposed to attaining a decisive victory in negative war, challenges not only the force of the enemy but also the underlying principles of their political logic and strategic grammar (i.e. system of rules) (Caygill, 2013). This conceptual link between politics and war is central to Clausewitz’s theory of the war of resistance—as well as his broader philosophy of war based on the conclusion that war is politics by other means (Caygill, 2013). More concisely, the war of resistance is conducted at both political and military levels through a series of non-violent and violent actions that are aimed at compromising the moral and material forces of the enemy over time (Caygill, 2013). Taken further, for Clausewitz, this new form of ‘vaporous’ violence could not be overcome by conventional military thinking—an enduring insight for contemporary counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism (Caygill, 2013).

Based on Caygill’s (re)interpretation, Clausewitz’s historical and philosophical reflections of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic upsurge of violence and resistance to it, provides the fundamental groundwork for understanding the concepts of resistance and counter-resistance. Additionally, as Caygill notes, the discourse of force, has been “carried over into and grafted onto other powerful discourses,” specifically, the discourses of consciousness, violence, and subjectivity, which are not “altogether entirely removed from Clausewitzian considerations” (Caygill, 2013). Collectively, these discourses, based on historical reflections of resistance movements, inform a theory of resistance and counter-resistance, which may be transformed into a typology of resistance, which has a certain affinity with other concepts: such as, legitimate and illegitimate violence; resistance and repression; oppositions of action and reaction; or, *ressentiment* and affirmation (i.e., the morality of resistance) (Caygill, 2013). These affinities give further shape to the concepts of resistance and counter-resistance. There is one important concept, however, namely, the concept of gender, which has a clear affinity with Clausewitz’s theory of the war of resistance, and other classic military works, but which appears only briefly, but not unimportantly, in Caygill’s meticulous analysis of resistant subjectivities. Clausewitz, as Caygill points out, in attempting to understand how the capacity to resist (i.e., *Energeia*) –defined as the sum of material and moral means—could be preserved and enhanced, created an anthropology of violent or resistant subjectivity (Caygill, 2013). Furthermore, he had little interest in the rhetoric of freedom, whose truth he saw manifested in the Napoleonic Empire; rather, in place of freedom, he was interested more in the *Akt* or actuality of war, which Clausewitz describes as being” permeated by spiritual forces and actualities” (Caygill, 2013). Clausewitz thus viewed resistant subjects as defiant, governed by enmity and chance and dedicated to the actualisation of a capacity to resist in view of their (freedomless) predicament (Caygill, 2013).

This resistant subject confronting violence and chance, suffering, in the words of Hamlet, “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,” has little choice but to “take up arms against a sea of trouble,”

(Shakespeare), but with only a bare capacity to confront chance and enmity (Caygill, 2013). It is, as Caygill writes, the “sheer necessity of resisting that intensifies their capacity to resist” (Caygill, 2013). The capacity to resist, therefore, “occupies a subject that *must* resist” (Caygill, 2013). Based on necessity, the formation of the capacity to resist in a subject can occur in a variety of ways that leads to “spontaneous acts of violence,” but how the resistant subject lashes out at intolerable repression depends on and is shaped by the enemy (Caygill, 2013). Clausewitzian formulations of the resistant subject therefore prepares the ground for recognising not only a feminine resistant subject and a gendered capacity to resist, but also the idea that their actions are shaped by counter-resistant forces, which is the main concern of this research. It is at this point that the concept of gender and its affinity with the concepts of resistance and counter-resistance can be more thoroughly examined.

The Concept of Gender

Gender, a relatively recent concept in social science (Meyerowitz, 2008), is a concept that assumes the existence of structural relations wherein hierarchies and norms are institutionalised relations of dominance and non-dominance (Radoi, 2012). The concept of gender relates to the psychological, social and cultural differences between male and female and is distinct from the category of ‘sex,’ used by sociologists since the 1970s, which refers to the physiological differences that characterise male and female bodies. Accordingly, people are born male or female, but learn to be men or women—marking the cultural and attitudinal characteristics of the concept (Diamond, 2002). Perceptions of gender are deeply ingrained, vary considerably both between and within cultures, and change over time (United Nations, 2018). Most notably, in all societies, gender predetermines access to resources and power (United Nations). Throughout this research, gender is treated analytically, meaning that the analysis is not concerned with only tracing how specific military practices and polices impact republican female and male combatants differently, but also how gender is “central to the possibility of these policies and practises to begin with” (Dyvik, 2017).

In line with feminist security theory, gender may be defined as “a cluster of norms, values, and behavioural patterns explicitly and implicitly expressing expectations of how men and women should act and represent themselves to others” (Twagira, 2016). This definition coincides with Laura Shepherd’s treatment of gender as a “verb,” a “noun” and a “logic,” signifying how it expresses what people do, what they are and how it governs our lives in various ways (Dyvik, 2017). Accordingly, it points to Judith Butler’s conception of gender as fluid and performative, emphasising how gendered bodies come in diverse forms and participate in a variety of gendered practices (Dyvik, 2017). Taken further, research has shown that there are multiple variations of masculinities and femininities; but, not all forms are equally accepted (Fasting, 2010). In most cultures or institutions, for instance, there is a normative form of masculinity, which holds the dominant position, known as “hegemonic masculinity” (Fasting, 2010). This form of masculinity—which is most valorised and most identified with power and authority—is typically associated with the military, in the form of the combat soldier. Although hegemonic masculinity is upheld as the ideal form of masculinity, the majority of men cannot meet its expectations. Conversely, emphasized femininity, especially in western nations, is characterised by nurturance, compliance, heterosexual attractiveness and empathy (Fasting, 2010). By definition, the role of a strong female combatant does not sit comfortably with such an image (Fasting, 2010).

Furthermore, as cultural and historical constructs, notions of masculinity and femininity are continually contested and persistently negotiated in the context of existing power relations (Twagira, 2016). This is certainly true in the context of war and national security. Institutionalised state nationalisms or non-state

'liberatory' nationalisms, for instance, involve assumptions about femininity, masculinity and gender relations—though their gendered assumptions differ (Alison, 2004). Additionally, as R.W. Connell points out, it is easy to discern gender order, but not to understand it (Fasting, 2010). Illustrations are that most of science and technology are controlled by men, and most large institutions, especially the military, are dominated by men (Fasting, 2010). In most societies, the 'gender order' also highlights the fact that men and women have unequal respect, and that women are often neglected or marginalised (Fasting, 2010). The discourse of gender has also historically provided the means to articulate relationships of power in relation to race, region, politics, class, nation and empire. (Meyerowitz, 2008). Gender and the discourse of gender therefore play a very important role in resistance and counter-resistance as well as the resistance within the resistance (i.e., gender relations).

Returning to Clausewitz's theory of the People's War of resistance, Clausewitz is explicit about the decisive role "an entire people with weapon in hand" can play in resisting a stronger enemy, and about the character of People's War (i.e., 'vaporous' violence) (Caygill, 2013), but he does not extend his analysis in terms of gender. Conspicuously, the gender dimensions of war remain unarticulated; there is no intuition or recognition of the feminine resistant subject or a gendered capacity to resist in his historical or philosophical analysis. Consistent with the philosophic thinking he was educated in – such as reason, upheld as a predominately male trait; objectivity, which ignores the perspective of the "knower;" or metaphysical essentialism grounded in realism (Mosser, 1999; Rudavsky, 2004) –Clausewitz assumes either a masculine or genderless resistant subject. This aperture in his theory of the war of resistance however provides a propitious conceptual portal for grafting the concept of gender onto his concepts of resistance and counter-resistance, as (re)interpreted by Caygill. Significantly, one of the few thinkers in realist security literature who analytically and theoretically examines gender in relation to resistance and counter-resistance is anti-colonial revolutionary theorist Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) –an Algerian psychiatrist, who wrote about the Algerian struggle for national independence from France (1954-1962) in the late 1960s (White, 2007). Fanon brings Clausewitz's resistant subject into proper relief "in terms of the *acktus* of war" (Caygill, 2013) by acknowledging the extensive role resistant women played during Algeria's national war of liberation (White, 2007). Insightfully, Fanon also showed the ways that political resistance was based on a reconstruction of masculinism and a restructuring of gender relations, which further marks the linkage between the concepts of gender, resistance and counter-resistance (Malvern and Koureas, 2014).

Theoretical Background of the Research

Classical Realism

This research incorporates several theoretically informed interpretations of security—namely, classical realism, conventional constructivism and feminist geopolitics. To begin with, classical realism, a normative theory which reaches as far back as Thucydides—an Athenian political philosopher who wrote about political realism nearly 2,000 years ago—is a theory of International Relations which views the state as "a national political community struggling to survive in a condition of constant anarchy" (Nuruzzaman, 2006). Classical realism is based on the idea that human nature is flawed, which explains conflictual behavior. (Elman, 2008). Accordingly, classical realists believe that risks of war and organized violence remain the most salient problems in human existence. Consequently, maximum value is assigned to successful political action based on prudence: the ability to judge the correctness of a given action from a variety of possibilities on the basis of its likely consequence (ex. anti-terrorism legislation). Most importantly, classical realism recognizes that human security can be enhanced or imperiled by state

policies. Classical realism also typically looks to political science and history (Holsti, 2004) for evidence and insights to explain contemporary state-level processes. Classical realism analyzes security from the ‘top-down,’ taking the state as the prime referent of security.

Feminist Geopolitics

Feminist geopolitics, a critical node of geopolitical scholarship in International Relations, further expands the purview of classical realism by examining the security conditions that make the daily lives of individuals, such as female republican dissidents vulnerable, and develops strategies to minimize their impact. In addition, for feminist geopolitics, different groups are affected differently depending on what policies are used to achieve security; consequently, this needs to be deconstructed (Massaro and Williams, 2013). Feminist geopolitics works to demonstrate that geopolitical relations are generated in the home as much as the battlefield and by a range of individuals outside the formal political realm. (Massaro and Williams, 2013). Feminist geopolitics, like human security approaches and critical theory, analyzes security from the ‘bottom-up,’ taking the individual as the prime referent of security.

Conventional Constructivism

Conventional constructivism, though less an International Relations theory than an approach, expands the purview of both classical realism and feminist geopolitics by providing a sociological examination of the nexus between security and identity. Conventional constructivism centers on identity, which is considered more fundamental than interests; as such, identities provide the basis for interests in any given situation (Zehfuss, 2002). Ideas of self and the environment tailor interactions and are tailored by interactions (Zehfuss, 2002). In this way, social reality is created. Most significantly, identities not only arise through interactions with others, but they also essentially determine what kind of security environment will prevail (Zehfuss, 2002). A constructivist analysis emphasizes the importance of meaning, but assumes the existence of an *a priori* reality, which places the approach on a middle-ground between realism and critical theory in security studies (Zehfuss, 2002). Moreover, conventional constructivism analyzes security from the ‘middle,’ taking the collective group as the prime referent of security.

There are clear benefits that come from using classical realism, feminist geopolitics, and conventional constructivism as a theoretical triumvirate. For one, the particular weakness of one theory is compensated for by the particular strength of another. As a result, different theories identify different problems or issues. Second, relying on a theoretical triumvirate helps to avoid the risk of drawing ‘atheoretical’ conclusions, choosing only data that aligns with theoretical biases (McCroy, 2015). Thirdly, the principal strength of a theoretical triumvirate is “its ability to look deeper and more broadly at findings” (McCroy, 2015). A theoretical triumvirate provides a strong base for an integrative bridge-building research strategy as an antidote to restrictive theoretical perspectives.

Situating the Research

Throughout the last decade, there have been some attempts to document the gender dimensions and effects of counterterrorism measures; however, much of the critical analytical focus has been on the practices of the US military in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantánamo Bay, and on the way that gender is entrenched in the differential impacts of both non-militarized and militarized counterterrorism polices directed mainly at radical jihadist groups. In the context of Northern Ireland’s counterterrorism measures, there is much knowledge to be harvested from an area that has a long history of being exposed to anti-

terrorism legislation—particularly in relation to emergency regulation (ex. stop-and-search powers) (Ní Aoláin, 2013). For instance, the effects of Britain's counterterrorism regime on women in Northern Ireland have not been systematically documented, and the political and social roles women undertook during the Northern Ireland conflict remains substantially under researched (Ní Aoláin, 2013). And, although there is a large inventory of research regarding the participation of male combatants in Northern Ireland's ethno-national conflict, there is a dearth of critical research that focuses on the ways in which Irish female and male combatants differentially experience counterterrorism regimes as well as the interface of Irish female and male combatants within Britain's counterterrorism regime.

In addition, before 9/11, there was a global preoccupation with researching Northern Ireland, which led to 'The Troubles' and its Irish dissident republican groups becoming one of the most thoroughly researched and understood conflict throughout the world (Ferguson, 2009). But since 9/11, the global focus withdrew from Northern Ireland and turned its attention to Islamic terrorism and Islamic combatants. The potential for Northern Ireland to be drawn back into protracted ethno-political violence, however, still exists for several important reasons (Ferguson, 2009). For one, it is notable that none of the participants of the 1998 peace agreement viewed post-1998 Northern Ireland as a society at peace; rather, they believed that the conflict was smoldering with the potential to reignite under the right conditions (Ferguson, 2009). Since 2014, for example, attacks from dissident republican groups have risen dramatically, causing the security threat to Britain and Northern Ireland to be raised from "substantial" to "severe" in 2016 and 2017 (McDonald, 2016). Such dissident groups continue to instill fear among Northern Ireland communities and pursue gangland-style violence, with punishment attacks and sometimes even murder transpiring openly on the street (Forss, 2015).

Secondly, Britain's decision to withdraw from the European Union (ex. Brexit) on June 23, 2016 has implications for the Northern Ireland-Ireland border (Lammy, 2017). Brexit, for instance, could mean remilitarization for the Irish border as the British government regains control over UK borders (Mohdin, 2017). The transformation of the Irish border since the 1998 peace agreement has resulted in a "soft" border that has allowed goods and people to flow freely from Northern Ireland, which is part of the UK, and the Republic of Ireland, a European Union (EU) member state (Mohdin, 2017). The Common Travel Area, which facilitates this soft border, will likely see increased policing of the border. The return of a "hard" border has the potential to reignite old tensions and destabilize the 20-year peace process (Mohdin, 2017).

Thirdly, in 21st century Northern Ireland, being Catholic or Protestant, or Republican versus Loyalist, still plays an influential role, determining many people's identity, education, religion, political affiliations, and friendships (Forss, 2015). Research conducted by Belfast's Institute for Conflict Resolution in 2013 found that the peace agreement and "subsequent binary configuration of power-sharing" have resulted in the "further entrenchment of perceived cultural differences" and that the current arrangement largely precludes the formation, maturation, and development of alternative political and religious identities (Forss, 2015). Overall, most people in Northern Ireland are still likely to vote for a political party positioned on narrow ethno-national identification (Forss, 2015).

Conclusion

Significantly, in normative counterterrorism and national security discourses in Britain, gender has been largely underplayed (Ní Aoláin, 2013). As such, the Northern Ireland context is a crucial portal for examining the gendered shortcomings of British anti-terrorist legislation, discourse, and policies. Unreservedly, there is a critical need—given the history of British counterterrorism in Northern Ireland

and the potential for Northern Ireland to be drawn back into protracted ethno-political violence—for the gendered histories of Irish republican male and female combatants to be more fully exposed. And, there is a critical need to understand how the lives of Irish republican male and female combatants intersect with each other and with Britain's national security policies and its counterterrorism regime.

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COMPREHENDING THE RESISTANCE TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY OF POST COLONIAL ZIMBABWE UNDER ROBERT MUGABE

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Abstract

Democratization and adherence to the fundamental tenets of human rights are two traditionally entwined social objectives that any state has to comply with to be treated as an egalitarian state. The civility of the state is to be further manifested in its ability to give its citizens a fairly acceptable form of governance along with the cover of a slew of natural rights and legal safeguards against human rights abuses, from which the idea of justice is to flow. However, many of the erstwhile Western colonies that attained independence and became sovereign states through the 1980's to 1990's, especially those in Asia and Africa, have had a questionable history with democratic forms of government. While these states might now be hailed as formal democracies, the fact remains that they have only had the experience of a very perfunctory degree of democratization. In such circumstances, human rights, without the existence of a real democratic structure to uphold and sustain it, does not effectively translate into a charter of rights but would merely be retained as a set of flexible norms. It is in this context that the proposed paper intends to address the internalisation of the principles and values associated with the concepts of democracy and human rights in post-colonial states. The reality and ambivalence surrounding the consolidation of democratic virtues along with observance of human rights, thus ensuring peace and harmony, is best evident in the way in which Zimbabwe, under its longest serving President Robert Mugabe, operated its 'democracy'. Robert Mugabe has been an ardent critic of the neo-imperialist imposition of ideas and cultural norms on his countrymen and has argued for a separation of human rights discourses from the West-sponsored notions of democracy and democratization. However, the reality remains that Zimbabwe under Mugabe did largely weaken the integrity and probity of human rights as a set of natural rights that are universal in nature. Such dilution of the universality of human rights further paved way for shrinking of democratic spaces in Zimbabwe, as democracy ceased to be the principal legitimising touchstone in Zimbabwean politics. Mugabe's regime under his ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front) sought to position itself as the sole saviour of the post colonial nation of Zimbabwe. Through an analysis of his regime, the paper seeks to understand the resistance forged by discourses around democratization and human rights to Mugabe's ideology of *chimurenga*, which was to be a revolutionary struggle towards accomplishing a socialist transformation of Zimbabwe.

While recognizing the lack of democratic ethos and respect for human rights in Zimbabwe, it is also equally important to not turn a blind eye to the cultural imperialism foisted on post colonial societies like those of Zimbabwe by the new and old colonial masters. The polemics of such neo-imperialist hegemony undermined the universality of the dialogues on human rights and democratization and reduced them to mere synonyms for Westernization. Hence, this paper proposes to undertake a contextual inquiry in to the varying levels of resistance to the globalization of human rights and democracy, in the specific context of Zimbabwe under Mugabe. It also aspires to study the need to put an end to the misrepresentation of the interrelation between democracy and human rights, mostly by the West, so that the ambiguities surrounding the democratic credentials of states like Zimbabwe do not serve as an alibi for them to not formally recognise the internationalism of human rights laws.

Keywords: Democratization, Human Rights, Cultural Imperialism, Westernization, Globalization.

Introduction

The identification of an ideal state most often rests both on the notions of political freedom, frequently summarized as democracy, and on the guarantee of civil liberties and human rights to all its citizens on a day to day basis and in activities relating to their political participation. Zimbabwe since its independence in 1980 has presented itself as a classical example of how the stability of political institutions and the sustainability of economic reforms are organically linked to the multiple parameters of political freedom. The swearing-in of the first post-independence government committed to radical social transformation of society, under the leadership of a liberation leader like Robert Mugabe, was expected to pave way towards a new democratic revolution in Zimbabwe. The standardized democratic ethos was to eventually give birth to well-founded political institutions in the country. However, the semi-democracy state that Zimbabwe descended in to, in due course of time post-independence, not just made its political institutions fragile but it also soon became an arena for fierce political conflicts; the adverse spill-over effect of which was rampant human rights violations on the downtrodden (Gwenhamo, Fedderke and Kadt, 2012).

The political transition of Zimbabwe was, and to this date continues to be, marred by intense polarization and surging violence. However, interestingly neither the polarization of the Zimbabwean electorate was an imminent repercussion of the democratization process nor was the mobilization of the electorate carried out along the lines of pre-existing ethnic chasms. Rather, the two prominent political parties in Zimbabwe, namely the ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front) and the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) politicized their respective constituencies and boosted their mobilizing faculties through combative maneuvering that essentially divided the electorate in to two antagonistic factions, fiercely opposed to arbitrations or hammering out deals with the rival camp. The exclusionary tactics employed by the political parties in democratizing countries like Zimbabwe not just spawned disintegration, displacement and state violence but it also became the focal point of the political craft that operates in Zimbabwe. Such a scheme of political craft, built in resistances and rebellions, further enables one to understand the intertwined relationship between spiralling electoral contests (in other words democratization) and state sponsored violence (read as human rights violations) (LeBas, 2006).

In Zimbabwe's political transition from a heavily militarized liberation movement, rooted in the ideals of socialism and left-wing nationalism, to a democratic government that eventually conformed to the neo-liberal designs, what shot through the most was how the politics of command emerged as the chief

precursor to centralization of control. Even with the acceptance of neo-liberal policies like Essential Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 90's, the opponents of the Zimbabwean government, under Robert Mugabe, continued to be attacked as agents of the West, foot-soldiers of the imperialists and thereby anti-Zimbabwean. Furthermore, the anti-colonial /imperial rhetoric and the cautiously popularized patriotic history of the liberation struggle of Zimbabwe served as the legitimizing factors for crushing democratic dissents in the country (Ranger, 2005). In fact, the process of democratization of the Zimbabwean society was largely equated with an absolute compliance to Mugabe's call for national unity and a complete subservience to the historical discourses of nationalism appropriated by Mugabe's ZANU-PF (Hammett, 2011). However, conditions of politically instability and perceived vulnerabilities soon forced the ruling elites to sacrifice liberation and democracy for the sake of retaining control over the nation-state. The resultant slump in the development of the democratic institutions, thereby, became a smokescreen for the exclusivist and authoritarian policies of the Mugabe government (Tomaselli, 2009). The complexity of the relation between the ruler and the ruled, in the early stages of independence, was perhaps best represented in how the Zimbabweans evolved critical forms of resistance to violent state repressions by organising themselves around social spheres of engagement and critique, while also keeping faith in the indelible anti-imperialist commitment of the ruling dispensation.

The Political Economy of Conflict in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe

Zimbabwe stepped in to its post-colonial era after fighting a lengthy protracted liberation war for 13 long years, from 1966 to 1979. However, post-independence, the liberation leaders of the Bush war turned around to become the primary oppressors of the common Zimbabweans in the streets and in rural areas, instead of moulding themselves into champions of democratization and national integration in the country. The symbolically socialist government in Zimbabwe, which came in to power in 1980, riding on the glory of the venerable liberation struggle it led successfully, initially yielded promise amongst the masses through institutionalization of constitutional democracy and implementation of social policy measures that aimed to bridge the gap between people divided on racial and ethnic lines during the civil war times. The Mugabe government also paid excessive care towards minimizing the structural inequalities that were rampant in the health and education sectors, thereby, seeking to exhilarate the sanctions-ridden Zimbabwean economy in to one which endorsed the golden rule of growth with equity. However by the 90's , the Mugabe government was forced to surrender to the first in a series of structural adjustment programmes sponsored by international financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) as a result of its mounting debts. Although Mugabe and his ministers were abandoned by the erstwhile colonial masters who were, as per the Lancaster Agreement, supposed to assist the newly independent country in its smooth democratic transition, the fact remains that the incumbent government too lost sight of its revolutionary left ideals with the advent and accretion of state power. When faced with the challenge of bringing about radical social transformation on their own in Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government faltered and soon got riddled with charges of nepotism and corruption. The furtherance of the vested interests of the political elites, consecutively, necessitated turning a blind eye to the principles of egalitarianism, civil liberties and natural rights in the country (Maclean, 2002).

By the Presidential elections of March 2002, it had become sufficiently evident that electoral outcomes, though highly predictable, were no longer the determinants of political and economic stability in Zimbabwe. However, the heightened socio-economic and political chaos that Zimbabwe plunged into,

post 2000, can only be understood within an extended context of its past. A critical, historiographical understanding of the rationale behind the Zimbabwean crisis would point towards a total collapse of the rule of liberal governance under the stratagems of an imperious political figure like Robert Mugabe (Raftopoulos, 2006). Thus, any discussion on the respect for rule of law, human rights and constitutionalism in Zimbabwe would be incomplete without an appraisal of the infamous Operation *Murambatsvina* of May 2005, orchestrated by the Mugabe regime in order to regain the lost radiance of the city of Harare. The legacy of several decades of organised violence and torture in Zimbabwe which continued through the years since independence to 2000 and further in to 2001, 2002 and 2003 finally heightened in to an exponential disaster in 2005 in the form of Operation *Murambatsvina*.

The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (ZHRNF) in their detailed report in June 2005 on Operation *Murambatsvina* talks of how *Murambatsvina*, meaning “to drive out rubbish” was the code name given to the operation that began in Zimbabwe towards the end of May 2005 and how it was nothing short of a brutal onslaught on the residential settings and the trading markets and stalls in the informal sector. Also called, Operation Restore Order, this clean out operation carried out in a large scale in cities and towns all across Zimbabwe literally generated a human tragedy of massive proportions in a country that had already suffered a series of human casualty and misery, mostly as an after-effect of ill-advised and directionless government policies and actions. The nation-wide campaign that moved beyond cities and towns and stretched into settlements on farms in peri-urban and rural areas led to the obliteration of thousands of houses, means of shelters, trading spaces and markets. In a matter of few weeks, this government sponsored campaign, that was both extra-judicial and barbaric, managed to generate a humungous internal refugee crisis in Zimbabwe by pushing thousands of common families in to the streets with no roofs over their heads and no means to earn a living. The Zimbabwean government, which till then had extended tacit and at times even explicit support to informal housing arrangements in the name of ensuring economic justice to the black majority and which publicly espoused the cause of the rural landless peasantry, surprised not just its own people but its outside supporters too with the *Murambatsvina* campaign as the operation proved to be the last nail in the coffin for many common Zimbabweans whose lives and livelihoods were taking a downward spiral.

The ZHRNF Report (2005) further explains as to how the resistance of a section of the population residing in certain pockets could not match up to the repressive paraphernalia of the state, which constituted a show of strength by the police amply backed up by the army. In many regions incidents of police arriving at camps in the middle of the night or early morning to force people out of their homes at gunpoint were also reported. The resultant raging panic and chaos forced many to leave their homes with no hopes or promises of an alternate accommodation; many were unwillingly moved to transit camps where the living conditions were sickening. A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing placed an estimate of around 200000 people as homeless with the number of displaced families adding up to 64,677, outlining a total of 323,385 individuals in immediate need of emergency relief and resettlement. However, over a period of time the number of displaced crossed well over a million. The government wanted many of these families who were thriving in informal settlements to move back to rural areas. A significant number of Hatcliffe residents, for instance, were forcibly mounted on to trucks and moved to a farm in the outskirts of Harare called the Caledonia Farm. However, as the rural areas were already under the grip of severe food shortage, the forcible expulsion of the urban poor in to these rural areas worsened their living circumstances.

Also as per the ZHRNF Report (2005), while the government justification for the campaign ranged from the informal vendors and traders violating by-laws to engaging in a variety of illegal activities like unlawful foreign currency transactions, hoarding of goods like cooking oil and selling them way above their market

prices and dealing in foreign goods thereby sabotaging the economy, the main opposition party MDC and other neutral political commentators had different observations. They were overwhelmingly of the opinion that the campaign was a means of punishment designed by the ruling ZANU-PF to penalize the urban poor who voted largely in favour of the opposition party in the March 2005 Parliamentary elections. They also read the *Murambatsvina* campaign as a ploy by the government to scatter the MDC supporters in cities by forcing them to move in to rural areas, numerically dominated and controlled by the ruling party. Though the ruling dispensation gave an unconvincing logic of its own staunch supporters, namely war veterans, also being driven out of the housing co-operatives erected on lands captured during land invasions, it must be stated that the government found some real merit in being able to oust a sizeable number of MDC supporters from the towns and cities. There are still others who have argued on the lines of the campaign being a strategic strike against the urban poor to curb any possibility of a massive uprising or revolt against the incumbent government while yet others clasp on to the theory of government destroying the informal flea markets to exert absolute control over the economy to be able to take charge of the foreign currency generation by informal trading, in addition to being able to allocate trading licenses to party loyalists.

The ruling ZANU-PF, while designing and implementing Operation *Murambatsvina*, was clearly going through a governance crisis which was the offshoot of the government's abysmal track record of human rights violations, breach of rule of law, implementation of draconian legislations and curbing of voices of dissent. The ZHRNF Report (2005) explains in detail as to how the ruling ZANU-PF was fully aware of the potential of a politically discontent informal sector, mired in inflation and price rise, to be a probable vector for massive protests in its attempt to liberate itself from a repressive regime. Along with being at the receiving end of widespread condemnation from within several quarters of the country including Zimbabwean NGO's, churches, legal organizations and the opposition MDC, the operation also became the subject of literary works like *The Uncertainty of Hope* by Valerie Tagwira, which outlined the difficulties faced by the common Zimbabwean women during the course of the operation. Though African Union and countries like South Africa dismissed the Western condemnation of the operation, from the likes of Britain, New Zealand and USA, as undue interference in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe, the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, reprimanded Mugabe government for clamping down on alleged illegal establishments with no regard for human sufferings and different provisions of national and international legal frameworks. Finally, on 23 May 2007, on the legal opinion sought by the Geneva based Centre on Housing Rights and the Zimbabwe-based Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, it was rightfully concluded that the operation amounted to rampant attack on civilians as part of the state policy involving serious violations of fundamental rights of the citizens like "the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being", as enumerated in Article 5 of the African Charter.

It is important to deliberate on the infamous Operation *Murambatsvina* in order to understand the political economy of conflict in Zimbabwe, as it represented the best prototype of Mugabe's idea of decimating political opposition and establishing a *de facto* one party state. The systemic far-flung attack on a poor, defence-less population, which took the form of an epidemic of organised violence and torture in Zimbabwe, bore testimony to the fact that even after two decades of political liberation, the ruling ZANU-PF which had perched itself at the heart of the liberation movement had not made any significant transformation to a civilian, democratic party, receptive to the needs of the new millennium. On the other hand, amidst all the human rights violations of the Mugabe regime, one must also acknowledge the pressure foisted on the ZANU-PF government to live up to a democratic framework that the West deemed appropriate.

The Crisis of Democratization and the End of Human Rights Discourse in Zimbabwe

The liberal notion of the idea of democracy encompasses a variety of characteristic features ranging from regard for the rule of law, a vibrant civil society, transparent and inclusive elections, guarantee of constitutional and political liberties to citizens and respect and recognition of human rights. Although the evolution and stability of political, social and economic institutions in a state are fundamental to the development and deepening of democratic ethos, it can also be stated that these two conditions are closely associated to each other; just as institutions establish democracy, democracy too promotes institutions. The important thing to note here is that no country begins its democratization process on a clean canvas as any effort towards the rebuilding of a nation-state on democratic principles must acknowledge that certain components of the erstwhile society, like its institutions, would remain as they are and hence, the process of rebuilding must be receptive to the existence of such still surviving institutions (Eve, 2009).

The West has always assumed the mantle of being the agents of democracy and has particularly positioned itself as the benefactor of democracy in African countries. The Western idea of a New World Order is for them the only democratic framework that can secure peace and development for the entire world. The West also sets the benchmark for democratization in almost all the erstwhile colonies and this includes framing of a constitution, existence of a multi-party state, fair and free elections, dynamic civil society groups and most importantly blind allegiance to capitalism. Any country fulfilling the above mentioned criteria would then be hailed a democracy. However, what the West conveniently forgets is the fundamental oversight in superimposing their ideas of democracy on these erstwhile colonies, specifically those in Africa, who have completely antithetical lived experiences and hence, while the African countries can definitely take inspiration from the West in their democratic transitions, it would also be highly unworkable and counterproductive for the African countries to blindly mimic the Western models of governance and economic growth in their transition phases (Udogu, 1997). For instance, the concept of free and fair elections is one of the bulwarks of the Western notion of liberal democracy. While it is true that transparent elections are critical to the sustenance of democracy in any country and is also the foundation on which all the other facets of democracy would derive from, it must also be known that the outward bogey of periodical elections cannot serve as the sole determinants of the survival of democratic ethos and culture in a country (Abbink and Hesselink, 2000).

While African countries have had much less experience of contemporary democracy due to colonization for centuries, it also remains a fact that African societies have always placed greater emphasis on community living and have given precedence to community rights over rights of individuals. Zimbabwe, like many other African countries, began its democratization process in the early 90's and wished to move forward through a socialist set up under the aegis of democracy. Yet in the words of Fomunyoh (2005), democracy for African countries, like Zimbabwe, largely remained "*a mixed bag of accomplishments, challenges and largely unmet aspirations*". As democracy most often takes the flavour of the society it emanates from, Zimbabwe too had its own unique democratization process. This process, however, neither checked the political competition between the ruling elites at the national level nor did it expand the social basis for productive political interactions. It must also nevertheless be pointed out that many a times African leaders, Mugabe included, are elected not just to political power but are also elected into challenging circumstances such as acute economic debts and bankruptcy, natural calamities like famines and epidemics and man-made catastrophes like ethnic cleansing. Hence, it becomes the responsibility of the colonisers, with claims of democratic credentials, to assist these newly independent countries in their capacity building (Campbell and Carroll, 2005).

In the specific instance of Zimbabwe, the West talks about how the country would only proceed towards real democracy with the abolition of a one-party state of ZANU-PF that wields definitive control and authority over a wide range of institutions, economic sectors and resources. However, what the West overlooks is the deep-seated antagonism that they fostered amongst the native black communities in countries like Zimbabwe, during their colonial rule, for the settler White minorities. The era of European imperialism in Zimbabwe, just as it did in several other African countries, pushed the native black population into an epoch of social marginalisation. While the Europeans took pride in them being a glorious nation-state, Africans for them were mere tribes and hence, lesser mortals. Post-independence, Zimbabwe and many of its counterparts were primarily pre-occupied with correcting the historic mistakes of the Whites that had by then become laws of the land in these former colonies. Thus, if South Africa was engaged in quashing the legal sanction accorded to apartheid, Mugabe in Zimbabwe sought to give back the blacks their native lands which were taken away from them over the course of occupation. Mugabe also took it upon himself to accord entry to the blacks to those sectors like the agricultural, financial and industrial sectors, from where they were barred through white mandated laws and provisions. Under such circumstances, the West could not have anticipated the newly elected black majority government in Zimbabwe to treat both whites and blacks as equals for the greater good of the nation, regardless of their race and class positions (Eve, 2009). Also while it is true that Zimbabwe has to be provided with a level-playing field for establishing a political framework governed by rule of law and respect for human rights, it must also be noted that Zimbabweans must be able to solve their own dilemmas as that is indispensable to drive Zimbabwe towards a healthy state of democratic governance.

The advent of the 90's brought with it a liberal democratic critique of human rights violations too in Zimbabwe. Along with discussions on the electoral malpractices, an accusation that still holds weight in the case of Zimbabwe, this new wave of political liberalization was also quite vocal about the human rights abuses perpetuated by the Mugabe regime in the guise of exerting absolute control over its citizenry. There was a massive plea from the civil society groups to re-evaluate the legacies of the liberation struggles and to place more attention to the movements within the post-colonial state demanding civic and human rights. While the land reform movements of the ruling party were largely appreciated as efforts towards reparation of the colonial legacy, the authoritarian nationalist politics of the Mugabe regime, that many a times ended up as massacres, posed and still continues to pose both theoretical and political hitches to the influx of alternative politics in Zimbabwe (McCandless, 2005). When the role of the state as the central force of development and transformation went uncontested both within the socialist ZANU-PF and the early left-intelligentsia, in the first decade after independence, the abuses of state power remained unquestioned. All concerns surrounding human rights excesses and shrinking of democratic spaces, which once constituted the bulwark of the Zimbabwean national movement, were all systematically wiped out from the selective history of nationalism popularized by the ruling ZANU-PF. However, what was most disturbing was the manner in which the Mugabe regime found a refuge for its human rights violations, necessitated by a coercive nationalist politics, under the broad umbrella of an anti-imperialist, Pan-African clique. Mugabe successfully used the congeries of race as the perfect justification for his war against the historical wrongs while attempting to cover up the very structures that continued to breed inequality in post-colonial Zimbabwe (Raftopoulos, 2006).

In short, it can be stated that while the ZANU-PF government led by Mugabe regime pandered to its anti-imperialist ideological offensive internationally, back home they orchestrated a very precise and autocratic class project. Further, the language of anti-imperialism helped Mugabe in accumulating a collective idea of nation, in a nationalist pattern of the politics of globalization that worked towards camouflaging resource accumulation by the political elites and employed mass mobilizations to obfuscate

the critiques of authoritarian politics. Mugabe's nationalism was no doubt one of the repressive variety that revived in the face of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, thereby leading to the end of an international solidarity of socialists. Hence, as clearly stated by Raftopoulos (2006), "*notwithstanding the impressive achievements of the anti-globalization movement, the broadness of the diverse agendas of the nationalist projects of the likes of Mugabe could also accommodate the authoritarian anti-imperialism of the Zimbabwe regime*". The real challenge for the post-colonial states like Zimbabwe in Africa is, therefore, to evolve an anti-imperialist critique and praxis that is both democratic in spirit and anti-capitalist in its principles and that which ensures more space for democratic political participation while also confronting the remnants of the New Imperialist Order (Raftopoulos, 2006).

The Tragedy of Globalization of Human Rights without Democracy in Zimbabwe

It is now common knowledge that the globalization of the ideas of democracy and human rights has been met with several criticisms from all around the world, wherein the most notable has been the one linking the process of globalization to the neo-imperialist hegemony over the cultural practices, religious traditions and ways of living of the erstwhile colonised by the former colonial masters. As the power differential here is clearly tilted in favour of the latter, as per Langlois (2003), it is imperative that a non-separation of human rights and democracy would culminate eventually into a clash of civilizations which would essentially be a by-product of cultural imperialism. In fact it could be assumed that the globalization process, instead of diminishing the cultural differentiations between the West and the rest would indeed bolster them, thereby activating culturally conservative pandemonium in less developed countries. Such anarchist uproars, far from institutionalising the global discourse around human rights, would instead very well obscure the process of evolution of a global culture of respecting and recognising the principles of human rights (Langlois, 2003). In the words of Monshipouri and Welch (2001), "*one way to promote an international human rights regime is to separate respect for human rights from the Western-centric notion of democratization and treat such respect as the international norm*".

Enumerating on the need to disassociate the Western notions of human rights and democratization from each other, Nathan (1997), also explains that such a segregation can combat the advent of reactive nationalism in erstwhile colonies of Asia and Africa. He further goes on to take the specific case of United States of America and says, "*the United States should separate human rights from democratization, focus on abuses that are illegal under international law and pre-empt the charge of cultural imperialism by framing the issues as one of compliance with international norms...it is important to separate human rights from democratization and treat it as the international idea that it is, not as a code word for Westernization*".

Before getting into the specificities of Zimbabwe, it is important to understand that although the concepts of human rights and democracy are globally revered as the inalienable attributes of any civilized nation and their application all around the globe as pragmatic political projects, the truth remains that the statuses accorded to both these notions differ significantly; both in terms of the political and ideological functions they are to fulfil and also in terms of the institutions that bolster and shape the expansion of the significance of human rights and democracy as objectives and action schemes. In comparison to democracy, human rights has a more powerful institutional standing in the international arena, specifically because of how the United Nations (UN) has engineered the progression of the human rights discourse as one of the cardinal principles of the statement of norms by which human beings are expected to co-exist with one another. While human rights are bestowed with international recognition, the fact remains that this recognition does not take into account the dynamics of power and politics at

play and mistakes the value and implication of such a recognition to mean more than what it effectively does. Hence, it would be preposterous to think of its relevance and intensity to be identical to its *prima facie* claims and it would certainly be a misstep to take this international recognition at face value (Langlois, 2003).

Another important subject of concern is how the international human rights laws are blindly applied to states all over the world. In other words having a democratic set-up is not a pre-condition to endorse and even be signatory to the various conventions and instrumentalities, pertaining to human rights, of the United Nations. The fact that a regime does not need to be a democratic one but could just be superficially seen as being committed to pursuing the human rights norms is quite alarming, as the actual reasons for both democratic and non-democratic states for getting tangled with a particular UN treaty on human rights could be quite removed from the honest and prioritized interest in a particular issue of human rights at hand. Mostly, it is the pressure of international legitimacy along with access and respect in international platforms that pushes world leaders and country heads to publicly recognize the need for institutionalization of human rights laws in their respective states. Coming to Zimbabwe, it can be stated that this kind of a perfunctory commitment to certain human rights standards have been the basis of UN aid programmes in Zimbabwe which bears testimony to how international cooperation is heavily determined by owing allegiance to the human rights conventions. Even states like Zimbabwe that does not have a West-approved democratic domestic government, thus becomes eligible for international assistance, provided they come under the purview of international human rights law. Hence, it is crucial to understand the real politics behind the propagation and mindless adoption of such human rights covenants and protocols (Langlois, 2003).

Apodaca and Stohl (1999), in fact argues that international aid is integrally linked to adopting human rights respecting postures. Taking the specific example of United States as one of the leading donor countries providing aid and assistance to the less developed countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, they argue that a state's human rights record is paramount to the United States when it comes to providing it with economic, if not military, aid. This is quite ironical when the self-proclaimed oldest democracy in the world has its own skeletons in the closet. That apart, what the pre-condition of observance of human rights laws for delivery of aid in erstwhile colonies like Zimbabwe, does is to provide ample opportunities for the donor countries to justify the global recession in the amount of cooperation and services to their domestic and international precincts. Therefore, the fact remains that the position and prominence accorded to the concept of human rights and its actual worthiness in a country are two different aspects and are hence to be treated as two separate political concepts. As the political realities of human rights and its relation to legitimacy are concepts that are very different from those that emanate from a democratic framework, it can be stated that the combination of the legitimacy and the political/economic impetus aspects of the human rights scheme provides the international community, in the words of Langlois (2003), "*the wherewithal to demand that the state regimes change the way they govern without necessarily demanding that they change their governance regimes*". Thus, the imperial masters devised a plan to socialize non-democratic states by pulling them out of the human rights abuse abyss without really bothering to check on the progress of their domestic democratization performance before facilitating any form of collaboration (Langlois, 2003).

While it is argued by some that democracy is not an immediate pre-condition for the expansion of human rights in less developed countries like Zimbabwe and that the complex process of democratization might actually defer the institutionalization of human rights norms in many states, the fact remains that the

complete disconnection of democracy from human rights mostly ends up in the latter being reduced from a set of rights to a mere set of norms or covenants. As the concepts of both democracy and human rights are Western-sponsored concepts, the basic foundation of the two remains the same and the latter, if not operating under the auspices of democracy, would be no better than some basic standards of human behaviour or in worst cases charity (Langlois, 2003).

In the case of Zimbabwe, till the last harmonized elections of 2013, Mugabe's ZANU-PF wove all of its electoral agendas around fighting the neo-imperialists, wherein, in the words of Ncube (2013), "*the right to 'external self-determination' (against extant power relations in the global system) was prioritized over the right to 'internal self-determination' (referring to political and civic rights of citizens, including that of choosing one's own government)*". It is a fact that Mugabe, in the name of countering Western hegemony, perpetuated and justified state-sponsored human rights violations in the country. The repression programmes were however most often a cover up for the corruption and financial misappropriation charges against the Mugabe government. However, the opposition forces in Zimbabwe, understandably backed by the West, always sought to prioritize the abuse of civil and political rights, which was indeed a reality, over the measures taken by the Mugabe regime to ensure social and economic justice through land reform programmes. While the latter was ridiculed as politicization of the land question, the stated prominence for the deepening of political and civil rights became a potent weapon in the hands of the opposition to achieve their ultimate aim of bringing about a change of regime. Interestingly, it was not just the opposition forces who were in an iniquitous alliance with the Western imperialists but there were the petty bourgeois classes too (Ncube, 2013).

In order to thwart the socio-economic and cultural progression of Zimbabwe, the petty bourgeoisie too used and abused the human rights discourse. The white settler farmers, who shared a common goal with the opposition of ousting Mugabe and his ZANU-PF from political power, employed the human rights rhetoric to halt the forceful acquisition of their lands by the ZANU-PF government as part of their land redistribution projects. Similarly, some of the black bourgeoisie too effectively contracted the Western conception of human rights to promote self-aggrandizement (Ncube, 2013). It is in this context that scholars like Raftopoulos (2010) have talked about the need to raise consciousness about the uncritical usage of the human rights discourse in subaltern countries, mostly by playing into the hands of the West, as that could herald a new wave of neo-imperialism. What is to be in motion in Zimbabwe, even with the recent *coup de'etat* that dislodged Mugabe from power only to then make one of his former associates the new President, is the continuous struggle for social democracy which must be inclusive of both rights-based claims to national self-determination as well as political and civil rights (Zhangaza, 2013).

Conclusion

While it is indeed necessary to promote and protect the basic human rights of citizens occupying any nation-state, the fact remains that in many of the relatively newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, where the process of democratization is still an ongoing event, the West-sponsored rights discourse has reduced the practice of democracy to evolving progressive legislations and paving the way for formal democratic processes. The lived experiences of African countries like Zimbabwe, rich in their incomparable traditional beliefs and practices, have vouched for the ineffectiveness of the Western idea of human rights to apply itself into both lending support to the sensibilities of collective rights of the predominantly underprivileged communities inhabiting such regions or redressing their social grievances. Hence, the West, rather than super-imposing their ideas of a liberal democracy and human rights on subaltern states must understand the historical and cultural specificities of each of these regions in order

to be able to create a space for both effectual democratization and respect for human rights. It is true that human rights would end up being the discretion of the sovereign under benevolent authoritarian regimes nevertheless the doctrine of human rights in itself cannot be the quintessential indicator of a truly democratic state. Zimbabwe, under Mugabe, became an increasingly unpopular regime over the years, from 1980-2017, as the people of Zimbabwe saw through its bogus claims of pursuing a permanent nationalist revolution against the erstwhile colonial masters and the Western imperialism. However, one cannot also take away from Mugabe the distinction for heralding an era of black sovereignty over the white settler communities in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe of today, while taking pride in its revolutionary history and liberation movement, must also prepare itself to walk towards a political framework founded on the principles of inclusiveness, social security, communal harmony, tolerance and plurality to take forward its commitment to the socialist discourse of development and the undeterred quintessence of African resistance to all forms of imperialist manifestations.

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FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT: REFLECTIONS ON GENDER FOR POLICY-MAKERS AND CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES

LIZZY AMBLER

Cynthia Enloe notoriously called for a research agenda that addresses women's involvement in war. This paper utilises feminist critical theory to explore the specific role of female foreign fighters in conflict. The rise of female foreign fighters has fascinated mainstream Western media since the onset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, with women often presented as either extensions of their male counterparts as jihadi brides, or as victims of coercion and radicalisation. Through critical analysis of well-documented cases of female participation in groups such as Daesh, this paper seeks to understand the dynamic and often fluid roles women undertake within contemporary conflicts. In doing so, this paper challenges various gendered assumptions that often misconstrue, in particular, Muslim female participation in political violence. Through insights into female participation and agency beyond the dominant notion of victimhood and jihadi bride narrative, this paper aims to further our understanding of how female foreign fighters contribute both directly and indirectly to contemporary conflict.

SECTARIAN VIOLENCE & EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN: A WAY FORWARD

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Abstract

'Sectarian Violence' implies 'the use of physical force by members of one or more sects or groups with an intention to hit or kill each other'. In Pakistan's perspective, Sectarian Violence refers to attacks against a target's sect and is usually referred to open conflict between Shia and Sunnis. Sectarian 'fault lines' have far reaching regional and global consequences. Sectarian Violence is multicausal and has roots in various social, political and geopolitical factors along with the regional context of the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Pakistan sectarianism is an inherited phenomenon from the Sub continent and it has been accentuated due to the fact that emerging Pakistani regimes paid no attention to the peace and stability of Pakistani society and acted under the influence of the foreign powers to serve their interests. As a fallout of War on Terror, Pakistan is facing daunting socio, politico, economic and security issues and the current sectarian situation in Pakistan came about gradually as a result of pro sectarian policies pursued by the Pakistani regimes and partly as a reaction of Pakistan's involvement in war on terror. This paper highlights the factors contributing to Sectarian Violence and suggests the way forward to eliminate political violence of all sorts as non-violence is the only solution to end violence and build long lasting peace. It is found that dehumanization and demonization of each other's sect by religious clerics deepen the Sectarian divide and add fuel to the fire. State has vital role in controlling structural violence lest sectarian tensions transform into sectarian violence.

Keywords: Sectarianism, extremism, Pakistan

Introduction

Sectarian violence represents a major disturbance to the physical and economic survival of the civilian population, whether riots, gang wars, ethnic clashes, guerrilla insurgencies or rebellions. Larger than its individual perpetrators, sectarian violence is a contagion of destructive attitudes and behaviors that destroys not just human life, social trust, local government and ability to provide for and thrive in diverse groups (Carpenter, 2013).

'Sectarian Violence' refers to the use of physical force between different sects or groups in a society with an intention to hurt or kill. In a Pakistani context, sectarian violence principally refers to aggression or open conflict between Shia and Sunni groups which are the two leading sects in Pakistan. In Pakistan an overwhelming majority of 95% of Pakistani population belongs to Sunnis and only 5% belongs to Shia sect.

Historically, the first major wave of sectarian trends emerged during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when with politicization of Islam under Zia's era, sectarianism grew in the country. The internal policies of the then military ruler (Zia ul Haque) coincided well with and suited the emerging interests of USA when the former USSR attacked Afghanistan and Pakistan entered Afghanistan to fight a proxy US war against the former USSR. During the same era, a massive wave of sectarianism and related violence was seen in the country pushing the Pakistani society to new higher levels of sectarian violence. As Zia also pledged unconditional support of Afghan Jihadi groups that led to the arming and supporting of the Jihadi groups who held strong views regarding minorities, particularly Shias. These trends supported sectarianism and provided institutional set up for sectarianism. In pursuant during the 1990's, sectarian violence stayed on as the Pakistani state allowed them to flourish as part of its efforts to support sectarian groups deemed to be waging jihad war in Indian-held Kashmir in pursuance of achieving a strategic lead against India.

History seems to have repeated itself only a decade later when 9/11 brought an acute wave of terrorism towards Pakistani soil primarily caused by Pakistan's involvement in US-led global war on terror. Sectarian violence followed suit in Pakistan and the incidents of sectarian violence have been rising in numbers and intensity. The policies of emerging Pakistani regimes allowed the situation to worsen while making it possible for the external powers to exploit sectarian trends for their global interests.

With this backdrop, sectarianism today remains a complex phenomenon in Pakistan. It has deep roots in the country's political history and has been shaped by a host of reasons that range from domestic policies of successive governments to the geo strategic location of Pakistan to proxy wars fought by foreign powers. However, trends in sectarian divides over time show how violence has spiked in the post September 11 period. Questions abound what factors contributed to the rise of sectarian violence in Pakistan and what are the prospects of sectarianism in Pakistan? This study will carry out a qualitative study to address these questions.

Sectarianism has badly hit the civic life in all major parts of the country and the peace and security situation in Pakistan has gone from bad to worse over the last few decades. The emerging political and military regimes have always responded with plans and actions but any lasting solutions of rising sectarianism have always been elusive. Pakistan continues to live in the web of worsening economic, political, financial and cultural crises augmented further by the growing sectarianism over the last few decades.

Pakistan has an unparalleled geostrategic location in the region which twice led to Pakistan's involvement in Afghan jihad in 1980s and then after September 11. Pakistan has also been actively involved in providing support in several regional proxy wars. Examples are for Saudi Arabia, Iran and Afghanistan where Pakistan supported different factions. Owing to Pakistan's geostrategic location, it has been actively involved in the cold war and played a decisive role in ousting the Russian empire from Afghanistan enabling a US victory over the former USSR during cold war decades.

Sectarian trends prevalent in Pakistan got aggravated with the use of advanced technology by terrorist networks. Suicide bombings, explosives, suicide jackets, fixed and non fixed detonation devices, remote control bombs and explosives and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) are few to name in addition to conventional means of creating havoc and terror.

The study of Pakistan's internal sectarian issues deserves to be carried out in conjunction with the study of external factors contributing towards them. The two can be linked together to understand the problem in totality in order to find lasting solutions for sectarianism in Pakistan. We precisely seek to attempt this task in this paper.

Objectives:

To identify the factors contributing towards sectarian violence in Pakistan

To suggest way forward to eliminate Sectarian Violence and extremism in Pakistan

Significance of the Research

Today the world is living in a chaos and dispersion. Muslim world is divided into Sectarian fault lines threatening the peace and stability of not only Muslim countries but the human civilization around the globe shares the uncertain future due to this looming danger. Violence is a transnational phenomenon and sectarian violence destroys without doing discrimination among innocent and the guilty. This is one of the most crucial topics to be researched to make the Muslims united, educated and harmonized. Thus its significance is obvious and beyond any doubt. Muslims, especially in Pakistan, are on the verge of strife and self destruction. They are entangled into this quagmire especially after Russian invasion of Afghanistan which paved way for Saudi Arabia to enter into power play of this region. The Iranian revolution in the same year gave birth to another predicament. This critical venture of history left Muslims of this country killing, slaughtering and dehumanizing each other. The study signifies to explore and identify the major factors and dynamics behind this blood bath so that the policy makers could devise policies vehemently for the well being of the people of this land and inhabitants of the world at large.

Literature Review:

Rehana (2014) focuses that since inception of Pakistan, new sects were developed in the society resultantly due to different reasons non-Muslims became insecure about their rights in a Muslim state. The writers of

this article hold view that whenever military government became dominant in history of Pakistan it downplayed liberal and democratic powers of Pakistan and religious parties got profited from this. The writers also mention in this article that world's political scenario has been changed since 9/11 incident in U.S.A and Pakistan was a major ally of U.S.A in war against terror. Because of this a door was opened for extremist's elements. According to this article sectarian conflicts in Pakistan became prominent due to some external forces for example Shia people get assistance from Iran against Sunni people and on the other hand Sunni people are helped by Saudi Arabia and U.A.E against Shia minority in Pakistan. In this article writers have also suggested some strategies to minimize sectarian conflicts.

Nadeem (2014) elaborates sectarianism means a country having same religion with diverse views. People of every sect believe that they are serving their sect and religion. But in reality, they are creating religious violence which in turn converts the religion of peace into religion of extremism. Writer says that Islam is a religion of peace and comfort for all. Islam respects the faith of minorities and side by side teaches tolerance, equality, justice and Islam respects values and cultures also. According to teachings of Quran whosoever kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is hell. Most of so called Mullah, Peer, and Imams, exploit innocent individuals on the name of religion by teaching them that all other sects are enemies of Islam and they should be killed to enter in heaven. In short, all these sects made Islam a religion of extremists in front of western media and because of this religious violence innocent people suffer. No matter, Shias are killed or Sunnis are killed, all it is called killing of Muslims and this killing leaves a bad impression on international community. So, Pakistan should develop laws and enforce such laws for human development and security of citizens.

Paul (2014) has believed that the history repeated itself in post 9/11 when US again chose Pakistan to fight a proxy US war on terror. The geostrategic location of Pakistan is simultaneously a blessing and a curse for Pakistan which attracts global powers and Pakistani elite to play the international games. This implies that the writers believe that the geostrategic location of Pakistan is a blessing as well as a curse as global powers keep coming back to Pakistan for their interests and make Pakistan a part of the global power play whether it is for economic reasons or for the cultural or ideological reasons.

Saima Afzal and others in "Sectarianism and its Implications for Pakistan Security: Policy Recommendations Using Exploratory Study" (2012) discussed background and motivation to Sectarian violence in Pakistan, including the Internal and External Factors of Sectarianism Zia Islamization Policy, The Iranian Islamic Revolution, The Saudi conservative religious indoctrination, Iran Iraq War, The Soviet Union Invasion of Afghanistan proved contributory in rampant sectarian violence. The writers have outlined no. of policy recommendations considering Sectarian violence is 'real threat' to the security of Pakistan.

Ahmed (2011) in his book "Sectarian War: Pakistan's Sunni-Shia Violence and its links to the Middle East" traces the growth of sectarianism in Pakistan. He sees the surge in sectarianism as a parallel development to the rise of extremism and intolerance which had its origins in the Zia era. He evaluates the development and solidification of Pakistan's religion-based nationalist discourse through the decades and charts the origins and politics of Pakistani sectarian organisations and explains how the Sunni-Shia schism in the Middle East was shifted to Pakistan in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and how it turned

into a proxy war between Iran and Sunni Arab states led by Saudi Arabia with the connivance of Pakistani military dictator Zia-ul-Haq. The book further links recent sectarian violence in and out of Pakistan with the shift in Al-Qaida's focus to include Muslim targets which were perceived to be "collaborating" with the West in the so called War on Terror. He criticizes the role of militant nexus played in turning Pakistan into a cesspit of sectarianism and terrorism. A big share of blame lies with the Pakistani establishment which fostered ties with those groups in pursuit of strategic advantage in Kashmir and Afghanistan at the cost of great social instability at home and abroad.

Another notable scholar on the subject is Moonis Ahmar, who discusses the various types of extremism in Pakistan in his paper. Regarding the causes of extremism in Pakistan "there are three schools of thought that define the phenomenon of extremism in Pakistan. First, those who consider the policies of military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq responsible for nourishing Islamic extremists for perpetuating his rule. Second, those who believe that extremism, militancy and terrorism deepened in Pakistan because of the role of the Army and the intelligence agencies. Third, those who consider the failure of the state and society in dealing with the unresolved social and political issues on which extremism nurtures" (Ahmar, 2005).

Ahmar compares Shia Sunni conflict in Pakistan with that of Irish in his Article "Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: some lessons from the Irish experience". He discusses the Conflict management and varied approaches to solve the problem. He further discusses how Pakistan became battleground of Saudi and Iranian sects of Islam promoting sectarian violence. He depicts the similarities and differences in the Sectarian conflicts in Pakistan and Northern Ireland in tabular forms and asserts that from Irish experience certain lessons can be learnt.

Cordesman (2011) in "Pakistan: Violence vs. Stability" discusses that events surrounding the death of Osama Bin Laden make all too clear, Pakistan is passing through one of the most dangerous periods of instability in its history. This instability goes far beyond Al Qaida, the Taliban, and the war in Afghanistan. A net assessment of the patterns of violence and stability indicate that Pakistan is approaching a perfect storm of threats, including rising extremism, a failing economy, chronic underdevelopment, and an intensifying war, resulting in unprecedented political, economic and social turmoil. The assessment shows that these broad patterns of violence in Pakistan have serious implications for Pakistan's future, for regional stability, and for core US interests. Discussing the bleak side he also mentions the silver line of hope in the form of its vigorous civil society and its talented secular elite and hence not a case of terminal decline.

Firdous(2009) The year 1979, due to two major incidents sowed seeds of sectarianism. These two major events had substantial impact on the sectarian dynamics in Pakistan and beyond: the Iranian revolution and the Russian invasion of the Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 can be considered as the starting point of Saudi funding to Sunni Muslims combating for religious or political goals. That war in particular was an event to affirm wahhabism as the true belief, in sharp contrast to the atheism promoted by communists and the conflicted Islam followed by Saints and Shias .

Hassan Abbas (2005) in his book, Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror chalks out chronological account of growing extremism in Pakistan. The author's historic account of

the subject starts from as early as first Muslim invasion of Indian subcontinent. He attributes the growth of extremism in parallel to events in the history.

Ahmar (2005) discussed new paradigms of sectarian conflict. Since 1980s Pakistan is been facing the sectarian conflicts because of which killing has been tremendously increased. If we talk about 20th century the years 2003 to 2005 had been named as bloodiest year in the history because most of Shia and Sunni religious schools were attacked and their religious leaders were murdered during these years. According to a BBC news report, 4000 people had been killed in 2005 due to sectarian violence. Writer of this article suggests a policy of peace and reconciliation is needed for the solution of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. Not only militant sectarian groups dividing the Shia, Sunni communities, they also enhancing the sectarian violence and there are also number of internal and external factors which are working as a fuel on sectarian fire.

Zaman (1998) asserted that war and peace cannot take place at the same time. Sadly, today, the indelible stains of blood are accumulating on Muslims' faces. They have tarnished even the image of Islam .The woes of the people have grown tremendously which demand for complete and timely solution.

Shah (1997) has believed that Pakistan possesses multiple features of Middle Eastern, South Asian and Central Asian state not only because of its geographical location but also because of its ethnic and cultural compositions which highlights that Pakistani people and culture has a potential to blend well with the regional cultures and can play role in promoting peace and harmony in the region after uprooting sectarian violence and causes which nourish this menace.

Methodology:

A qualitative research based upon secondary sources has been conducted. All the data has been collected through journals, books and news paper articles. Data has been analyzed through content analysis and arranged in to different tables and figures.

Dynamics of Sectarianism

Setting The Stage

It seems easier to take into account Pakistan's political problems or internal chaos but these are symbolic of the nation's problems as they highlight the cause. Symptoms identify that the disease is chronic. Phenomenon of Sectarian Violence cannot be understood in isolation. The rising trends and patterns of terrorism, insurgency and violence must be considered in the context of Pakistan's overall political landscape, key problems and challenges like poverty and unemployment, illiteracy, population explosion and failure of the democratic governments to ensure the good governance and the reform of the security sector.




Figure 1.Sectarian Violence in Pakistan (1989-2014) Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal-2014

The situation is deplorable and frequency of sectarian onslaught is high in number. and severity. The country is passing through its difficult times and spill over effect of this violence is affecting the other countries seemingly having its traces back to rivalry of dominant players especially Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Internal Factors:

1). Zia's Islamization& politicization of religion:

The process of Islamization, initiated by General Zia ul Haq left the Shi'ah community of Pakistan greatly concerned as it had treated all the people of Pakistan under the same law i.e., Hanfi law. This created a sort of tension between Shi'ahs and government. This further led to the protests by Shi'ah leaders. They had demands about implementation of Hudod Ordinance on Shi'ahs in accordance with Jafrī fiqh.

In July 1980, government failed to control countrywide demonstrations of Shia community. Ultimately, Zia met with the Shi'ah's leaders and on 6th July 1980 Mohammad Haroon, the minister for religious affairs, and Mufti Jafar Hussain, the Tehreek Nifaz-e-Fiqh Jafariya (TNFJ) leader, jointly signed an agreement called Islamabad Agreement. The agreement proclaims that the Shi'ahs will be treated according to their own fiqh. It was due to this Islamization programme that the Shi'ah felt the need to form a political organization of their own that could safeguard their interests(Rizvi,2003).

2). Politicization of Shi'ah:

Tehrik Nifaz-i- Fiqha Jaffaria was formed in April 1979 as a reaction to the Zia's Islamization programme and the psychological boost received from the Iran Revolution with Mufti Jafar Hussain as its first president. For the first time the party stood for the rights of the Shi'ah community in Pakistan, when Zia promulgated Zakat and Ushr Ordinance in 1980. It was due to this reason that Zia acceded to the

demands of Shi'ahs by concluding 'Islamabad Agreement' with Mufti Jafar Hussain in July 1980. After the demise of Mufti Jafar Hussain in August 1983, the party leadership went into the hands of Allama Arif Hussain al-Hussaini.

The operation activities of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) were mostly confined to the Northern Areas and some parts of NWFP in its early years. However, with the formation of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which the TJP claims, is an Iraqi puppet organization to counter the revolution, the party moved to Punjab also. As the SSP grew in strength, the TJP became more and more militant. From being a defensive organization, it became the aggressor on a number of occasions (Khan, 1994).

The assassination of Allama Arif Hussain al-Hussaini in August 1988, was greatly resented by the Shi'ah community all over the world. Allegations were made that he was killed due to his anti-Zia, anti-US and pro-Iran policies. Allama's assassination did spark Shi'ah-Sunnī riots in his native Kurram Agency, where sectarian fanatics turn every issue and dispute into clash between the two sects (Jalalzai, 1998).

After the 1988 polls the Tehrik (movement) changed its name to Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) and established itself as a political party and the sole representative of the Shi'ahs in Pakistan. The group felt that Tehrik's focus had shifted from religion to politics (Jalalzai, 2002).

3). Religious disparities

Pakistan can be identified as an extremely plural country which consists of numerous religious, ethno-linguistic and sectarian groups. The country is by and large composed of Muslim community. Among the Muslims, Sunnis are in majority and almost 80 percent population is Muslims, While Shia Muslim constitute 12 to 15 percent of population. A significant number of Ahmadis are also present in Pakistan which was declared as non-Muslim in 1974 by the national assembly of Pakistan. There are a number of non-Muslim minorities like Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Kalash, Sikhs and Parsis who are recognized as non-Muslim Pakistani.

According to researchers religious segregation is one of the leading factors of growing sectarianism. They said that various religious factions antagonize each other and mirror that their faith and belief set reflects an absolute religion. They are not ready to harmonize with the different views of the opposite sect and this state of intolerance leads to sectarianism. They said that the educational institution is also responsible for creating intolerance along with the religious educational institutions. They were agreed on the point that biasness and prejudice is circulated and disseminated against opposing sect in classrooms and mosques. Although many Pakistanis do not endorse this type of negative stereotypes, but the authorities fail to curb the hate speech and negative stereotypes. The easy availability of weapons adds fuel to the fire and provides opportunity to the extremist groups to spread violence (Khan, 2017).

Religious intolerance is growing since the last two decades in Pakistan. Every sect is intolerant towards the opposing sect. This state of intolerance has deeply affected the minorities of Pakistan. There is sense of insecurity among minorities. Wall chalking is always proactive against the minorities. Such walk chalking is used to spread hatred against a targeted community (Razia, 2014).

4). Emergence of Sectarian Organizations:

Sectarian organizations have played a key role in promoting the sectarian violence. The emergence of such organizations took place during Afghan-Russian war. The emergence of these sectarian organizations is very interesting. These emerged from the main stream religious parties of Pakistan. However, their functionality is totally different than their parent organizations. These splinter groups are far more dangerous than their parent organizations. Easy access to arms for these organizations in Pakistan aggravates the situation. These groups are not accountable to anyone for their activities, though

government has started taking actions to curb violent activities but that seems a disproportionate effort while keeping in view the magnitude of the problem.

A vast amount of religious literature based on hate speech is circulated to common masses by these organizations. It is through this offensive literature that restlessness is created among the followers. There is not a single page in all these pamphlets and booklets which will not fall under the offence of 'incitement to religious hatred.' The fire of sectarian hatred is also ignited by speeches delivered by leaders of these sectarian groups. (Musa, 2002).

5).Political Turmoil:

Pakistan falls among few countries who are rich in natural resources but lack political and economic stability due to cluster of issues. Mal governance or poor performance of the political governments has created many issues. It has generated trust deficit among masses and developed a sense of discomfort with government policies to solve the problems of common masses. Lack of effective planning has contributed towards the gap between the poor and richer stratas of the society. Root cause of many problems is linked with extreme poverty and illiteracy. Governments remained unsuccessful in creating democratic institutions which can articulate demands of all sects in society to policy formulations. Hence, divide among sects is wider due to the lack of institutionalization of political and legal institutes. Finding alienated and aloof in the system people resort to violence and fall an easy prey to foreign funding, unknowing the consequences for their families and generations to come.

Lack of leadership and absence of democratic norms have further aggravated the sectarianism in Pakistan. For almost 35 years State remained under military rule. The governments of Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League may be taken as a struggle for self-supremacy rather than strengthening democratic institutions. Virtually every successive government did just the opposite to the vision of their founding fathers which was based on freedom and equality to all.

6).Lack of check on religious seminaries:

Historically, Madaris had played a crucial role in imparting knowledge and serving the Islamic societies. Its

contribution in serving the society, strengthening and transferring Islamic values is stretched over the ages. No doubt Madrassas are prevailing in Pakistan since its inception but its role in serving the state and society on both social and educational level has never been controversial. After the dawn of 21st century and the event of 9/11, the institution of madrassa received prominence. In 2002, as many as 239 religious organizations were working in Pakistan, pursuing similar agendas (Amir, 2011).

The international media linked this incident of terror with Islamic militancy; and countless research has been

published that alleged the role of madrassa in promoting extremism and militancy (**Mehmood, 2012**).

After 9/11 Pakistani government started taking steps towards registration of Madaris and lot of efforts are

needed to upgrade their education systems according to contemporary requirements.

Role of Madaris is not negative in all cases but the brainwashing is so comprehensive that students of every different sect start believing themselves the only true Muslims around the world and others

inherently wrong which speaks intolerance in the society by not accepting and respecting the right of difference of opinion (**Khan,1995**).

Government by providing logistic support and supervisory check to these religious seminaries may transform them into worth joining platforms for the young learners belonging to poor families.

7).Social Injustice and unfair treatment of minorities:

Pakistan holds a long history of constitutional development. The equality in fundamental rights is ensured to

all the minority groups in almost all the three Constitutions. Article 26 (1) disapproves all sorts of religious discrimination, similarly article 36 ensures equal protection to the minorities. It is the supreme duty of the government to ensure the equal rights to the Minorities in Pakistan. However, despite of these constitutional amendments the Minorities have the grievances regarding their rights.

Research shows that being minority group they are treated unequally and the government should adopt such policies towards the minority groups which can ensure their rights. It is claimed that Pakistani Government comes under severe criticism for not providing equal opportunities to the minorities. About 180 million Pakistanis are Sunni Muslim. In recent years mostly the minority in Pakistan, including Shiite Muslims, Christians and Hindus have been targeted in attacks by religious extremists (Dawn,2010).

The wave of religious intolerance and extremism greatly affects the minorities in Pakistan. The minorities have psychological pressures. They have feeling of insecurity and inferiority (Razia,2014).

Lack of Islamic values i.e. intolerance and disrespect to divergent views have sown the seeds of hatred towards religious minorities.

Foreign factors

Apart from domestic anti-state elements, external actors have contributed in sponsoring sectarianism in Pakistan some times directly or indirectly. Nearly all sectarian groups, operating in Pakistan, seek financial aid from one or another foreign state and those states support such organizations and religious groups for their own agenda. "The pattern of events suggests that sectarianism is masterminded by internal and external forces that use the indoctrinated youth to further their own interests" (International Crisis Group, 2005).

There are notable factors of foreign influence with reference to sectarian divide in Pakistan.

Developments taking place in the Arab World and Middle Eastern countries have link and impact on the religious elite in Pakistan. They identify themselves with some of Arab and Middle Eastern countries and consider themselves the guardian of those countries' interests in Pakistan.

The identity mobilization has its genesis in the political struggle in a weak state. This political struggle within a state by different segments paves way for the externals to influence the body politic. Same is the case with Pakistan. The sectarian violence demonstrates that the power struggle at local level is combined with

the interest of international actors to settle identity rift in the political process.

1).Power politics

One of the most important factor contributes to sectarian violence in Pakistan is power politics. At local level there is a power struggle between different groups and institutions. It is asserted that mostly political leaders are the facilitators of sectarian differences for personal gains as they create division under the pretext of 'divide and rule'.

On the national level the power struggle emanates between different political parties. There are many historic instances where electoral support was gained from different sectarian groups. The national level political parties make alliances with respective sectarian group. The electoral alliance in 1989 by Peoples Party with Sipa e Sahaba group and the electoral alliance of Pakistan Muslim League (N) with the same group in Jhang district are the most notable examples.

On international level this power play further deepens sectarian divide in Pakistan with assertive role of Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran. Mostly fundamentalism is exported by these two countries along with active foreign funding to religious groups.

2).The Iran Saudi proxy wars:

According to several researches it is claimed that Deobandi sect believes that after the Iranian revolution, the Shia led Iranian governments started to mobilize Shia community in the rest of the world to empower them. Sunnis believe that it is Iran that supports the Shias both morally and financially to promote sectarian violence. Similarly, insights revealed that Shia community mostly blamed that the Saudi Arabia patronizes the sectarian violence. They are funding the religious Maddaris as well as the jihadi militants. The motive behind this agenda is to promote Wahhabism in the rest of the world (Mahsood, 2017).

A United States based Pakistani researcher states that, initially the Iranian were involved in assisting Pakistan's Shia with money; this was the reason that Zia ul haq invited Saudis to help in assisting Pakistani Sunni group. Soon the Sunni becomes in a position to attack Shia minority to purify Pakistan from Shia heterodoxy. As a

result, Shia community also organized themselves to tackle Sunni extremist in a same way (International Crisis Group, 2005).

A specialized French scholar in Islamic affairs Oliver Roy said that the Iranian role in Shia awakening led to Sunni reaction which is violent. This violent reaction first started in Pakistan and then escalated in Middle East (Kazi, 2013).

3).Iranian Revolution:

Iranian revolution in 1979 had far reaching impact on Shi'ah-Sunni relations in Pakistan. Khomeini equated this with Islamic Revolution and expressed his will to expand this revolution to neighbouring countries.

Iranian version of Jihad and the teachings of Khomeini were circulated in Pakistan through printed pamphlets through its established institutions. Top leadership of Shi'ahs in Pakistan was approached by Iranian leaders, showing their religious sympathies towards them. The Shi'ahs of Pakistan also looked to Iran for spiritual guidance. They held Khomeini in great esteem. Iran made jihad related movies to infuse the spirit of jihad among the Shi'ahs and to raise them against the government.

On the other hand, Sunnī community also got active against Shi'ahs. They targeted Shi'ahs in their private meetings and public processions. The ex-head of the SSP, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, chanted the slogan Shi'ah kafir, meaning Shi'ahs are 'infidel'. They distributed literature against Shi'ah and Khomeini among the people, pasted these on walls and buses. Mosques became source of spreading hatred against each other rather than the source of providing religious guidance to the common people. These hostile policies of both sects created sectarian hatred between them (**Adil,1997**).

4).Afghan Jihad & Soviet intervention in Afghanistan:

During Afghan Jihad Pakistani society got exposed to extremely dangerous involvement into US proxy war in Afghanistan against Soviet forces. Financial and military help started to flow into Pakistan for the Afghan mujāhidīn (those who fight jihād) from USA, Saudi Arabia and other anti-Soviet countries. This help of money and weapons were either channeled through military government or religious groups such as Jama'at-e-Islamī. Within no time, funds and weapons intended for mujāhidīn started making their way into the hands of religious groups within Pakistan. This development led to the emergence of the Kalashnikov culture in Pakistan

The outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan, after the defeat of the Soviet forces, added a new grave dimension to sectarianism in Pakistan. New sanctuaries and training centres emerged in different parts of Afghanistan which further deepened the sectarian divide in Pakistan. Places like Khost and Kunar became training centres for Sunnī extremists. Hazarajat area provided training to Shi'ah militants of Pakistan(Abbas,2003).

5). Foreign Powers' role in Sectarianism:

Iran Iraq war which was war of two ideologies than two countries impacted the sectarian divide in Pakistan. Other than Muslim countries role of USA and India cannot be ignored to support sectarian differences in Pakistan for their vested interests.

The incident of 9/11 and the initiation of War on terror with the invasion of Afghanistan had a grave impact on Pakistan. Musharraf's commitment to join war on terror has severe implications for the overall security situation in Pakistan. The US needed to involve Pakistan due to its geo strategic position. There were also other reasons behind the purpose to involve Pakistan in this war. First the US has in their minds the previous successful alliance with Pakistan during Afghan-USSR conflict. Secondly Pakistani administrations sympathetic behavior towards Afghan Taliban feared the US that Pakistan can provide support to Taliban to prevent disaster. A French researcher Oliver Roy stated that there are two events that created a huge change related to Shia Sunni relation, the revolution in Iran and American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. America is trying their level best to create instability and to achieve their greedy interest. Much like Al Qaeda and the Islamic states is trained and assisted by USA to design terror and to control oil rich Muslim world (Mahsood,2017).

Pakistani political party Jamaat-e-Ulma Islam JUI (Q) leader Ajmal Qadri claims that India and its Intelligence agency (RAW) are involved for attacks in Pakistan based on sectarianism. "No Pakistani agency can be involved in terrorism. I am certain of that. It is RAW". He also asserted that the Pakistani

agencies simply blame the foreign hand in promoting sectarianism, but it would be better to arrest and prosecute the culprits.

India had never sincerely accepted the Pakistani state and always tries to destabilize it. Pakistan intelligence agencies have acquired strong proofs of Indian involvement in aiding terrorism and instability in Pakistan. It had also acquired proofs against Indian aiding of sectarian organizations Baluchistan. Pakistan has decided to raise the issue at Global level according to Maliha Lodhi (Minhas,2015).



Figure 2. Contributory Factors of Sectarianism

Source: Author's Own

Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: 1989-2018

Year	Incidents	Killed	Injured
1989	67	18	102
1990	274	32	328
1991	180	47	263
1992	135	58	261
1993	90	39	247
1994	162	73	326
1995	88	59	189
1996	80	86	168

Table 1.
Violence in
till February

Source:

			Sectarian
1997	103	193	Pakistan*Data
1998	188	157	18,2018
1999	103	86	
2000	109	149	
2001	154	261	
2002	63	121	
2003	22	102	
2004	19	187	
2005	62	160	
2006	38	201	
2007	341	441	
2008	97	306	
2009	106	190	
2010	57	509	
2011	30	203	
2012	173	507	
2013	131	558	
2014	91	208	
2015	53	276	
2016	35	137	
2017	16	231	
2018	0	0	
Total*	3067	5718	11224+

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>

Conclusion

It is concluded that Sectarianism means to divide people on religious lines and gain vested interests i.e.political or economic.It has been highlighted through this paper that motivators of sectarian violence count for both internal and external factors. Sectarianism and extremism has hit Pakistan severly in last 3 decades and social fabric of the country is shattered mainly due to this menace.Perpetual negligence and delay in devising creative interventions aimed at reducing sectarian conflict could jeopardize the social cohesion and harmony in Pakistan. Ulemas/scholars role should be differet than religious entrepreneurs.Sectarian trends are on rise in Pakistan and sectarian violence is turning into active war from passive cross sect speeches to declare wars on the name of religion calling each other ‘infidels’.There could be better ways for resolving the tensions among different sects than resorting to

violence. Government has to play a decisive role in curbing religious extremism and violence of all kinds in all its manifestations. Experts have consensus that Pakistan's education system, an important factor in inciting intolerance, must be reformed. Better governance and enhancing economic opportunity will also make it more difficult for radical elements to influence the country's burgeoning youth. Shattered Political and Economic Landscape will raise only dissatisfied and divided individuals who will resort to extreme ends for their survival. Reintegration of extremist elements is extremely important and process of deradicalization could only be started with a willful responsible government and a hopeful air in the current despair.

Peace is a better buy for all times ultimately, serving the long run interest and survival of divergent religious communities living in already a volatile world.

Remedies and a Way Forward:

Pakistan is marred with sectarian differences and other related enigmas. Lack of sincere leadership, political crises, economic under development, unrest in the society and proxy wars and Kalashnikov culture have ruined the soft image of Pakistan which was once famous for its vibrance and natural beauty.

Recommendations to the State:

It is prime responsibility of the state to maintain law and order in the country through its Law enforcement agencies.

State institutions must be up to date and preemptive of the potential threats.

Intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies must be in best and timely coordination with each other.

Para Military forces should be given proper training with regard to handling and controlling of violent mobs without using weapons for sake of avoiding civilian casualties as violence generates more violence.

State should be neutral and balanced in its policies towards different sects.

Selection and appointment of Imams of Mosques should be on merit basis.

State should provide joint platforms to Ulamas of different sects to enter into dialogue and peaceful exchange of views.

State should devise mechanism to eradicate poverty, promote balanced education system for all and enhance capacity of its institutions through good governance as it is mostly social and economic causes which lead to violence and extremism apart from religious grounds.

Reintegration of the extremist elements and families of killed extremists is of utmost importance to control damage which if uncontrolled, will cause more harm to the society.

Destabilizing the terror networks by advance use of technology

Deradicalization by provision of healthy opportunities in society to uplift economic conditions

A transnational and pan continental effort is needed to promote peace and to reintegrate extremist people in the society by rehabilitation rather than repudiation

Capacity building of Government and the governed is paramount to survive and thrive in the fast paced changing modern day advanced world

Recommendations to the Religious Clergy/Ulema:

The Ulema should play their role in eliminating the misconceptions about various sects.

They should try to abridge the gap between different divergent views and develop census among opposing sects

They should try for censes building.

They should avoid irritating speeches.

They should promote brotherhood through Quranic injunctions and Sunnah of Prophet (Peace be upon him).

In case of emergency, it is the duty of the religious scholars to come forward and control people of their own sect.

Ulema should put their efforts together for joint prayer meetings and difference of opinion should be tolerated.

Core values of Islam should be propagated i.e. tolerance, respect to all and perseverance in the society should be promoted

Other Recommendations:

Role of NGOs:

Non Governmental sector plays a vital role in influencing the public opinion. NGOs can play an important role in creating awareness among people of different sects to live peacefully and cordially.

Work of NGOs should also be under surveillance of state institutions so foreign actors promoting sectarian divide may be checked and spotted in doing so.

NGOs should not take part in any activity which divides the society on Sectarian lines.

Role of civil society:

It is the responsibility of every individual apart from governmental and non governmental institutions to promote peace and provoke peaceful co-existence. Civil society collectively should stand for:

Intra & inter faith harmony

Promotion of dialogue for peace

Acceptance of diversity and respect for differences or difference of opinion

Culture of respect for all

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MOROCCO'S APPROACHES IN COUNTERING RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

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Abstract

No one can deny that religious extremism has become a major issue in today's globalized world. In fact, it has become a major threat in many parts of the world. In Morocco and starting from 2003, after a series of suicide attacks in Casablanca, the country has declared war on religious extremism. Since then the Moroccan government has been adopting a comprehensive strategy in an attempt to roll back and defeat this serious phenomenon. In fact, the kingdom of Morocco is viewed as a world model of success in countering religious extremism because of its efficient multifaceted approaches. The latter include hard security measures, cooperation and intelligence sharing, the promotion of a moderate form of Islam, deradicalization and human development projects, among others. The aim of the present paper is threefold. First, it will briefly discuss the main reforms which have recently been implemented in the religious field. Then, it will try to shed light on the country's multidimensional approaches in its ongoing efforts to fight religious extremism. Finally, it will stress the crucial roles of two religious institutions, namely Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution and Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchedines* and *Morchedates* in combating religious extremism. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations to maximize the benefits that are likely to be obtained from the country's efforts in countering religious extremism.

Keywords: Countering Extremism; Morocco; Religious Education; Multidimensional Approaches; Reforms

Introduction

Extremism has become a serious phenomenon threatening many parts of the world today. In Morocco and starting from 2003, after a series of suicide attacks in Casablanca, the country has declared war on religious extremism. The Moroccan government has been evolving a comprehensive strategy to roll back and defeat this problem. The aim of the paper is to highlight the country's multifaceted approaches in countering extremism and discuss the role of two religious institutions in the kingdom's war on extremism.

The paper is divided into three main sections. The first one presents a brief account on the major religious reforms in the kingdom. Morocco's approaches in fighting extremism is the concern of the second section, and the third section discusses the role of religious schools in countering this problem with a special reference to Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution as a pioneer school of religious studies and Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchedines* and *Morchedates*.

Major Religious Reforms in Morocco

Since the advent of the new king, Mohammed VI, clear signs of reforms have been noticed in various fields like the economy, the media, administration, human rights, education and the religious field. The reforms in the latter have taken different forms, namely the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, the national and local councils of *Ulamaas*, and the institutions in charge of training religious professionals (Lotfi, 2006). The main aim of these reforms is "*the renewal of the religious field in order to protect Morocco from extremism and preserve its identity, which is marked by balance, moderation and tolerance*" (Royal speech, 2004).

At the level of the Ministry, new directorates were created. For example, we have "Directorate of Mosques Affairs" and "Directorate of Traditional Education". The former aims (1) to preserve architectural standards for mosques, (2) to prevent the foundation of "unofficial mosques" funded by undesirable sources and (3) to bring all Imams under a common line of religious discourse. The second directorate ensures that Islamic schools provide a good education and that their curricula conform to modern scientific knowledge. An in-service training program is also launched for existing Imams to update their knowledge and improve their skills in the use of modern communication tools to be closer to, and more effective with, their audiences.

There has also been a reorganization of the High Councils of *Ulamaas* (religious scholars). The country has one 'Supreme Council of *Ulamaas*', which is made up of 47 scholars, and there are 30 local scientific councils along with their 68 branches all over the kingdom (Halim, 2018). Also, a council for Moroccan immigrants has been created. The main role of the 'Supreme Council of *Ulamaas*' is "*to oversee all religious matters in the country and keep an eye on all forms of religious expressions and teachings that detract from the orientation of official Islam. Clearly the council would be alert to all forms of 'deviation' and what it perceives as extreme forms of Islamic discourse*" (Meghraoui, 2009: 202). Moreover, this body, whose major role is to ensure religious security, consists of both men and women with different professional backgrounds. Therefore, the members are required to (1) implement a profound modernization program for the sector, (2) provide advice to people, and (3) issue *fatwas* (legal opinion on religious matters) on important issues.

As far as the local branches are concerned, their creation was meant to serve different functions. In a message addressed by King Mohammed VI to the 'Supreme Council of *Ulamaas*' in April 2009, it was stressed that the local councils' main objectives are to "*contribute to strengthening the nation's spiritual*

security, ensuring the preservation of its religious doctrine, which is based on tolerant Sunni Islam...and to guide the people and combat those who hold extremist views” (Royal speech, 2009). At the international level, and in order to manage the religious orientation of Moroccan immigrants, the state has created the Council of *Ulamaas* for Moroccans living abroad. Its main aims are to cater for the needs of Moroccan and other Muslim immigrants, see to their day-to-day problems, make life easier for them, and make sure they keep to the main-line Islam, with its middle course and beautiful outlooks. It is important to mention that, according to Schwartz (2011), “*Moroccan Muslim emigrants account for sizable communities, with as many as a million in France, and large numbers in Spain and the Netherlands.*” In brief, the religious scholars have their influence “*in a number of domains, such as implementing the fundamentals of religion, especially in mosques, the intellectual enhancement of the caretakers of religion and of the general public, which would definitely curb negative phenomena such as terrorism*” (Toufiq, 2014).

Another major reform concerns the introduction of women as religious preachers or *Morchidates*. Initially, this innovative program began in a center in 2006, and, as of 2015, it became Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchidines* and *Morchidates*. The aim of this program is to provide female spiritual leaders with the necessary training to teach, interpret, and promote a moderate Islam. The ultimate goal is to prepare the next generation of Muslim religious leaders to counter extremist interpretations of Islam. Each *morchidate* is assigned to one or more mosques throughout the country. While they do not lead prayers, the *morchidates* give basic religious instruction in mosques and provide support in prisons, hospitals, and schools. The program serves both to spread Morocco’s message of tolerant Islam and to improve the role of women in a traditionally conservative domain. In fact, Islam did have many female scholars and preachers, but over the years the narrow interpretations of people deprived them of that scholarly role, and now this is simply being restored to them as a natural thing.

During a speech before the king in October 2017, the minister of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq, reported that the institute was hosting students from Mali, Guinea Conakry, Côte-d’Ivoire, Tunisia, France, Nigeria and Chad. The number of the Institute’s graduates from these countries had so far reached 712 imams and preachers. The minister added that 778 foreign students were currently pursuing their studies at the institute. Few months later and during the researcher’s visit to the institute last February, the director said that the number of the international students had increased and had reached 1200. Moreover, according to Abdelmajid Mouhib (personal communication), a professor at the institute and a member of the entrance exam committee, there are also students from the Gambia and Senegal, and the institute has received requests to train imams from twelve more African countries. Therefore, the program trains imams from Morocco and abroad to preach, practice, and teach moderate Islam. The program includes theoretical studies, lectures, seminars, and practical training. The courses are Arabic, Islamic jurisprudence, psychology, foreign languages, IT, human sciences, and history and politics. On the practical side, students are taught research skills, public speaking, and dialogue and persuasion methods. It is also worth noting that the institute aims to serve the individual and the specific needs of the countries requesting Imam training. In other words, since the national context in which each trainee will practice differs depending on their country of origin, the training programs are tailored to the individual needs of the requesting countries (Lazaar, Institute director, personal communication).

A very crucial aspect of the religious reforms in Morocco is the one which has been implemented in religious schools. For example, Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution has undergone profound reforms (see Khtou, 2012). Following a royal decree in 2005, various new subjects were introduced. The decree clearly stresses the need to make social sciences part and parcel of the curriculum as they are indispensable for a student of religious sciences. It also states that there is a need for a solid training for scholars who possess a deep knowledge of Islamic sciences and a mastery of their approaches. Moreover, these scholars need

to assimilate the noble purposes of Islam and to have good Arabic and foreign language skills, which would allow them to engage in ,among other things, interfaith dialogue and defend the Islamic values which are based on tolerance and mutual respect.

Morocco's Approaches in Countering Extremism

In order to thwart extremism, and unlike other countries in Africa and Europe, Morocco's strategy does not rely only on strengthening internal security. Its approaches are multidimensional, which has made Morocco gain an international recognition for its efforts.

Promoting Moderate Islam

Promoting a moderate form of Islam has been given much importance in the Moroccan approaches. Following the terrorist attacks in 2003, many people who were suspected of being directly or indirectly linked to the attacks were arrested. Immediately after, the Moroccan government realized that one of the important steps in the fight against extremism was to regain control of its mosques. It was discovered that hundreds of mosques across the country operated independent of government supervision. Therefore, it was found that the Casablanca attacks were in part the result of the extremist ideology preached in those mosques. This was mainly due to the fact that during the 1980s and 1990s, practices and lectures that contrasted with Morocco's brand of Islam were widespread in those mosques. As a result, the government decided to control and monitor mosques all over the kingdom in a way that left no room for radical groups to exploit the places of worship to spread their thoughts. Since then, every new mosque falls under the control of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs.

In order to present a modern image of Islam, resort has been made to the use of different types of information technologies. With the aim of promoting Morocco's practice of Islam and counter the radical views on Islam spread by some satellite channels based in the Gulf, the king decided to launch Mohammed VI TV channel and Mohammed VI radio station in October 2004. The programs are broadcast in both local and foreign languages. In addition to Arabic and Amazigh, French and English are used in some programs. This is in order to reach the widest possible audience both in Morocco and abroad. These channels are meant to promote moderate Islam that stresses tolerance and denounces all forms of extremism. Also, the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs has launched a website to stress the unique features of Moroccan Islam, which is grounded on the Maliki *Madhab* (Lotfi, 2006). Furthermore, Moroccan mosques are connected to a television network to air lessons and sermons with the purpose of spreading a more tolerant form of Islam and a uniform discourse.

It is worth noting that, in Morocco, the King is recognized as Commander of the Faithful and has both a religious and a political role. In fact, his religious authority shuts out radical proponents of political Islam. His influence even extends beyond Morocco to include certain parts of West Africa. In August 2016, King Mohammed VI delivered a speech in which he strongly condemned radical Islam stressing that "*those who engage in terrorism, in the name of Islam, are not Muslims, and their only link to Islam is the pretexts they use to justify their crimes and their folly. They have strayed from the right path, and their fate is to dwell forever in hell.*" In July 2015, King Mohammed VI launched the Mohammed VI Foundation for African *Ulamaas*, to support Moroccan and African theologians and scholars in promoting religious tolerance and moderation in the continent. The Foundation is also expected to support the creation of religious and scientific schools and cultural centers to spread the values of moderate Islam in those nations.

In addition to reorganizing the state's religious structures to protect citizens from extremist ideas, Morocco is also promoting scholarly research on the nation's Islamic values through the Mohammedan

League of Ulamaas. The latter has launched a series of books titled “Islam and Contemporary Context” whose aim is deconstruct radical discourse. As reported in Dasaa (2016), Ahmed Abaddi, Secretary General of the League, believes that countering violent extremism is not an easy task since it requires the combined efforts of society, practitioners and researchers. Therefore, he further argues that fostering an authentic, moderate religious discourse, which will offer a viable and appealing alternative to extremist ideology, has become necessary in this era of globalization and social media. Moreover, Abbadi has stressed the need for innovative educational strategies, engagement with youth through media and a commitment to the principles of human rights as the best ways to dismantle and counter extremist discourse (Dasaa, 2016).

2.2. Fighting Poverty

Given that most of those involved in the Casablanca attacks in 2003 had a poor background and that impoverished areas in cities often breed extremism, Morocco has realized that there is an urgent need to fight extreme poverty and all aspects of social exclusion. As Noury (2017) rightly argues reducing both extreme and relative poverty is a prerequisite for any nation’s development as well as for ensuring human rights to all its citizens.

To this end, one of the major steps taken is that the Moroccan king launched the National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD) in 2005. The program, as a solidarity project, aims at reducing poverty and improving economic conditions in poor areas. According to a report released by the Word Bank in 2015, four million Moroccans had benefited from the NIHD since it was launched. Moreover, in parallel to the initiative, numerous projects which aim at creating job opportunities have been launched. In a statement to the Maghreb Arab Press in October 2014, World Bank country director in the Maghreb, Simon Gray, said that Morocco succeeded in reducing both [extreme and relative poverty](#).

All the above-mentioned achievements are likely to empower the needy and alleviate poverty in various parts of the kingdom. However, there are other necessary measures to be taken to maximize the benefits of the initiative. For one thing, eradicating illiteracy should be given top priority to build the human capital in the country. Moreover, there is a need for effective governance in all types of administrations, a thing which will enable the country to really reduce poverty. Finally, innovative solutions within entrepreneurship are likely to play an important role in fighting poverty. In this regard, support and encouragement should be provided to the youth (Achy, 2010 and Noury, 2017).

Adopting Strict Security Measures

At the security level, Morocco is known for reinforcing its security apparatus. In fact, on many occasions, it has successfully managed to foil terrorist attacks before they happen. Moreover, it has been proven that Morocco’s intelligence services have played a key role in aborting [terrorist attacks](#) inside the kingdom and in various other countries such as France, Spain and Denmark. This proves that the kingdom has demonstrated its commitment to deeper cooperation with different countries to fight religious extremism. This coordination has allowed the country to provide crucial intelligence and operational support.

Moreover, Morocco has made reforms in the police and intelligence services, including the creation of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (CBJI). By bringing various elements of the security sector under a central institution, the CBJI works to bolster *“security governance nationwide within a legal and transparent framework”*. Another measure is the creation of the new security mechanism *“Hadar”*

(‘vigilance’ in Arabic). This plan aims to support the work of the government departments to protect citizens and foreigners. To make it more powerful, it incorporates elements of the Royal Armed Forces, Royal Gendarmerie, the Police, and Auxiliary Forces. Furthermore, Morocco is tightening its control over the borders with Algeria, along with reinforcing military presence in the southern borders. These measures came in reaction to the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bennis, 2015).

It is also worth mentioning that Morocco also uses a large network of informants and undercover agents that are operational throughout the country. Municipal auxiliary agents, known locally as the *Muqaddamin*, are famous in the country as crucial elements in providing information about all kinds of illegal acts. In fact, they are considered like the eyes and ears of the Ministry of Home Affairs. *The Muqaddamin depend “on a heavy network of informants who provide them with detailed information about suspicious activities that take place in every single neighborhood”* (Bennis, 2015).

Given the above state affairs, in addition to the multi-agency cooperation, the Moroccan security forces have managed to dismantle and arrest a large number of terrorist cells that planned to carry out attacks against civilians and government institutions. According to the Director of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation, Abdelhak Khiame, Moroccan intelligence services have broken up 168 cells since 9/11 attacks in 2001. During the same period, 341 terrorist plots intending to destabilize the country were foiled and 2 963 suspected terrorists were arrested (Lamzouwaq, 2017).

Deradicalization in Prisons

In order to strengthen its legal measures, the Moroccan law considers any attempt to travel to danger zones to join terrorist groups as a crime. In fact, the Parliament has agreed to impose 5-15 year imprisonment on any individual caught planning to join those places.

Given that it has become crystal clear that traditional, security-oriented approaches are insufficient to effectively address the threat of extremism, deradicalization has recently been given much importance in many countries. Likewise, in the Moroccan context, and in order to roll back religious extremism, different parties have been involved in this process. These include the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, local religious councils and the Mohammedan League of *Ulamaas*. According to, Mohamed Salah Tamek, *the current delegate-general of Morocco's Penitentiary and Reintegration Administration*, in 2013 alone, these officials visited roughly 5,000 incarcerated offenders.

In his report on Tamek’s speech at the Washington Institute, *Brinster (2014)* states that Morocco’s experience with deradicalization is characterized by its successful reintegration of prisoners into society. Moreover, they are given opportunities to finish their university studies or vocational certifications. Partnerships are also signed between the government and private companies so as to help these prisoners find work or trainings once released. In this regard, the Mohammed VI Foundation for the Rehabilitation of Prisoners plays a significant role. It has a support program for micro-projects and self-employment. Scott (2015) stresses that the foundation is characterized by a strategy which gives much importance to social reintegration as part of its larger mission that aims at “*reinforcing societal security, fighting delinquency, reducing recidivism and creating income-generating activities through improving the quality of life of former prisoners.*” In an attempt to rehabilitate certain key figures accused of playing an ideological role in the Casablanca bombings, King Mohammed VI decided to pardon some former jihadists such as Hassan El Kettani, Omar El Haddouchi, and Mohammed Fizazi, all of whom were sentenced to 30

years. In fact, as the latter exhibited sufficient transformation, he was asked to deliver a Friday sermon and led prayers before the king in 2014.

The role of Religious Education in Fighting Extremism

Due to its awareness of the crucial roles which schools play in the religious education of the youth, Morocco has embarked on reforming and upgrading Islamic schools. As stated earlier, this is the case of Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution, as a pioneer school in religious studies in the kingdom. These reforms are meant “*to facilitate the integration of their graduates into the modern socio-economic sector, and to bring the schools closer to modern state-run schools*” (Lotfi, 2006: 36). Not only has Morocco introduced reforms in the existing institutions, but it has also created new ones like Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchedines*, and *Morchedates*.

Religious education has oftentimes been criticized for being outdated as its institutions produce graduates whose knowledge is usually limited; they do not master foreign languages and they do not have a basic understanding of social sciences. However, in the past, we used to have Muslim scholars who were encyclopedic as they knew, in addition to their religious specialty, social sciences and often even the exact sciences. That was the case of scholars like Ibn Khaldoun, Ibn Hazm, El Ghazali and Ibn Rochd, among many others.

3.1. The Role of Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution

It is widely believed that the reforms implemented in Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania have had a positive impact on the future scholars' training in many respects. It has been noticed that students at the institution have acquired a number of skills thanks to the introduction of social sciences. They have started developing a sense of assessment, and they are not just passive consumers of ideas, says Khamilichi (2011), the institution's director, in an interview with Al Massae daily newspaper. He rightly states that disciplines like philosophy, logic, sociology, law, history and comparative religion have made students interested in research. This has allowed them to benefit more from the knowledge they get in class. They evaluate this knowledge and ask relevant questions about it, a thing which is usually missing in Islamic studies in other institutions of higher education, where emphasis is always put on the information itself. That is to say, the students get so much information without giving enough importance to their assessment. Not asking questions about that information results in getting it without using it. By “using it”, Khamilichi (2011) means assessing it and producing other type of information on the basis of the evaluation of the first one. It is worth mentioning that this skill should be transferred to, for example, jurisprudence, and students should raise questions about what they are taught and make their judgments taking into account the present circumstances. They should always question the relevance of these judgments in jurisprudence and consider their effective application nowadays. A similar view is held by Ben Abdeljalil (2004) who argues that one of the functions of social sciences is to cater for the novice scholar by ushering him into the world of *Ijtihad*.

Learning foreign languages has been given much importance in the reform of Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania, which has helped students improve their language skills and become knowledgeable about other cultures and religions. Courses of foreign languages are introduced in all the semesters to keep the students in touch with these languages. They study French and English as obligatory subjects, and Spanish and German as optional ones. This state of affairs has enabled many students to become fluent at these languages, a thing which allows them to do various tasks. They can participate in conferences where

foreign languages are used. Some of them travel to Europe, especially during Ramadan to give lectures and provide advice to Muslim immigrants. Moreover, these languages are used for research purposes as students can oftentimes read references about religious issues. It is worth pointing out that these linguistic skills enable students to know a lot about other cultures and religious traditions, which will certainly make their engagement in, for example, interfaith dialogue, a fruitful undertaking.

Moreover, the training which students get at Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania helps in preparing a basis for a modern mentality. Thanks to the diverse knowledge the students obtain, they get a modern view of the world, which makes them open-minded. Therefore, they are likely to have a clear identity and a balanced personality, which would allow them to elaborate moderate and sensible religious interpretations. This, in turn, would provide them with a constructive perspective to present-day issues.

Graduates from Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania are trained to play an effective role in society. They are well-equipped to cater for the religious needs of people. There is a growing interest in knowing about Islam by both Muslims and non-Muslims. They are trained to explain and promote the beauty of Islamic teachings to help people assimilate its universal and humanistic values. Without doubt, the training at Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania is likely to equip the students with skills which are expected to make a difference in today's globalized world. Their training aims at, *inter alia*, restoring the old scientific status which Muslim scholars used to have. The latter did not use to limit themselves to learning and teaching religious sciences, but they were very knowledgeable about their environment from different angles.

Nowadays, a Muslim scholar badly needs to be well-informed and to update his/her knowledge about other issues. It is not healthy to have scholars with great knowledge in religious issues, but with many gaps in real life matters. This is likely to lead to narrow-mindedness, which would negatively affect the scholars' role in society. They would be very limited in their interpretations of religious scriptures, and they would face many difficulties while undertaking *Ijtihad*. Therefore, the training that is being offered at Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution contributes to making its graduates well-equipped to face current challenges such as religious extremism. They are getting the skills required to spread moderate values of Islam and combat all forms of extremism.

The Role of Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchedines*, and *Morchedates*

As far as Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchedines* and *Morchedates* is concerned, its training also plays a significant role in fighting extremism. First of all, like the students at Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution, the imams and female preachers are introduced to a variety of courses. In addition to Islamic subjects, they study social sciences such as history, geography, philosophy, psychology and sociology. According to Chtatou (2016), the latter lessons are despised by extremists because they teach critical thinking. Therefore, the training at the institute is meant to equip the students to face challenges once they join their society as religious guides. In a program called PBS NewsHour by Kira Kay, one of the female students in the program stressed that her "*mission as Mourchedat is to show a tolerant Islam, a moderate Islam that advocates dialogue and acceptance of others, and how to stay far away from extremism.*" (PBS NewsHour, 2015)

In addition to combating extremism, the program aims at raising the status of women in society. Given that a woman plays an important role as an educator in society and in order for her influence to work in the right way, she, according the institute's director, "*needs to be fully equipped and well-positioned. That is why she learns the social sciences and also good skills of communicating with men and women.*"

Moreover, because of her sacred role within the family, he argues, she has influence in her environment. One of the female students reported that their mission is to protect the youth by teaching them values

which are likely to make it easier for them to avoid bad influences. Therefore, according to Gorden (2016), "*an effective counterterrorism strategy could utilize the power that women clearly have ... to weaken radical rhetoric and strengthen a more moderate and progressive Islam*"

By welcoming foreign students to benefit from the training, Morocco is expanding its spiritual security program beyond its borders. Not only does the program serve the kingdom's interest, but it also has an international role. The students are getting equipped to serve various functions in the requesting counties from both Europe and Africa. As mentioned above, hundreds of these international students have already graduated from the institute, and they have already started effecting change according to the institute director. The latter reported during the researcher's visit to the institute last February that there is a committee whose function is to keep in touch with the international graduates and get informed about their activities and achievements. One of these foreign students stated that "*the program is rescuing Muslims from the tight spot they are in. If Islam is truly understood, security will come, justice will come and peace of mind will come*"

Given the above state of affairs, the efficacy of Morocco's efforts to reduce the threat of religious extremism has been praised on several occasions. Morocco is considered as a good model to follow by any nation facing the threat of extremism. In fact, in September 2017, Morocco was reelected as the co-chair, along with the Netherlands, of the GCTF (Global Counterterrorism Forum) extending its mandate for an additional two years. Scott (2017) reported that the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita viewed the incident as an eloquent testimony to the confidence that the international community attaches to the Moroccan approach and as a sign of recognition for the significant contribution of the kingdom in the fight against extremism.

Conclusion

The present paper has tried to shed light on the holistic approach Morocco is adopting to combat religious extremism. After a brief discussion of the major religious reforms in the country, I presented these various strategies which have social, economic, religious and educational dimensions. Emphasis has also been put on the role of two religious institutions, viz. Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution and Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morchedines* and *Morchedates* in fighting religious extremism. Of course, the role of education in countering violent extremism has gained prominence worldwide. It has been shown that the two institutions are providing their students with a theological training that conforms to the values of tolerance and open thinking. Once the graduates have joined the job market, they are likely to contribute to helping young people distance themselves from extremism and resist the 'pull factors,' that may drive them to recruitment. Moreover, involving women as preachers is a wise idea, for, as educators, they are certainly contributing to awareness raising, generating respect for others, and creating and maintaining cultures of peace and dialogue. However, it is worth bearing in mind that education alone is not sufficient to prevent violent extremism. That is why Morocco has been adopting a multidimensional approach, and it has been undertaking initiatives to advance regional and global cooperation on fighting extremism.

From the above discussion, one can make the following recommendations:

- * All concerned parties in the kingdom should continue their efforts to promote religious moderation and tolerance as a shield against extremism in the country.

- * Religious scholars should be trained in specialized schools and institutions in which they are exposed to a wide knowledge in various areas to avoid narrow-mindedness and limited interpretations of religious texts.
- * Other countries worldwide can get inspired by the Moroccan experience as a world leader in combating extremism, and the kingdom should benefit from similar experiences in other countries.
- * Women should be encouraged to take a greater role in fighting extremism since they are among the most powerful voices of prevention in their homes, schools, and communities.
- * All countries should be involved in a strong international cooperation and exchange ideas and expertise in intelligence.

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PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM AMONG RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS IN MOROCCO

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the 11th of September and subsequent terrorist incidents across the globe, which have affected the lives of innocent civilians and jeopardised the stability of a number of countries, the international community (i.e. international and regional organizations) and individual countries have invested a lot of efforts and money to combat terrorism. Morocco, which has suffered from some terrorist incidents, is now renowned for its international involvement in fighting terrorism and successful experience in adopting a twofold preventive approach: highly efficient intelligence and security system and religious reform. The present paper seeks to investigate the perceptions of terrorism among religious scholars in Morocco. The sample is drawn from two prestigious religious institutions, namely Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution, an institution of higher education for Islamic studies, and the Mohamadan League of Scholars, an academic religious institution. The data were collected by means of a questionnaire. The questions explored the following: (i) the definition of terrorism through Islamic law, (ii) causes of terrorism, (iii) the Moroccan experience and (iv) solutions to combat terrorism. The main results indicate that terrorism is the outcome of a number of factors such as: injustice and discrimination, the culture of violence and misinterpretation of religious texts and concepts. To combat terrorism, the participants came up with interesting proposals such as: establishing justice, correcting misconceptions about *jihad*, spreading a culture of tolerance, promoting moderate Islam and adopting political and economic reforms.

Keywords: terrorism, perceptions, religious scholars, religious reform, Morocco

Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, manifestations of terrorism have increased in a terrifying way leading to negative impacts on people worldwide. Terrorism has thus become a global phenomenon that affects the lives of innocent civilians and jeopardises the stability of a number of countries. In the 2017 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report, the number of terrorism deaths in 2016 was 25,673. Moreover, two thirds of all countries experienced a terrorist attack in 2016. According to the World Health Organization, terrorism, which is a form of violence, is a “public health issue” (WHO, 2002). This entails that all efforts should collaborate to respond to the consequences of terrorism and take part in strengthening and accelerating interventions against it.

Statement of the problem

The 2016 GTI report reinforces the fact “*that terrorism is a highly concentrated form of violence, mostly committed in a small number of countries and by a small number of groups. The five countries suffering*

the highest impact from terrorism as measured by the GTI; Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Syria, accounted for 72 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. Similarly, only four groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all these deaths; ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida" (GTI, 2016:3). The fact that particular ideological trends and movements in the Muslim world have been assigned as responsible for terrorism deaths has been misused by some media which claim that there is a strong relationship between Muslims and terrorism. This raises the question of whether Muslim scholars can provide any clarifications about this issue.

Objectives of the paper

Given the above state of affairs, the main objectives of this paper are threefold. First, it addresses the issue of terrorism to contribute to the ongoing debate about the issue. Second, it investigates the perceptions of terrorism among religious scholars in Morocco. Finally, it comes up with some conclusions and implications that may hopefully help understand the complex phenomenon of terrorism and develop efficient strategies to combat it.

Significance of the paper

The importance of this paper lies in the fact that it sheds light on an increasing phenomenon which is of interest to politicians, economists, researchers, religious scholars, journalists and media worldwide. Moreover, it addresses the issue of terrorism from a perspective which is of paramount importance, namely the perspective of Muslim religious scholars. This is important because understanding terrorism and providing solutions to prevent it has to consider different perspectives including that of religious scholars.

Research questions

The research questions that guided this study are the following:

What is the definition of terrorism from an Islamic perspective?

What are the causes of terrorism?

How unique and successful is the Moroccan experience in combating terrorism?

What solutions are suggested to combat terrorism?

The paper consists of four sections. Section one briefly reviews the literature on terrorism from the perspective of Muslim religious scholars. Section two addresses Morocco's experience in combating terrorism. Section three describes the research methodology. Section four introduces the results of the study. Finally, section five presents the conclusions of the research and highlights some implications for terrorism prevention.

1. Literature review

To obtain a proper understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and to try to find solutions to prevent it, it is essential to focus on a definition of what constitutes terrorism and to be aware of its causes. This literature review presents the definition of terrorism and its causes as viewed by Muslim religious scholars.

Definition of terrorism

Although the international community has been successful in mobilizing the will and resources to counter terrorism, it has failed to establish a universally accepted definition of terrorism. Generally, terrorism is often referred to as a form of illegitimate political violence. Yet, in a world of diverse political, moral and cultural systems as well as conflicting national interests the legitimacy of using violence raises immediate problems. It appears, therefore, very difficult to establish a commonly accepted comprehensive definition of terrorism due to the persisting disagreement about who is entitled to use violence against whom, for what ends and in what circumstances. In line with the main concern of this paper, the review of different definitions assigned to terrorism is confined to the perspective of Muslim religious scholars.

Muslim religious scholars have discussed terrorism and offered definitions of it from an Islamic legal perspective. One of the most important and informed discussions of terrorism is offered by Bin Bayyah, one of the most erudite Muslim jurists in the world today. Bin Bayyah (2009:9) argues that terrorism includes

"all violent acts that aim to obliterate, sabotage, and terrorize people, kill the innocent, and destroy property. It would also include the circulation of illegal drugs-as well as the violence of vigilantes waged against legitimate authorities, aimed to create sedition and anarchy and strike fear among civilians- or with the express aim of overthrowing a legitimate government".

According to Bin Bayyah, this definition of terrorism is more comprehensive as it addresses the needs of those concerned with the issue of state security. Moreover, "*it is grounded in classical Islamic jurisprudence, Muslim culture, and theological beliefs*" (Bin Bayyah, 2009:9). To further explain the nature of terrorism as understood from an Islamic legal perspective, Bin Bayyah makes reference to the following crimes as acts of terrorism: *hirabah*, i.e. brigandage; *baghi*, i.e. insurrection and *al-ifsad fi al-ard*, i.e. spreading corruption in the land.

In Islamic jurisprudence, *hirabah* is the act of terrorizing people and pilfering their wealth. *Baghi* is the act of being tyrannical, unjust or aggressive. It is also used to refer to an unjustifiable rebellion against the legitimate ruler. *al-ifsad fi al-ard* is a particular type of offense such as attacking people at random or accusing other Muslims of disbelief as a pretext for attacks. All these acts, which are instances of terrorism as Bin Bayyah argues, are considered by scholars of Islamic jurisprudence as crimes that deserve severe penalties.

Along the same lines, Yessef (2007), the secretary general of the High Council of Scholars in Morocco, takes terrorism as *al-ifsad fi al-ard*, i.e. spreading corruption in the land. In that respect, he states that

"Islam forbids hirabah (i.e. brigandage) and baghi (i.e. insurrection) and punishes those who commit these acts with severe penalties and terrorism is more dangerous than hirabah and baghi. Terrorism poses a real threat to security..... Thus it refers to al-ifsad fi al-ard that is mentioned in the holly Quran {For those who war on God and the messenger of God, and work for corruption on earth (al-ifsad fi al-ard) the reward is but execution, or crucifixion, or amputation of their hands and feet on opposite sides, or expulsion from the land. That is disgrace for them in the world; and there is a tremendous torment in store for them in the hereafter} (5:33)" (Yessef, 2007:15).

In his comments on this verse, Bin Bayyah (2009:29) explains that

"it is well known that Islamic law classifies crimes according to the danger they pose to society, thus the punishment is proportionate to the crime committed. It is natural then that terrorism, as we have described it, ranks among the vilest of crimes, as stated in the [Quranic] verse (5:33) This verse

establishes a reference for the specific punishments of terrorism as a crime, since it is considered an aggression against the whole of society".

It is clear then that Muslim religious scholars consider terrorism to include a number of acts that were severely condemned by Islamic jurisprudence. These acts are described in the Quran as crimes that deserve severe punishments. What mostly characterizes these acts is the danger they pose to society. In particular, they terrorize people, affect the public's rights and interests and threaten communities' security, which violates one of the major purposes of Islamic jurisprudence, namely protecting and ensuring the safety of society.

1.2. Causes of terrorism

Muslim scholars believe that terrorism is a complex phenomenon which is the result of several factors and not one causal factor. These factors are political, cultural and economic in nature. However, they insist on three main causes of terrorism, namely the culture of terrorism, misinterpretation of religious texts and injustice.

For instance, Ben Hamza (2007), who is the president of one of the local scientific councils in Morocco, stresses that one of the wrong conclusions about terrorism is to limit its causes to poverty and difficult social and economic conditions as terrorist acts happened in areas where people do not suffer from such conditions like Paris, Madrid, London, Bali and Moscow. Instead, Ben Hamza highlights that the main cause of this phenomenon is the culture of terrorism which is based on concepts of confrontation and violence (see Ben Hamza (2007)).

Similarly, Yessef (2007) considers the culture of terrorism as one of the dangers that threatens the security of society. Furthermore, he states that terrorism results from the misunderstanding of religion and misinterpretations of religious texts. To overcome this cause of terrorism, Yessef emphasizes the role of religious scholars who are able to correct concepts and fight the culture of terrorism through demonstrating its wrong foundations and its great evils on individuals and communities and through showing the true religious model which requires the preservation of public safety and prohibits causing harm to others (Yessef, 2007:15-16).

Bin Bayyah (2009) admits that a number of political, cultural and economic causes lead to terrorism. However, he identifies the culture of terrorism and injustice as the primary causes of this phenomenon. In particular, he proposes that culture is the main source of terrorism and situations of injustice have a direct impact on creating and sustaining this culture of terrorism (Bin Bayyah, 2009: 21).

Religious scholars tend to agree that economic conditions such as poverty do not represent a direct cause of terrorism. More importantly, they agree that what leads to the emergence of terrorism are the following main causes: the culture of terrorism, misinterpretation of religious texts and injustice.

Morocco's experience in dealing with terrorism

In 2003, Morocco suffered from suicide bombings that shook the city of Casablanca and resulted in 45 deaths including the 13 attackers responsible for these bombings. The authorities found out the involvement of religious extremists in these attacks. Since then, Morocco has developed a mainly twofold preventive approach to counter terrorism based on two foundations, namely: highly efficient intelligence and security system and religious reform. For the first foundation, a lot of efforts have been invested towards the effectiveness of the Moroccan security services which resulted in their ability to work in a highly professional manner and accumulate good experience in countering terrorism. For instance, more

than 150 terrorist cells have been dismantled between 2003 and 2016 within the framework of a proactive plan for the Moroccan security services. The experience accumulated by Morocco in the fight against terrorism and the dismantling of its cells has led its allies and traditional partners from Western countries to seek and praise this experience. As for the second foundation, Morocco announced in 2004 a comprehensive plan to restructure and reform the religious field. This religious reform is represented mainly in the following: consolidation of the fundamentals of the Moroccan nation (namely, the *Maliki* school of Jurisprudence/Islamic law, the *Ash'ari* school of theology, the Sunni Sufism, and the institution of the commander of the faithful (i.e. the king)), restructuring of religious institutions, improving the role of the scientific councils, assigning the role of issuing *fatwa* (i.e. authoritative legal opinion given by a qualified jurist on issues pertaining to the Islamic law) and interpreting religious texts to a qualified religious authority (namely, the High Council of Scholars), strengthening religious media and promoting religious services. In his speech about "the Kingdom of Morocco's Experience to Counter Terrorism" in the meeting of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, held in New York, 30 September, 2014, the minister of religious endowments and Islamic affairs Ahmed Toufiq mentioned the following religious services:

Construction, renovation and equipment of mosques;

Looking after imams and taking care of their material and social needs;

Training young imams from among university graduates;

Training spiritual guides from among female university graduates who would provide guidance to women and men in mosques and in other institutions, such as schools, hospitals and prisons;

Enacting laws that regulate relations with the caretakers of religion and between the State and the individuals who wish to contribute to building mosques and to their upkeep in such a way as not to allow their intervention to interfere with the fundamentals or to disseminate extremist ideology or political exploitation of religion in any form or shape;

Providing administrative supervision that can closely follow the local management of religious affairs;

Structuralizing religious education to guarantee the sound teaching of religion.

Morocco's experience in the religious field reform has received great attention. To this end, several partner countries have asked for assistance in rehabilitating imams such as Mali, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Gabon and France. This may lead to saying that both Morocco's security experience and religious field reform experience have played an important role in countering terrorism. In the 2017 Global Terrorism Index report, Morocco was listed among the countries with the lowest impact of terrorism in 2016 and ranked 122 out of 163 with a 0,077 score. Surely, the twofold preventive approach in fighting terrorism has contributed to this result (For a detailed discussion of Morocco's strategies to combat terrorism, see Khtou's paper in these proceedings).

Methodology

This study investigates the perceptions of terrorism among religious scholars in Morocco. The sample is drawn from two prestigious religious institutions, namely Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution and the Mohamadan League of Scholars. The first one is a higher education institution for Islamic studies whose main mission is to train future religious scholars and contribute to development of research in Islamic related sciences, while the second one is an academic religious institution whose core mission is to provide intellectual leadership in the field of Islamic studies and to strengthen cooperation and partnership with higher education institutions and other scientific entities of common interest nationally

and internationally. In particular, eighteen scholars participated in this study. Out of the eighteen participants, fifteen were males and three were females. They are all specialized in different fields of Islamic studies, such as sciences of the Quran, sciences of the prophetic tradition, jurisprudence and religions. As for years of experience in the religious field, nine participants had between 20 and 30 years, six participants had between 10 and 19 years, and three participants had less than 10 years. As for the instrument, a survey questionnaire was designed to collect data and investigate the research questions. It addressed a definition of terrorism from an Islamic perspective, the respondents' attitudes towards terrorist acts in the name of *jihad*, the main causes of terrorism, an evaluation of Morocco's experience in dealing with terrorism, and some solutions to combat terrorism.

4. Data analysis and interpretation

Participants' definition of terrorism

In the literature, there is a controversy over defining the word terrorism. This is the reason why the participants were asked to define terrorism from an Islamic perspective. The majority of them stated that terrorism includes all acts of violence that lead to terrorizing people and their loss of a sense of security. In addition, all the participants stressed that terrorism is forbidden in Islamic law because it violates the public's rights and interests. In particular, terrorist acts violate what the Islamic jurists call the "fundamentals of religion". These include five fields, namely: defending religion, protecting life, guarding against harmful ideologies, preserving property and defending honor and dignity. According to the participants, any harm that touches these fundamentals and affects people's rights deserve severe punishment as stipulated in the religious texts of the holly Quran and prophetic tradition. The following quotes are some samples of the participants' tentative definitions of the concept terrorism:

« In my opinion, the Quranic definition that better describes terrorism is the one that is composed of both concepts of hirabah, i.e. brigandage, and al-ifsad fi al-ard, i.e. spreading corruption in the land, which is mentioned in verse 33 of Chapter 5: {For those who war on God and the messenger of God, and work for corruption on earth (al-ifsad fi al-ard) the reward is but execution, or crucifixion, or amputation of their hands and feet on opposite sides, or expulsion from the land. That is disgrace for them in the world; and there is a tremendous torment in store for them in the hereafter} Holy Quran [5: 33]. As it is known to the scholars of Islam, hirabah, i.e. brigandage, is to carry weapons on people to terrorize and kill them and take their money. There is no difference in whether the assaulted or the victim is a Muslim or non-Muslim. al-ifsad fi al-ard, i.e. spreading corruption in the land, in the context of this verse is a threat to the security of the country and the people and not less than the crime of hirabah, i.e. brigandage. The combination of hirabah, i.e. brigandage, and al-ifsad fi al-ard, i.e. spreading corruption in the land, is terrorism in the Islamic perception, and therefore the penalty was parallel to the kind of committed acts as shown in the above verse. » [Respondent 4]

" Terrorism from an Islamic perspective is to cause harm to people's life, health, property and dignity as prescribed in the Quran, the prophetic tradition and the fundamentals of jurisprudence (i.e. Islamic law). hirabah, i.e. brigandage, is considered the most severe form of terrorism because it is killing safe people in their homes and their countries. Neither the Muslim nor anyone can accept this type of crime. Moreover, terrorist acts are strongly condemned if they are against women, children, the elderly and worshippers. Islam forbids killing and assaulting these people even in a state of war. » [Respondent 18]

"The definition of terrorism from an Islamic perspective can be stated as follows: it is aggression by individuals, groups or states against individuals or communities. Such aggression may affect one's religion, money, or health. It includes all forms of harm such as threatening and killing people. The goal behind this

aggression is to terrorize people and spread terror among them to achieve various purposes and interests.” [Respondent 8]

“Terrorism from an Islamic perspective can be defined as organized aggressive behaviour targeting the interests of people, a particular state or group of states. Islam which is a religion of peace and dialogue does not accept terrorism and does not recognize organized aggressive behaviour against any entity or state. The current acts of terrorism are similar to the concept of hirabah, i.e. brigandage, to which Islam has dedicated severe punishments in verse 33 of Chapter 5 in the Quran.” [Respondent 6]

“The Islamic jurisprudence Council defined terrorism as the aggression carried out by individuals, groups or states against human beings: against their religion, life, mind, money and dignity, and scholars stressed that the definition of terrorism includes all forms of intimidation, harm and threat that are intended to terrorize or endanger the lives, liberty or security of people”. [Respondent 9]

Note that the participants' perceptions of the definition of terrorism agree with scholars' views in the literature. In particular, they take terrorism to include all violent acts that cause harm and terror to people. Such violent acts are similar to the concepts of hirabah, i.e. brigandage, and al-ifsad fi al-ard, i.e. spreading corruption in the land. These acts as reported by both participants and scholars in the literature are strongly condemned in Islam and deserve severe penalty as they violate people's rights and interests.

Participants' attitudes towards terrorist acts in the name of jihad

It is often claimed that terrorist acts are carried out in the name of *jihad*. To get a clearer view about the accuracy of such a claim, the participants were asked about their attitudes towards terrorist acts that are declared in the name of *jihad*. Significantly, all the participants stressed that practices such as run over pedestrians, bombing stations and other criminal practices have definitely nothing to do with *jihad* as is known in Islam. They explained that Islam forbids all forms of aggression and assault on people's lives, health and properties and that the Quran strongly denies all acts that undermine people's security and tranquillity. Moreover, the participants pointed out that *jihad* was legitimized for reasons of defence and protection against enemies' assaults. Some of them said that *jihad* is similar to the work of the Defence Ministry's army, whose role is to protect the state from every attack. More importantly, they highlighted that *jihad* requires certain conditions, mainly that it should not be carried out by individuals but by the ruler, that it takes place in battle fields and that it should not lead to the killing of women, the elderly, children and innocent people or to causing harm to the environment. In what follows are some of the respondents' answers:

“There is no basis for these practices in Islam and they have nothing to do with the system of jihad, which is not obligatory unless its conditions are met. The main condition is that jihad is legitimate only if called for by the ruling power of the state to defend its territories and fight the assaulting enemy in the battle field. Among the other conditions, it is not allowed to kill women, the elderly, children and innocent people and cut trees and spoil the environment” [Respondent 6]

“These acts cannot be considered as jihad, whatever the justification of those who carry them out, because they are committed against innocent and safe people. The Prophet Mohammed, peace and blessings of God be upon him, forbade the killing of children, women and the elderly and the cutting of trees in battles. So how about those who are in public places not related to the war at all, as well as the consequent damage and loss of property. Surely, all that is forbidden in Islam.”[Respondent 14]

“Terrorist acts cannot be described as jihad. The latter was legitimized to protect the five fundamentals: religion, life, mind, property and dignity, that is to protect people's rights, while terrorism is the opposite of

jihad because it affects the five fundamentals and violates people's rights. So how can terrorism be interpreted as jihad? It should be noted that jihad has its principles and regulations the most important of which is that it can only be ordered by the ruler of the state. Consequently, what extremist groups are doing is not called jihad and has nothing to do with jihad. » [Respondent 18]

"These are crimes that are forbidden by Islamic law because they involve the killing of innocent people and violating public interests. God says: { If anyone killed a person, it would be as if he killed all mankind, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all mankind. } The Quran [5: 32]. " [Respondent 11]

Participants' perceived causes of terrorism

Since terrorism is a complex phenomenon which is rooted in the human history, its causes are numerous and complex. There is a bad need to unveil its major causes, which is likely to be of much help to come up with sound solutions to defeat it. The participants in the current study have pointed out that this issue has various and complex causes. First of all, a vast majority of the respondents reported that injustice is a very significant motive for terrorism. This injustice is manifested in the behaviour of some rulers in their own countries or the invasion of Western countries of Muslim lands. Moreover, the Palestinian problem was mentioned by a few respondents who viewed this issue as a case of colonization which has lasted for a long time. These aspects of injustice are oftentimes behind terrorism as a form of revenge. Moreover, the culture of violence is another major cause of terrorism. It is spread by some extremist groups mainly through the use of various forms of the mass media. Finally, misinterpretation of religious texts and concepts is also a major motive for terrorist acts. This wrong understanding of religious texts is attributed to the ignorance of religion and the influence of extremist religious groups.

In addition to the above-mentioned causes, many participants stressed the role of other economic, social and political factors of terrorism. For one thing, poverty is viewed as a serious problem in poor neighbourhoods which breed terrorism. Many young men are jobless and they struggle to feed their families. Terrorists often exploit this needy situation and recruit these youngsters to join terrorist groups. At the political level, lack of democracy has led to depriving citizens of their basic rights in some Muslim countries. Also, there is the external interference of some powerful nations in the policies of some developing countries in the Islamic world. Finally, as stated earlier, the mass media play an important role in spreading a discourse of hatred and hostility.

Participants' evaluation of Morocco's experience in dealing with terrorism

Morocco is a world leader in fighting terrorism, and it has an international recognition for the success of its approaches. The latter's efficiency is the concern of this subsection. In particular, the participants were asked to evaluate Morocco's experience in dealing with terrorism. 10 scholars out of 18 said it was good and 4 among them described it as excellent. However, one respondent described it as fairly good, another respondent said it was weak, while another respondent evaluated it as very week. The majority (83%) of scholars then hold positive attitudes towards Morocco's experience in combating terrorism. In justifying their answers, the participants mentioned that the success of this experience is due to the fact that it is not based only on the security treatment of the phenomenon. Rather, it is also based on religious field reforms. In this respect, one respondent said:

"Morocco has taken important steps to combat the phenomenon of terrorism, using two security approaches: the first is to provide the spiritual protection from extremism and fanaticism. This work is

performed in an effective way under the supervision of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs and other religious institutions such as the High Council of Scholars and the local scientific councils and the Mohamadan League of Scholars. The second is to activate the state organs of justice and security to ensure the stability and security of the country and the people.” [Respondent 4]

However, some participants pointed out that a lot of efforts are needed to combat terrorism particularly in what concerns dealing with economic and social factors. In this regard, one scholar stated:

“Morocco’s experience is a good experience because it has not only addressed the issue of security, but tried to address some of the intellectual reasons. However, it did not achieve much at the level of addressing economic and social causes, such as job opportunities for young people and justice in the distribution of wealth and so on.” [Respondent 1]

Participants’ perceived solutions to combat terrorism

In an attempt to present a thorough perspective of Moroccan Muslim scholars on terrorism, participants’ perceived solutions as to how terrorism can be efficiently countered were surveyed. Responses came up with solutions that match to a large extent the perceived causes of the phenomenon.

Almost all the participants stressed the importance of multiplying efforts to counter the culture of terrorism by involving religious scholars, educators and the media in promoting a culture of tolerance and peace-building that recognises difference and values diversity. Also, they called for the need to ensure the spiritual security of citizens by providing modern understandings and moderate interpretations of religious texts and concepts to help them cope with the challenges of modern life and empower them against extremist misinterpretations of Islam. The third strategic course of action towards combating terrorism is political and socioeconomic; without which the two above-mentioned solutions fall short of achieving their goals. To undo the social, economic and political motives for terrorism, there is a need for genuine reform in these three domains to guarantee (i) democratic and transparent political systems of governance that protect the rights and freedom of peoples and citizens at both the national and international levels, (ii) social justice through efficient and equitable social services and rights such as education, healthcare and employment and (iii) a fair and transparent economic model where every citizen feels recognised and gets his due share of public financial resources.

5. Conclusions and implications

The present paper has sought to investigate the perceptions of terrorism among Moroccan religious scholars from two prestigious institutions, namely Dar Al Hadith Al Hassania Institution and the Mohamadan League of Scholars. The main focus of the investigation was to explore the Muslim scholars’ perceptions of the nature of terrorism and its causes, the evaluation of the Moroccan experience in combating it and the perceived solutions. The participants suggested definitions of terrorism which agree to a large extent with the common views in the related Islamic literature as they both use the same frame of reference and key constituent concepts. They also strongly reject using the concept of *jihad* to justify terrorist acts explaining that *jihad* is a noble broad concept that refers to the legitimate right of any state to use force to ensure its territorial integrity and the security of its people and it is decided by the ruler and takes place in the battle field under the restrictions of not harming innocent civilians and the environment. As for the perceived causes and suggested solutions, the results of the study indicate that terrorism is the outcome of a number of factors such as: injustice and discrimination, the culture of violence and the misunderstanding and misinterpretations of religious texts and concepts. To combat

terrorism, the participants came up with interesting proposals such as: establishing justice, correcting misconceptions about *jihad*, spreading a culture of tolerance, promoting moderate Islam and adopting political and economic reforms.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, the following implications can be drawn:

Moroccan religious scholars are better qualified to join efforts with their counter parts in other Muslim countries as well as religious authorities representing other main religions to work towards developing a common understanding of the endemic phenomenon of terrorism and help political leaders and decision makers develop efficient and fair strategies to counter terrorism.

Terrorism has no race or religion; it has political, economic and social motives. Culture and religion are resorted to in order to develop ideological discourses to serve those motives.

Addressing the political, economic and social motives of terrorism locally and internationally is to be considered the most efficient strategy to combat terrorism as most terrorist acts tend to be violent reactions to political, economic and social injustice inflicted by the powerful on the weak.

It is high time the world leaders come together to establish a democratic, transparent and fair world order that promotes international reconciliation, democracy, human rights and common wellbeing.

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THE PRESENTATION OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE REAPER DRONE OFFENSIVE AGAINST DAESH

ALFIE MACADAM

The Royal Air Force (RAF) holds a unique position in the military history of the UK. It was the home of the pilots of Fighter Command described by Winston Churchill as 'The Few' who fought the Luftwaffe for air superiority over Kent in the summer of 1940 and in prevailing, prevented a German seaborne invasion. It was also the home of Bomber Command, whose tactics of mass area bombing of civilian population centres in Germany has been a source of moral ambivalence both during and since the end of WWII. The RAF heavy bomber raid on the city of Dresden in 1945 is still cited within Britain as an example of the abuse of air power and even a state terror tactic, and despite appalling losses the crews of Bomber Command did not receive a campaign medal in recognition of their service. The RAF has recently formed a Reaper force to deploy armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's, or drones) and RAF drones controlled from the UK have carried out missions using lethal force over Iraq and Syria in support of Operation Shader, the British air offensive against Daesh. How have the British Ministry of Defence sought to shape public opinion about the use of drones to carry out targeted killings abroad, including of British nationals? How have the British public responded to this new development in warfare? The use of digital propaganda suggests a change of emphasis towards the use of war footage that is social media-friendly and ideally possesses a narrative. Analysis of British public opinion as expressed in the national media in the aftermath of RAF drone strikes illuminates the sometimes-surprising attitudes the British public hold to the adoption by the UK of this most controversial method of modern warfare. And what does this mean for the methods the UK might choose to use to prosecute further the 'Global War on Terror'?

MUSLIMS' WESTOPHOBIA: SPLIT FOREIGN POLICY VISIONS AND PRACTICES

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Abstract

There are at least two fundamental traditions of comprehending the ascriptions or attributions that Muslims people used to elucidate their classical, modern and contemporary encounters with the 'West': (a) as a historical "clash of civilizations," or an inherent conflict between Muslim and Western cultural and civilizational values, and (b) as a "anti-dominance or anti-hegemony" reaction to perceived and real Western subjugation of and supremacy over Muslims in general and Middle Easterners and Arabs in particular. This paper presents a general perspective of Muslims' Westophobia or Muslims' fear of the 'West'. Following a brief conceptual framework and definition, the paper then turns to a general account of the historical origins and evolution of such phenomenon and specifically anchors it to European and Muslim elites/scholars. A discussion of the root causes and manifestations of such Westophobia as well as the foreign policy visions and practices associated with it follow in a subsequent manner. The author concludes by recommending that if the 'West', including the United States, aspires to change its negative images and the relevant Muslims' Westophobia, it should seriously reconsider its foreign policies towards the Muslim World and address the phobia-based reactions by such World to such images or stereotypes.

Keywords: Muslims, Westophobia, Foreign Policy, Visions, Practices

Introduction

Since the aftershocks of the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 against the United States of America, the complex question of “why do they hate us?” (Zakaria, 2001; Chomsky, 2003) has come to infuse all *global* political and academic or scholastic debates about ‘Islam’, the ‘West’, ‘Muslims’ and the colourful Muslim/Islamic movements, organizations and groups in both the West and ‘Muslim World’: The immense and diverse region comprising the group of countries with significant Muslim populations that stretches from West Africa to the southern Philippines, as well as Muslim migrant communities and diasporas scattered throughout the world, Europe and North America in specific. While the answers to this intricate question might be diverse because of one’s cultural background and ideological conviction, affiliation, and commitment, the very contour of questioning exposes an inherent ‘pathology of fear and animosity’ that simplistically reduces “Islam” and the “West” as incompatible cultural and civilizational entities, ideologies, and even disciplines of in-depth investigations and objective analyses. The world is, currently, experiencing ‘Hard Times’ (Dickens, 1854) where efforts are made to define the ‘West’ as an alter ego or antithetical to ‘Islam’, as one culture against another, rushing, not to discover commonalities and harmonies but to highlight the ineradicable fissure between two religio-cultural and civilizational entities. The irreconcilability of the ‘West’ and Islam, then, may reflect a multitude of representations, misrepresentation and images whether it be in everyday cultural confrontations — between European natives and Muslim migrant communities—or in the more broadly expressed antagonisms between Western liberal democracy and capitalism and multifarious religious orthodoxies. All these incidents of misconceptions, stereotypes and clichés have come to represent nodal points that mark the irreconcilability — the so-called “clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 1997; Lewis, 1990) — between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’.

The impressive narrative of the antagonism between ‘Islam’, the ‘West’ and Muslims, including Middle Easterners and Arabs, between the tradition of Islamic identification and the pressures of the Western values of liberal democracy and Western-dominated capitalist globalization, is not a wholly new phenomenon. Although it has been shaped by the geo-political challenges of the twentieth century and early third millennium, it should not be perceived exclusively as a response to the interesting novel of globalization and its structural dimensions of global state, culture, economy, and warfare industrialism and digitalized informatics. It has a history—embedded in the deep-seated memories of early global Islamic conquests, Western crusades to recapture Jerusalem in the twelfth century and Western colonial interventions and expansions in the Muslim world in the early twentieth century, and in the Muslims’ economic and political dependence on the ‘West’/Europe in the years that followed their i.e., Muslims’, political independence. Differently expressed, that when we investigate the relationship between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ we cannot and should not perceive the exchanges, tensions, and clashes in a historical vacuum filled and sealed, for instance, in the aftermath of the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. In sequence, we should also be critical of the view that the antagonistic relationship between ‘Islam’, Muslim Middle Easterners and Arabs, and the ‘West’, is one flourishing exclusively on enmity and the longing for the eradication or submission of one to the other. Rather, we must search the complexities of this relationship by analysing these tensions and clashes outside of the ‘essentializing discourses’ that have infused the Western debates over the colourful Muslims’ activism and militancy as something that is lacking rational thought, realistic judgement and complexity.

To these ends, this paper attempts only a small part of such a deeply important rethinking of the broader concern over the mounting incompatibility of ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’. By generally looking to Westophobia in Muslims’ political thinking, the author tries to offer a different account of the connection between Islamism and its presumed “Western monster and enemy”. He also posits a rereading of this Westophobic

relationship as both vastly productive and critical, marking both the clear tensions and radical interventions between the ideological claims fostered in the ‘West’ and the constant re-inventions or re-creations of Islamic/Muslim political identity. The main intention here is to argue for *foreign policy visions and practices* that are founded on ‘civilizational dialogue’, an alliance among civilizations and accommodation’ as a *counter* or an *alternative* to foreign policy visions and practices that are constructed on a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations.” In these senses, this paper presents a general perspective of Muslims’ Westophobia or Muslims’ fear of the ‘West’. Following a brief conceptual framework and definition, the paper then turns to a *general* account of the historical origins and evolution of such phenomenon and specifically anchors it to some European and Muslim elites/scholars. A discussion of the root causes and manifestations of such Westophobia as well as the foreign policy visions and practices associated with it follow in a subsequent manner. The author concludes by recommending that if the ‘West’, including the United States, aspires to change its negative images and the relevant Muslims’ Westophobia, it should seriously reconsider its foreign policies towards the Muslim World and address the phobia-based reactions by such World to such images or stereotypes.

Westophobia/Anti-Westernism/Occidentalism: Towards a Definition

The complex historical encounters and multifarious interactions between the conceptually *controversial* ‘West’ and the Muslim World, including the Middle East and the Arab countries, have been founded on three pillars: mutual perceptions, predominantly conflicting interests and asymmetrical power. Perceptions are images, visions and realities not only about one’s self or identity, culture and civilization but also about the ‘different other’, the ‘other’ as real, or imagined, as created, reconstructed, perpetuated, internalized, entrenched and utilized and colored throughout ‘human history’. Perceptions of the ‘other’ are colored by arrogance, paternalism, ethnocentrism, plot mentalities (theories of conspiracy), mental blockages, aggressiveness and senses of superiority, inferiority, frustration or closure of horizons, deep-rooted injustices, grievances, etc. Feelings and behavior of racial, economic, political superiority or inferiority, of cultural and civilizational particularity, or of insecurity, of being threatened, realistically, potentially or mythically do shape the way of mutual perceptual creation. A second pillar of interactive relationships is interests. However, interests are not a clear-cut concept to be defined with mathematical precision or accuracy. It always includes judgments of preferences over multiple alternatives and on values and priorities. In addition, interests imply conflicts, both real and potential, as well as cooperation and exchanges of varying degrees. Perceptions, feelings, behaviors and interests are linked by a third pillar of relationship: a chain of power (economic, political, military, ideological, etc.,) which finds manifestations in *foreign* policy and decision-making, application and assessment at the domestic, regional and international levels.

An expression of much of the Muslim/Islamic World’s historical encounters and interactions with the ‘West’, its cultures and civilizations is its mounting waves of Westophobia or Anti-Westernism (particularly Anti-Americanism) and the continuous quest for Islamic solidarity to challenge ‘Westoxication’ and Western hegemony. As an emphasis, the ‘West’ has an image or a perception problem. Fear and antipathy towards it or Westophobia or Anti-Westernism particularly engulfs the Muslim World, including the predominantly Muslim Middle East and the Arab countries. Such Muslim Westophobic image has been especially evident since the end of the Cold War and the anxious search and intense debates by ‘scholars’ (Lewis, 1993) (Huntington, 1997) (Fukuyama, 1992) of International Relations to identify the ‘West’ and explain its pivotal and *dominant* role in shaping the emerging ‘new world order’, (which was repeatedly used by the former American President, Bush, in 1990s, rested on a

perception or ‘a big idea’ that with the end of the Cold War something transformational had begun, and that the emerging world would inevitably be different), and the Muslims’ Westophobic perceptions and reactions to it.

For Jacinta O’Hagan, “among the debates stimulated by the conclusion of the Cold War, two of the most dramatic focus on the contrasting visions of world order presented by Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ and Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ theses” (O’Hagan, 2002, p. 1). As widely discussed, Huntington’s clash thesis presents a post-Cold War world that is dominated by bloody conflicts between world civilizations. Conversely, Fukuyama’s end of history perceives a world sharply divided between a ‘West’ that represents the apex and model of ideological evolution, i.e. liberal democracy and capitalist economy, and civilization and a ‘non-West or Rest’ that is still struggling along the historical route towards such Western model. In Huntington’s, the ‘West’ is a powerful civilizational entity that struggles to maintain its might and influence in an intensively globalizing world of multiple and clashing or confrontational civilizations. In Fukuyama’s, the ‘West’ provides a universal model of ideological evolution and human progress and development. In addition, both scholars perceive the ‘West’ as a dominant actor in world politics and a critical constituent of any cultural, civilizational, political and economic world order. Therefore, how it is variously *conceptualized and defined* and how its role in the world order is perceived, can inform us much about broader assumptions relating to Muslims’ historical encounters with the ‘West’, Muslims’ phobia or fear of such ‘West’ and the Muslims’ reactions and *foreign policy* endeavours to challenge/confront, selectively adopt/accommodate, negotiate/dialogue, or ally with Western cultural and civilizational pre-eminence, economic power, military and political superiority and/or global hegemony.

Intriguingly, International Relations, the discipline most closely concerned with the analysis of world politics, provides little assistance in thinking conceptually about *what or where or who the ‘West’ is*. For Kathleen M. Heller, “despite the voluminous literatures on the clash of civilizations, Orientalism, and the American culture wars, the West has generally not been problematized but rather assumed to refer to something given.” (Coker, 1998; Huntington, 1996; Mahbubani, 1992; Heller, 2007). This is fascinating given that the ‘West’ is undoubtedly a *colourful concept* or a host of diverse conceptions of paramount significance in inter-states’ cooperative and conflictual relations, inter-cultural and inter-civilizational exchanges, dialogues and even alliances across spaces, times and traditions. The various conceptions of the ‘West’ take place within these divergent perceptions and practices of these historical relations, exchanges, dialogues and alliances. These mutual perceptions shape prospects and interpretations of interactions between peoples, including Muslims and Westerners, from different cultures and civilizations as following trends of peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and integration or ‘paranoia’/phobia, irreconcilability, clash, and disintegration. Underlying assumptions about cultural and civilizational diversity are implicit in how *images of ‘Self or Ego’ and the ‘Other or Alter Ego’ are constructed in international relations and reflected in foreign policy visions and practices*. These assumptions would also influence objective, subjective, eclectic and even teleological readings of the earlier historical encounters and interactions, critical analysis of the existing relations and trends and prescriptions about the future of such interactive relations.

In addition, the scale and extent of influence exercised by the ‘West’ over the ‘Non-West’ or the ‘Rest’ of the world, including Muslims, is a reality of colourful and global dimensions and ramifications. Such reality has captivated generations of scholars from multiple diverse disciplines or schools of thought to *define* the ‘West’, investigate its tremendous impacts on the ‘Non-West’, identify the secrets of its triumph and come to terms with the Westophobic or anti-Western sentiments and practices that have been generated by its global reach and unparalleled economic, political and military hegemony. Perhaps one of the most

significant questions in these respects that has been raised by Sandra Harding is “whether the ‘West’ represents a universal culture, or is it a pioneer of a universal civilizing mission and process or whether it is a domestic culture that has attained a global reach?” (Harding, 1998).

For Jacinta O’Hagan, “the West is acknowledged as a political, economic, and military force of unprecedented standing. The West is also considered to be the one of the central architects of major modern international institutions such as the League of Nations, the UN, the IMF and the WTO.... The West is not a state, but most commonly perceived as a civilizational entity...” (O’Hagan, 2002, pp. 1-2). Furthermore, the sociologist Benjamin Nelson, building on the works of Max Weber, argued that “to understand the West and the growth and global reach of its power, it is necessary to go beyond material and technical factors to examine how the culture of Western societies facilitated a capacity to both reach out to, and draw in ideas and insights from others” (Nelson, 1973, pp. 79-105). Nelson stresses that the West’s quality of tolerance has helped its engagement in a multicultural dialogue with different civilizational entities as well as its strength and global expansion.

In the ‘philosophy of history’ (Spengler, 1922; Toynbee, 1989), the ‘West’ is often presented as a cohesive community, its historical evolution following a natural progression from ancient times to the present and future. Western civilization has been various believed to have begun in ancient Greece, in ancient Rome or early medieval Europe. As Samuel Huntington observed: “various scholars agree on a number of institutions, practices, and beliefs that may be legitimately identified as the core of Western civilization. They include: (1) the classical legacies of Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, and Latin. (2) Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Protestantism. (3) European languages. (4) Separation of spiritual and temporal authority. (5) Rule of law. (6) Representative bodies and (7) individualism” (Huntington, 1996, pp. 28-46). As emphasized by Arthur M. Schlesinger, “Europe is the source – the unique source of the ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights and cultural freedoms... These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption” (Schlesinger, 1967).

Just as the identification of the ‘West’ is ever-shifting, so too is the narrative of its *geography*. After all, the ‘West’ does not refer to a *specific geographical location* but a direction, and thus the ‘West’ invokes a relational geography rather than a locatable place. In this sense it is not strictly comparable to the name of a nation which can be identified by its recognized territorial borders and its institutional and legal framework. The line dividing those who belong to the ‘West’ from those who do not has been neither evident nor agreed-upon. The ‘West’ is often identified with Europe, ‘us’, or with that enigmatic entity, the modern Self. In practice, these paradigmatic elements are frequently interchangeable or synonymous, so that such terms as "We" or "Self" are often employed to mean Europe or the ‘West’ and vice versa. For Fernando Coronil, “with the consolidation of U.S. hegemony as a world power after 1945, the “West” shifted its center of gravity from Europe to “America,” and the United States became the dominant referent for the “West.” Because of this recentering of Western powers, “America,” ironically, is at times a metaphor for Europe” (Coronil, 1996, p. 54; Hall, 1992). As a lengthy emphasis of Coronil’s account, Peggy Heller states that: “as a geographical designation, however, the contemporary West’s relative location has become displaced...The West names an imaginary geography without a place and shape. It cannot be drawn on a map...Depending upon the text, the West can include Europe’s western extension in the Americas, into North America alone, or into America alone, it also can include Australia, New Zealand, South Africa (under apartheid), Israel, Japan, and in some instances even the former Soviet Union” (Heller, 2010, pp. 9-10).

In addition, the fluidity of the significance of the ‘West’ or ‘Occident’ seems especially connected to the term’s use as a tool for comparison and for being an *antithesis or a negation*; that is, its meaning seems to change according to what it is evaluated or mirrored against: the ‘East/Orient’ or the ‘Non-West’ or the ‘Rest’ or the ‘Third World’ etc. Combined, these terms represent the West’s antonyms or opposites. Most opposites follow the logic of dualism or dichotomy, or ‘Other’ or ‘Alter Ego’ whose characteristics or qualities derive from its negation and/or denial. But the ‘Rest’ who reside in the ‘Non-West’ have the particular quality of being unified by a lack, the absence or non-existence of qualities associated with the ‘West’ i.e. tremendous power and unprecedented global hegemony. Differently expressed, in the language of world politics, the ‘West’ is identified with a range of powerful actors and processes that have helped to shape contemporary world politics, actors such as the United States and the European powers, processes and ideas such as imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, capitalism and liberal democratic institutions. It is this hegemonic rather than the dialogic dimension of Western growth and global expansion that significantly contributes to the generation of Occidentalism as an unsettled or disconcerted style of representation that produces polarized and hierarchical conceptions of the ‘West’ i.e. ‘Occident’ and its assorted ‘Others’, including the ‘East/Orient’, the ‘Rest’ and the ‘Non-West’.

Papadopoulos points out that the ‘Other, Othering and Otherness’ suggest tensions between interacting social groups “regardless of whether one group aspires to imitate or despises and wants to distance itself from the other group” (Papadopoulos, 2002). In other words, Otherness often suggests establishing a boundary to distance from or discriminate against the other group by identifying it as a strange, different and oppositional entity or as a fundamental source of threat and even fear or phobia. In this sense, the treatment of Occidentalism specially focuses on the othering practice between the ‘West’ and Muslims, Middle Eastern and Arabs in particular. As in Said’s (1979) ground-breaking ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 1979), it looks as constructing the ‘Western Other’ through different lenses, relation ‘Othering’ to discursive practices and hegemonic power structures. Said’s critique of the discourse of Orientalism has been regarded as the “most influential” work and it “literally changed the way we understand the relationship between the West and the East” (Furumizo, 2005, p. 130). Said demonstrates that Orientalism as a discourse creates the Oriental Other by emphasizing the essential differences between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, and this knowledge has been used to distance the ‘Orient’ and to further empower the European Self to dominate the Orient. Further his critique sharply points out that Orientalism as a form of knowledge has heavily framed Western people’s perception of the East and its people.

A corresponding and brief handling of ‘Occidentalism’ (Wagner, 2004; 2005; 2006) deals with how the ‘Western Other’ (Jouhki, 2006, p. 70) is constructed and reconstructed by people in ‘non-Western’ countries, including Muslim Middle Eastern and Arab ones, through discursive practices. For Alastair Bonnet, “to judge by the sudden eruption of new work on the topic, Occidentalism is an idea whose time has come. For Western scholars it would be convenient to imagine that what we are witnessing is an evolution of something familiar, *namely Edward Said's theory of orientalism*. It could then be supposed that a focus on the *West's construction of the East* is now being supplemented, or merely footnoted, by an interest in *constructions of the West*” (Bonnett, 2005).

It is noted that Occidentalism creates a stereotyped ‘West’ by stressing fundamental variances, as did Orientalism, and uses the constructed and reconstructed images or perceptions for numerous political objectives such as the indoctrination, protection, empowerment and mobilization of non-Western peoples to *hate or loathe*, reject and resist *Western global imperialist penetration, expansion and hegemony*. The treatment of Occidentalism also highlights distinctive characteristics embedded in various countries’ Othering practice due to diverse *encounters* with the ‘West’ in historical contexts, classical, modern and contemporary. And, like Orientalism, the constructed image of the ‘Western Other’ has

framed the public's perception of the 'West'. The image of the 'West' as globally imperial and hegemonic has been studied by the 'scholars' (Hobson, 2012) who have identified it as another example of *Orientalism in reverse*, a discourse and rhetoric associated with what they called Occidentalism.

In many Eastern, including Asian countries, the 'West' has also been associated with *cultural and economic imperialism*. Occidentalism was thus a tool to counter the imperialism of the West. Santos offers an important definition of the term Occidentalism: first, Occidentalism as a counter-image of Orientalism: the image that the 'others', the victims of Western Orientalism, construct concerning the West. Second, Occidentalism as a double image of Orientalism: the image the West has of itself when it subjects the 'others' to Orientalism" (Santos, 2009, p. 105). What is significant in Santo's second definition of Occidentalism is that it is revealed as a strategy and tool by Westerners in the West against the imperialistic and hegemonic practises of their nations. This second definition equates with the way people in the 'East' use "Occidentalism to counter the hegemony associated with Orientalism" (Santos, 2009, p. 105).

Ning Wang agrees with the proposition that Occidentalism in the East took anti-Western rhetoric, but he attributed this rhetoric mostly to the increasing, unfavourable attitudes of the last two decades towards US imperial interests in the world outside the West. As he writes, "Occidentalism manifested itself in different forms during different periods, but its fundamental tone was hostile to the West, especially the US imperialists, and sometimes even the Soviet social imperialists" (Wang, 1997).

Buruma and Margalit also associate Occidentalism with the history of anti-Westernism in both the 'West' and the 'East'. They define Occidentalism as the "dehumanising picture of the West painted by its enemies... as a hateful caricature of Western modern progress" (Buruma & Margalit, 2004). In addition, they further define Occidentalism as an anti-Western ideology shared by a number of aggressive, irrational death cults, notably Nazism, Japanese nationalism and other contemporary fascisms, the regime of Pol Pot and, in a milder form, Marxism in general.

In a sense, Buruma and Margalit understand Occidentalism to be a "reversed Orientalism" (Buruma & Margalit, 2005) - according-to-Edward Said. Occidentalism is based on the perceived need to distance oneself from the Other, to claim a sense of superiority. In the case of Occidentalism, that Other is the 'West'. They further identify four overlapping animosities at work in Occidentalism. First, there is the dismissive attitude to The City, understood to be a rootless agglomeration of arrogant and cold materialists, as opposed to rural men, who are firmly in tune with nature and tradition, whose blood and sweat have mixed with the soil of the land, which they plough and know as their own. Secondly, Occidentalism is opposed to 'the mind of the West', against its science and rationalism. Thirdly, there is the disgust with the bourgeoisie, understood to be a collection of mediocre men of no principles but the quest for profit and comfort. Lastly, there is the *phobia or fear of the Other* as well as the *hatred directed against the "Infidel" Other*. In addition, and according to Buruma and Margalit, what the world is witnessing today in radical Muslim/Islamic violence is a re-incarnation of that old, irrational *hatred* and fear of the 'West' or Muslims' Westophobia.

From the framework of this 'West-East' dichotomy, people in the 'West' have started to display an interest in what the Muslim Other thinks of the 'West'. More precisely, the interest is focussed on why there is 'Muslim Westophobia or fear and hatred' of the 'West'. Especially the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 were followed by the frantic search for an answer to the thorny question 'why do they hate us?' (Ford, 2001) (Zakaria, 2001). This idea that the crucial component nurturing the divide between the 'West' and its Muslim critics, is essentially an *illogical hatred* against the 'West'. Certainly, the primary scholar of this standpoint is Bernard Lewis. He grants that Western interference in Muslim

countries, [especially Middle Eastern and Arab ones], may rightfully be criticized, but states that in the end “something deeper is involved than [such] specific grievances”, and he suggests it is “something in the religious culture of Islam which inspired (...) a dignity [which] in moments of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper passions are stirred (...), can give way to an explosive mixture of *rage and hatred*...”.

Westophobia could also be perceived as a mounting wave of Muslims’ dread and insurgence or mutiny against the *triumphant and humiliating West* and its global intrusion, expansion and hegemony. In Bernard Lewis’ vivid words: “for a long time now there has been a rising tide of rebellion against this Western paramountcy and a desire to reassert Muslim values and restore Muslim greatness...It was also natural that this rage should be directed primarily against the millennial enemy and should draw its strength from ancient beliefs and loyalties” (Lewis, 1990, p. 49). Westophobia in Lewis’ sense is a direct and indirect as well as a conscious projection of a deep-rooted paranoia onto centuries-old adversaries or foes: the ‘West’ and its allies. As emphasized by Mark Dillof, “paranoids project their feelings — which are frequently *hostile*, if not downright malignant — *onto other people*. They then imagine that it is *other people*, not themselves, who have *evil intentions*... What, then, is the essence of the paranoid vision? It is that there exists an *enemy* who is *conspiring to do one harm*” (Dillof, 2006).

That phobia-stricken people have a proclivity towards believing in ‘conspiracy theories’ (Coady, 2006). It should also be kept in account that like all worldviews, the ‘paranoid vision’ can be shared by a group of people, including Middle Eastern and Arab Muslims, an organization, or by an entire society/community (Ummah), e.g., Muslims. Of course, worldviews are usually indigenous to a particular place and time in history. But the ‘paranoid vision’ is perpetual. It is as familiar to the human landscape and is associated with symptoms such as hostility, bitterness, envy, umbrage, resentment, suspicion and fear, hate jealousy, sadness, longing, laughter and love. For Mark Dillof, “The main polarity in the self-representations of paranoid people is an impotent, humiliated, and despised image of the Self versus an omnipotent, vindicated, triumphant one. A tension between these two images suffuses their subjective world” (Dillof, 2006, p. 10). Muslims are not an exception in manifesting such split and *ambivalent* representations not only towards themselves but also their ‘Alter Ego or Other: The West’.

In other words, Westophobia as *ambivalence* means that for Muslims, especially Middle Easterners and Arabs, the ‘Western’ Other has concurrently been an object of love and hate, a shelter and a menace, a usurper and a giver, an enemy to be feared and a friend whose sympathy and assistance are to be sought. It is in this light of such paradoxical relationship between Muslims and the ‘West’ that Rasheed Al-Enany has magnificently demonstrated that when Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt in 1798, he was no doubt an imperial invader to be resisted, but Egyptian intellectuals at the time, as witnessed in the annals of Al-Jabarti, the chronicler of the day, were able to see that Napoleon was not just another Mamluk, or Ottoman governor seeking to wield power over them. Ambivalently and as Al-Enany states, “they saw in him the representative of a different culture, a different world – they saw that he had come to them from a different age that they had yet to travel to. In an unspoken manner, they understood that he had come to them from the modern age, the age of science, invention, advanced weaponry and battle tactics, the age of sophisticated administration and civil rights for the people – theirs was still the medieval age, dominated by Divine law and religious learning, and enjoying a false sense of security from its isolation. (Al-Enany, 2006, pp. 2-3).

Al-Jabarti gave such ambivalence towards the ‘West’ its first expression when, horrified at the French’s violation of al-Azhar mosque, he described them as the very ‘soldiers of Satan’, but his demonization of the Western Other does not go much further than that. Elsewhere he can hardly contain his admiration for their science, their organisation, and their judicial system. From that moment on, the Muslims’ hate,

fear and appreciation of the Western/ European Other continued throughout the pre-colonial period and is still in evidence more than two centuries. In a much later interview, Naguib Mahfouz, the Noble prize winner for literature in 1988, spelt out the spirits of ambivalence expressed earlier. He told his interviewer in 1998: “we were in conflict with the English; we used to demonstrate against them and shout, ‘Complete independence or violent death!’ But at the same time, we valued highly English literature and English thought...We made the distinction between [Britain’s] ugly colonial face and its radiant civilised one” (Al-Enany, 2006, p. 3).

The dilemma that Muslims faced from the early days of the encounter with the ‘West’ was that Europe was at once the ‘malady and the remedy’. It had hegemonic power over their nations because it commanded the better life model and value system. European power, they have come to realise gradually since the time of Al-Jabarti, was not magic. It was the product of rational science and industrialisation, democratic government, acknowledgement and respect for human rights, economic modernisation, etc. The paradox for them was that to gain freedom from Western domination, the Western life model had to be adopted. The *tension* that is felt in their perceptions about West derives from their recognition of the necessity of the very *Other*, *against whom* they have been attempting to assert the *polarized Muslim Self-identity and of whom they are scared or fearful*.

It is in the light of this *tension* that Muslims’ Westophobia could also be defined as the Muslim’s contemporary deployment of the critique against *westoxification/westoxidation* (*Persian: Gharbzadegi*) or as a radical interrogation of the relationship between Western cultural invasion of the Muslim world and the Muslims’ continuous thirst for their presumably split *self-identity* and lost Islamic authenticity and splendour. It is a critique that engenders historically rooted political, military, cultural and civilizational *encounters* with the hegemonic ‘West’. To paraphrase Benjamin Lenox Smith, ‘what is always threatened in this encounter is the question of identity and the process of identification. As people of different cultural origins interact they expose each other to their fundamental identifications through their modes of thinking, religious beliefs, customs and traditions. The account of encounter looks to expose similarities and differences between peoples’ thoughts, beliefs and cultures, frequently seeking to reconcile real and perceived differences. This process does not take place in a vacuum but is usually accompanied by hierarchical notions of power and prestige between people, nations and cultures. Identities become caught in this confusing whirl ambivalently ranging between accommodation, acceptance/love and rejection/hate’ (Smith, 2014, p. 8; Siddiq, 2007; Boullata, 1976).

For Shirin Deylami, “the literal translation of *gharbzadegi* is west-struckness” (Deylami, 2008, p. 15). Yet, as a concept the term has consistently invoked a notion of Western intrusion into Islamic/Muslim life; Iranian in particular; a kind of illness, plague and/or intoxication; a foreignness or strangeness that takes over the cultural, civilizational and political-economic body or physique. Westophobia as a criticism or an invective against Western culture was a necessary tool to raise the morale of the Muslim nation (Ummah) during the struggle against imperial foreign occupation and continuous cultural invasion as well as current *resentment* and resistance against the ‘West’s’ global neo-colonialism and hegemony. The quest for self-assertion and relevant resistance, inspired by the nationalism of the first half of the twentieth century continued in the postcolonial period, and still does.

Occidentalism as “*Gharbzadegi or Occidentosis: A Plague from the West*” by the Iranian author Jalal Al-i/Al-e Ahmad, is not unique to Iran and might be encountered almost anywhere the ‘West’ has imposed itself as a colonial and hegemonic power in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the broader Muslim and Arab worlds. However, Ahmad rightly makes the case that the encounter and subsequent conflicts between Islam, Muslims and the ‘West’ have unique dimensions and consequences, including the Muslims’

ambivalent Westophobic sentiments towards the ‘West’. That Islam is above all the essential and defining attribute of a cultural and civilizational sphere, to which Iran belongs, that has been at war with the ‘West’ for centuries. Islam and its adherents or Muslims are seen as the eventual defence against the invasive waves of the Western “plague or disease” (Ahmad, 1984). “Occidentosis” is remarkably reminiscent of other scholarly postcolonial works of cultural self-analysis and critique by the victims of Western imperialism and global hegemonic outreach: the writings of Frantz Fanon and Edward W. Said’s Orientalism (1978). Common to “Occidentosis” and “Orientalism” is the construction of the ‘Other or Alter Ego’, the question of ‘Otherness’ and the dynamic process of ‘Othering’ as well as the consequence of ambivalence towards such ‘Other’.

Westophobia: Historical Root Causes and Manifestations

Having thus briefly identified the meanings of the concepts West, Occidentalism and Westophobia, I will then quest through history on a *concise* search for the latter’s i.e., Westophobia, origins or root causes. Differently expressed, the nature of Westophobia prompts one to inquire: what are its origins? What are the sources of its appeal and continuity? For decades, Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, academicians, researchers and mass media experts have been looking for convincing answers by resorting to history, to religion, to politics and even to psychology where “people under the sway of “the paranoid vision” experience the world as infused with malevolence.” Furthermore, Mark Diloff continues, “paranoids project their feelings — which are frequently hostile, if not downright malignant — onto other people. They then imagine that it is other people, not themselves, who have evil intentions. What, then, is the essence of the Muslims’ paranoid vision and ambivalence towards the ‘West’ or the Other? Is it that there exists an enemy who is conspiring to harm them i.e., Muslims? The answer to these questions demands a succinct rethinking of the ‘Westerners’ perceptions of the ‘West’ and the historical encounters and relationship between Islam, Muslims, including Middle Eastern and Arabs, and the ‘West’ as well.

In their co-authored book ‘*Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism*’ Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit depict Occidentalism a war against a particular idea of the ‘West’. That the idea of the ‘West’ as “a malign [and fearful] force is not some Eastern or Middle Eastern idea but has deep roots in European soil” (Buruma, 2004, p. 2) where it has been transformed into an anti-Western ideology used by Western and, particularly, non-Western thinkers. The ‘German romantics opposed the Western-French rationalism and universalism, Napoleon’s state expansionism, bourgeois mentality, and the 1789 revolutionary ideology, as well as the non-heroic merchant mentality.’ (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pp. 33-34) So did their national socialist followers later in Germany; they associated the anti-Western sentiments with anti-Semitism, identifying “Jewish parasitism and conspiracy or secret plots” as a threat to purity of race, faith and cultural traditions. The past harmony of the world in the eyes of the German Nazis was endangered by the “Jewified West”, together with “Russian Bolshevism”.

Some Russian intellectuals in the 18th and 19th century imposed a messianic view of the “Russian true faith”, as an anti-liberal alternative to Western rationalism (“cleverness without wisdom”), and to pro-Western Russian thinkers, who supported modernization. Marxists, including Marx and Engels also saw the West as decadent, parasitic, and imperialistic, and called for global class revolution. Following Japan’s attack against the American fleet in Pearl Harbour in July 1942, a group of distinguished Japanese, scholars, intellectuals and nationalists adopted European anti-Western ideas in their endeavour to “overcome the modern i.e., Western science, capitalism, modern technology and the notions of individual freedoms and democracy” (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 2). Later educated Japanese realized that national survival depended on the selective study and adoption of thought and technology that set the

West's progress and colonial expansion. Japan took over the role of modern expansive power in Asia. Similarly, the radical Chinese leader Mao Zedong and his supporters stood up against Westernization and the power of big metropolises (Shanghai), attempting to reconstruct society radically into a structure of rural communes. The Chinese Maoist radicals also supported spreading this idea and resultant political practices into Indochina, especially to Cambodia.

The clash between the negative image of the modern 'West' (Occident) and its opponents (anti-Westerners) is reflected by the sharp distinction between the periphery, and the metropolitan centre, rural versus industrial areas, materialistic versus native and spiritual mind, modernity versus tradition, mixed races cultures versus race and cultural purity. Buruma and Margalit describe how Western culture in the eyes of its enemies raises aversion by spreading allegedly materialistic, mechanical/soulless and rootless culture, which contaminates or pollutes and even destroys traditional communities and their spirit. The Occidentalists contrast a rural heaven or paradise and religious society with global capitalism concentrated in Western metropolises or "Babylon, the Sinful City of Man. Democracy, mass production, secular state organization, mass culture, hedonism, mediocrity, materialism, cultural arrogance, amorality, idolatry and intellectual shallowness - all together expand "Westoxications" to native non-Western societies all over the world" (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pp. 13-47), including the Muslim world.

The Islamist version of Occidentalism is described as an original and specific kind or strand of 'religious Occidentalism', which Buruma and Margalit trace back to modern religious scholars in Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, and which they argue is basically inspired by Judaism and European anti-modernistic thinkers. Thus, Occidentalism is an ideology that is modified and converted for the anti-Western and anti-Semitic political movement. The anti-Western Islamists aim to punish the materialistic and expansive 'West', and their domestic pro-Western, despotic and amoral rulers (including, for example, the secular regimes in Egypt and pre-Islamic revolution Iran), and re-establish religious and collectivist true communities (for example the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the current military rule in the Republic of the Sudan).

In his article on '*The Roots of Muslim Rage*' Bernard Lewis referred to the 'historical rivalry between Christendom and Islam, the long series of mutual attacks and counterattacks, jihads, crusades, Reconquista, the failure of Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, the rise of European colonial empires in Asia and Africa', as well as secularism, modernity and the Western creation and support for the State of Israel as significant sources of hatred and fear of the 'West' (Lewis, 1990, pp. 49-50). For Lewis the conflict between the 'West', Islam and its Muslim adherents is predicated on what he sees to be the historical decline of the Islamic civilization. Specifically, he argues that the divisive antagonism between Islam, Muslims, and the 'West' is contingent on Islamic resentment of the 'West'. While this in and of itself is not a new contention, — of course some Muslims resent the 'West' for their economic exploitation, intrusion in political affairs, colonialism, etc.— Lewis furthers the argument by instilling this resentment into the Muslim psyche. He argues, the 'West' has a history of imperial conquest, extraction and hegemony, however this is not the main reason Muslims hate and fear the 'West'. If that were the case all post-colonial subjects would have a 'vehement disdain for their former occupiers and colonizers'. Instead, Lewis argues, Islamic resentment is an effect of civilizational loss—a memory of the time when the Islamic empire was the greatest and most powerful civilization in the world. Political might and supremacy have been lost to what Lewis calls 'Western infidels' (Lewis, 1990, p. 53), and the Islamic world resents it at the economic, cultural and moral levels or spheres.

For Lewis this antipathy permeates the psychology of the Islamic civilization and Islamic identity at large. Because the Islamic world sees itself through a tradition of power and wealth and now feels subservient to the 'West', its civilizational identity is predicated and fuelled by this bitterness. This resentment is the

driving catalyst for the anti-modern and anti-Western sentiments of Muslims. The Islamic civilizations admiration of Western military might, economic prosperity, political hegemony and even ways of life (*Westoxification*) has been replaced with a hatred and a desire for Western intellectual despise and physical destruction.

Westophobia: Intellectual Critique and Physical Manifestations

The Muslims' Occidentalist attitude directs itself towards the *values* of the 'West'. In this sense, "Occidentalism was part of the counter-Enlightenment, to be sure, but also of the reaction against industrialization. Occidentalism was a revolt against rationalism, secularism and individualism" (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 10). However, Occidentalism is articulated only when the revolt against the West becomes a form of pure destruction, when a dehumanizing picture of the 'West' is painted by its secular and religious Occidentalist adversaries, Muslim Middle Easterners and Arabs in specific.

Buruma and Margalit's concept of Occidentalism is thus an accumulation of destructive images: the 'West' is soulless, rootless, godless, mechanical, superficial, trivial, corrupt, greedy, money-grubbing, insensitive, parasitic, mediocre, materialistic, racially mixed, fashion-addicted, selfish, decadent, arrogant ..., all boiled together in a venomous brew' (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, pp. 10-11). They argue that it is not a matter of simple prejudice or stereotyping. Occidentalism is a form of intellectual destruction. It strips its human targets of their humanity. The other is seen as being less than human. Occidentalism is also an attack on the mind or intellect of the West. The West is portrayed as having plenty of *instrumental* rationality and very little of *value* rationality. The mind of the West is thus seen as a kind of 'higher idiocy. It does have a special gift for making arithmetic calculations, but it is hopeless at doing what is humanely important. It cannot grasp the higher things in life; it lacks spirituality and understanding of human suffering; it is not capable of finding the *right way*" (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 75).

Muslim Middle Eastern images of the West are coloured simultaneously by envy and fear, admiration and suspicion. Western technological, economic, and political achievements are appealing, while the assertion of Western military, political, and economic power creates feelings of distrust and resentment. Pervasive Western cultural penetration generates deep ambivalence, in which attitudes of curiosity and even enthusiasm are coupled with a residual sense of inauthenticity or scandal. Overall, Western civilization is seen as an example to be copied; but when Muslims of the Middle East examine Western culture through the lens of the various mass media outlets, they see cultural decadence or depravity in the forms of pathological or *disease-like* sensuality, individualism, and materialistic disregard for religious values. From a Middle Eastern perspective, Western families have become atomized and fragmented because there are too few brakes on individual self-interest and self-indulgence. Muslim societies, in contrast, are seeking to meet the hardships of drastic global transformations while defending religion i.e. Islam as the ideal system of life for all mankind and maintaining Islamic ethics, family, brotherhood, justice, peace, and co-operation as the cornerstone of their socio-economic and political system.

The depiction of the 'West' as a fatal "disease," one that afflicts a Muslim's or an individual's self-identity, cultural authenticity and causes the collapse of traditional society, has become a primary *diagnostic frame* for a generation of Muslim scholars from both the modern (Western-educated) left and the traditional (religious) right. In the latter's sense, for instance, Sayyid Qutb narrowed down his critique of Western colonialism and Orientalism to one of America and Americanization and their symbols and intellectual allies in the Muslim world. Qutb's collection of articles, essays and letters entitled 'America Allati Ra'aytu (The America That I Saw) analyses the image of America by an Islamic ideologue whose understanding was conditioned by a tendency to posit a cultural clash between the spiritual East and materialistic

Western culture and society. "In the immediate post World War 11 period, Qutb's negative opinion of the Western nations extended beyond the usual British and French targets to include the Americans. Again, Qutb was particularly chagrined at America's growing support for the Zionist cause in Palestine, which he regarded as a manifestation of European imperialism. America's refusal to endorse the establishment of an independent Arab Palestine demonstrated that it was, in fact, not different in its basic attitudes towards Eastern nations than the British, the French and the Dutch" (Calvert, 2000, pp. 90-91).

In Qutb's opinion, the United States supported an unjust venture such as international Zionism because, like other Western nations, its leadership and population lacked a transcendental moral conscience (*damir*), a trait he considered essential for just and responsible behaviour in both the public and private spheres of human activity. Furthermore, he was not sympathetic with the American preoccupation with the external, materialistic and individualistic dimension of life. In Moussalli's words, "three features, among others, shocked Qutb and propelled his mind towards further rejection of the West as the model to be emulated. The three features were materialism, racism and sexual permissiveness." "Americans", Qutb proclaimed, "are not a people without virtues. But their virtues were those of production, organization, reason and work. Their virtues were neither of social and human leadership nor of manners and emotions" (Moussalli, 1992, p. 25). Qutb was overwhelmed by the vastness of the American land, beauty, creativity and the organizational knowledge of people. But all of these characteristics and accomplishments, Qutb believed, had been gained at the expense of basic human values and moral depth. To him, "there is no correlation between the greatness of the American material civilization and the men who created it. In both feeling and conduct the American is primitive. The result of the imbalance between the material and the spiritual is deformity in the American soul" (Calvert, 2000, pp. 99-100). It is a strong indictment, John Calvert writes, "but one which is consistent with Qutb's long-standing proclivity to divide the world into the culturally distinct and ethnically unequal categories of the East and West and later Islam and *Jahiliyyah* (Ignorance)."

The epistemological and rapturous break from an intellectual Westophobia advocated by Muslim ideologues Such as Qutb, Al Mawdudi, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Muhammed Iqbal, Ali Sahri'ati, Sayyid M. Taleqani etc., who yearned for a "future order ... thoroughly Islamic ... (and) cleansed of any negative influence of the other or 'jahili West' and to be realised 'through education and intellectual activism', to a radicalized and militant Westophobia that desired the same goal of such ideologues but through unmitigated violence and mayhem as demonstrated by Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the ISIS is the unfortunate outcome of the globalizing nature of Western imperialism and neo-colonialism with their American neo-liberal economic agenda. In its militant manifestations, the Muslims' Occidentalist attitude directs itself towards the *physical symbols* of the 'West' e.g., the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York. For Buruma and Margalit, "blowing up the World Trade Center in the name of Allah and holy war is a crude, literal, murderous act.... The *jihadis* had carefully chosen the symbol for their vengeance...New York and the Twin Towers represented everything that was hateful to the holy warrior about the greatest modern City of Man as a wicked symbol of greed and godlessness..." (Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 21).

Soon after the September 11 infamy when the U.S. and its allies bombed, invaded, occupied and destroyed Afghanistan and Iraq, sixty U.S. intellectuals, including Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, signed and published a contestable open letter titled, "What We are Fighting For: A Letter from America". It obviously provoked equally contestable and even angry responses from Muslim quarters, Al-Qaeda in specific. In his "Letter to the American People" Usama Bin Laden answers the question "Why are we fighting and opposing you?", and in that answer he reiterates, "You attacked us in Palestine." "You attacked us in Somalia; you supported Russian atrocities against us in Chechnya, the

Indian oppression against us in Kashmir, and the Jewish aggression against us in Lebanon." "You steal our wealth and oil at paltry prices because of your international influence and military threats." "Your forces occupy our countries; you spread your military bases through them:" "You have starved the Muslims in Iraq, where children die every day." "You have supported the Jews in their idea that Jerusalem is their eternal capital and agreed to move your embassy there." "These tragedies and calamities are only a few examples of your oppression and aggression" (Ali, 2017, p. 10). These specific issues raised not only by Islamists like Bin Laden and his supporters but also by Muslim intellectuals, economists, political scientists, writers and academics who also question the *mutually split foreign policy visions and practices* by the 'West' and its Muslim Westophobic or paranoid Other.

Mutually Split Foreign Policy Visions and Practices

By stressing Western aggression and oppression and the divine obligation and reward for Muslim jihad and martyrdom in the path of God, Bin Laden and his partisans then appeal to Islam as a transnational/global, revolutionary and confrontational ideology and foreign policy that seek not only to alter the social order of the entire world, rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and civilizational and cultural ideals but also to create a worldwide community (Ummah) of believers. In this sense, the establishment and proliferation of Islamic organizations, groups and networks, including radical ones that seek to change the circumstances of injustice into which they live, intensify the language of jihad. Their further intention is the struggle to achieve domestic socio-economic, political and cultural reforms and challenge Western civilizational and cultural hegemony and aggression which now seem to be the rule, not the exception, in international politics.

Reinforcing this radical Islamists' challenge or anti-Western attitudes and actions is their increasing expression of grievances and critical stance against what Professor Bassam Tibi termed the "New World Disorder" (Tibi, 2002). In other words, the rise of militant Muslims' Occidentalism and regional and international violent/terrorist manifestations have a positive correlation with the political events and transformations taking place worldwide. This correlation is essential at a time described by Cyrus Bina as the "decline of Pax-Britannica and the corresponding rise of Pax- Americana, following the Second World War" (Bina, 1994, p. 3). This international political transformation shows that the essential mission of the 'new world order' is to achieve hegemony over the economy, polity and socio-ideological fabric of the world community, including Muslims, as a whole. As this hegemony has been, sometimes, violently challenged, the West, particularly the United States, has had to resort to the adoption of foreign policies formulated along lines of confrontation and accommodation to counter the challenge coming from Westophobic Muslims, and Islam, their radical and violent/terrorist brands in specific. Furthermore, and as would be expected, such Western, American spear-headed hegemony, is far greater than the sum of its political, economic and even cultural parts, as it is civilizational, including distinctive ideas, memories, beliefs, practices, misconceptions, myths and symbols that go to the very core of the 'West', Islam and Muslim identity.

Most mutual Western and Muslims' cultural perceptions feed upon rediscovering a deep-rooted history of neighbourhood, mutual rivalry and enmity. The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and their consequences, have confirmed the persistence of such Muslim-Western history of, again, neighbourhood, conflict and animosity. As earlier mentioned, Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington both appear to contemplate conflicts between civilizations as the "latest phases in the evolution of conflicts in the modern world." The lines have been sharply drawn between the West and its old nemesis: the world of Islam. Such demarcations reflect two distinct civilizational orders with their own specific understanding of

the cosmos, social existence and the relations within it. However, in a reaction to this ‘civilizational clash’, an inter-civilizational dialogue vision in foreign policy is receiving an increasing attention in both the Muslim and Western worlds. Both visions of ‘clash’ and ‘dialogue’ are an essential part of the foundation of any interpretation of international relations and the formulation of foreign policy in the post-Cold War and the post-September 11 era.

A different view adopted by Western opinion-makers and academicians towards Islam and international politics in the post-Cold War era consists of a vision of an inter-civilizational dialogue which rejects and criticizes the “clash of civilizations” (Said, 2001; 1997) notions that depict Islam and the West as being on a historical course of collision and confrontation. Partisans of the dialogue vision argue that Islam is neither unified nor a threat to the West. Graham E. Fuller, John L. Esposito and Leon T. Hadar, three leading proponents, contend that “there is no Islam per se that can be treated as a single, cohesive, and monolithic entity” (Fuller & Lesser, 1996, pp. 1-2). There are various sources of Islamic theology and law, including the Qur'an and the oral and practical traditions (sunnah) of the prophet Muhammad, and religious law by rational and independent reasoning (ijtihad). In addition, there are Sunni and Shi'ite branches of Islam, (each of which has broad and diverse subdivisions), a variety of schools of theology, a wealth of Sufi or mystical brotherhoods. There are regional customs and different historical personalities and experiences among dozens of Muslim countries across three major continents and a complete spectrum of climates that make up Islam. Needless to say, the concept of the ‘West’ is at least as diverse.

A significant question raised by the inter-civilizational dialogue vision is why Islam should be so often particularly perceived as the political and ideological rival of the West in the post-bipolar world order. Professor John L. Esposito thinks that many reasons suggest themselves: “despite many common theological roots and beliefs, throughout history Muslim-Christian relations have often been overshadowed by conflict as the armies and missionaries of Islam and Christendom have struggled for power and for souls” (Esposito, 1995, pp. 3-4). In addition, For a Western world long accustomed to an international vision and a foreign policy predicated upon superpower rivalry for global influence and dominance, the conflict between the U.S.A. and the former Soviet Union often being portrayed as a struggle between good and evil, capitalism and communism, it is too all tempting to identify another global ideological menace to fill the ‘threat vacuum’ created by the demise of the communist Soviet Union. In the 1990s the West found it important that the ideological gap created by the end of the Cold War be filled by exaggerated fears of Islam as a resurgent evil empire at war with the ‘New World Order’ and a challenge to international peace and stability. Such fears and the belief that a clash of world-views, values and civilizations is leading to confrontation between Islam and the West is reflected in mass media headlines like ‘Green Peril’, The Rage of God’, ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’, ‘Warriors of God’, etc. While such phrases capture Western public attention, they exaggerate and distort the nature of Islam, the political realities of the Muslim world and its diverse relationships with the West throughout history. Accordingly, a foreign policy of confrontation and exclusion is ultimately self-defeating and should, therefore, be dismissed. That it is prudent for both Muslims, Westerners and the partisans of both to establish an inter-faith, inter-civilizational and inter-cultural dialogue over rules and values as a means of conflict resolution that could prevent confrontation.

Conclusion

Despite the complexities and multiple meanings of Occidentalism it continues the opportunity of offering a radical and inclusive interrogation of the historical encounters and contemporary intricate relationships between Islam, Muslims and the ‘West’ or Occident. Such questioning is not simply mired in the discourse

of Islamic authenticity (*asalah*), traditionalism (*taqlid*), identity, and nativist Westophobia and anxiety. At its best, the critique can be seen as a mode of thinking about an intensive globalization that takes the nature of the histories, cultures and civilizations of ‘East and West’, ‘Orient and Occident’, to hearts, minds, attitudes, and actions of both Westerners and Non-Westerners, including Muslims and Arabs. It requires the avoidance of perceiving the multifaceted ‘West’ (Occident) or Islam and its colourful Muslim adherents as different and antagonistic cultures and civilizations working through their own rises and declines without significant inter-cultural and inter-civilizational connections and exchanges.

This kind of method to reading and interpreting Islamic/Muslims’ critiques and fears/paranoias of the West or Westophobia has both academic and political ramifications that exceed the scope of this paper. On the one hand, the re-valuation of critique as a political enterprise in the Islam/ ‘West’ context permits us to see the way in which anxieties about the West’s global outreach, political hegemony, economic and military might as well as cultural intrusion into the Muslim world, are not endemic of a Huntingtonian thesis of a “clash of civilizations.” Rather, they are important political involvements that question the West’s imperialist modalities of power and worldwide diverse interventions, the United States of America in particular. On the other hand, just as it disrupts claims about the essential incompatibility between Islam and the ‘West’, this emphasis on the fruitful aspects of critique allows us to be attentive to those who adopt the exclusion of the “clash of civilizations” through its opposite foreign policy vision and practice, the “dialogue and alliance among civilizations.”

Regardless of the position taken in this clash-dialogue visions and practices in foreign policies, one certainly needs to acknowledge the tremendous effort by Bernard Lewis and Samuel P. Huntington, etc., to bring culture, particularly religious beliefs, and civilization into the study of international relations (IR) and terrorism, despite the West-centered bias that characterizes their writings. Unlike Lewis and Huntington, etc., one does not view international conflicts in terms of security analysis, but rather as conflicts between civilizational world-views that can be averted through the search for cross-cultural and inter-civilizational commonalities without overlooking the existing variations and realities.

In a nutshell, the rise of Muslims’ Westophobia and religiously justified intellectual and physical violence, particularly terrorism, against the ‘West’ are not simply a political revolt against such ‘West’ and its domestic and regional authoritarian allies in the Middle East and the Muslim world, but also represent a deeper and militant Muslims’ rejection of Western secular values and such Western despotic cronies. This upheaval is articulated in a religious political language that aims to challenge the very foundations of the present Western-dominated international order. Politicization of religion, including Islam, and religious justifications for ‘holy/sacred violence and terror, as exemplified in global radical Islamic movements, organizations and groups, will lead to more phobias, mistrust and confrontation between Islam, Muslims and the ‘West’. They will also result in the Western reciprocal adoption of aggressive foreign policy visions and practices towards Islam and the Muslim world, the Middle East and Arab world in particular.

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PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES - DEVELOPING TRUST RELATIONS BETWEEN POLICE AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN A CLIMATE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM. AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

JASON HARTLEY

A qualitative research study into an Australian case study examining trust relations between police and Muslim communities in a climate of counter-terrorism.

Research has consistently shown that successful counter-terrorism policing depends on positive relationship between police and communities. Counter-terrorism community engagement consistently refers to the critical importance of trust as a foundation of progress, and a means of preventing terrorism in an environment considered culturally complex, highly emotional and fraught with tension. In the field of counter-terrorism, police and community partnerships are difficult to sustain and often fraught with tension as police seek to engender Muslim community trust. In Muslim communities, a perception of over-policing and hyper-legislation has resulted in a sense of resentment, growing distrust and further disengagement of Muslim leaders. This suggests that in the face of greater complexity, trust has become more problematic in its acquisition and maintenance, highlighting a number of concerns when traditional methods of policing are applied to the new challenges associated with terrorism.

45 semi-structured interviews were conducted in South-East Queensland involving 30 Muslims and 15 Police officers. Police participants included ranks from constable to deputy Commissioner of Police in operational and liaison roles associated with Muslim communities. Participants from Muslim communities included 8 imams, 5 academics, 8 community members, 4 youth and 5 community workers originating from Turkey, Palestine, South Africa, Pakistan, South-East Asia, India, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, England, South Africa and Anglo Australian.

The research was able to characterize strategies that were most successful in engendering community trust while highlighting strategies that were further destructive to trust relations. The result is a useful comparison between Muslim communities and the wider Australian community exposing cultural differences in the way trustworthiness is demonstrated and trust is bestowed. A further outcome is a number of recommendations to bolster counter-terrorism community engagement best practice to improve the quality and sustainability of community partnerships.

REVISED MODULAR SYSTEM THEORY ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: UPDATED VERSION WITH “DURMUS SCALE OF POWER” INCLUDING THE DATA FOR YEAR 2015

ABDULLAH METIN DURMUS

The author purposed “The Modular System Theory on International Relations” by developing Morton Kaplan’s System Theory in 2006, which was printed as an article in April 2017 during DAKAM’s International Conference, held in Istanbul. Three assumptions of the theory were laid down in the study which defines the modular character of international actors as well as the international system itself. This theory is thought to be useful for both diplomats and scholars in understanding the world affairs. The Global Potential Power Distribution Chart, which is compiled based on three main characters of the state, namely population, territory and economic power, shows “potential power of a state”. It is called “Durmus Scale of Power”. The chart is a comprehensive indicator with considerable accuracy and 100 % objectivity. In this updated version the author calculates data for year 2015 and gives a clear overview of the potential power distribution (balance of power) of the World regarding states and as well as International Organisations in 2015. EU with 28 member states in 2015 is 7,53. If Turkey joins EU, than EU becomes 29 and its power will be 7,58. When UK leaves EU after Brexit, power of EU with 27 members will fall to 7,47. If Turkey joins EU after Brexit and EU becomes 28 again, its power will be 7,53. Therefore, Turkey will compensate the power loss after Brexit. When we consider 29 member NATO with a coefficient of 7,96, the organisation will move soon to the next level (Great Power) which will mean NATO will have partly global hegemony. There are three conclusions to this research: a) “The Modular System Theory on International Relations” is a relevant and explanatory theory for the field of International Relations. It explains how international actors and international system behaves. b) The way “Durmus Scale of Power” is calculated is reliable because everybody with a scientific calculator or a computer can easily calculate power of a specific state provided that he or she has the data for territory, population and GDP. c) “Global Potential Power Distribution Chart” is a comprehensive Chart which shows “balance of power” at a specific year. It also enables us to compare power of states and international organisation at different years.

THE USE OF “POWER” IN COMBATING TERRORISM AND PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: OPERATION OLIVE BRANCH

MURAT PAYAM

As terrorism has turned to one of the basic threats for the states and humans, it became the mostly spoken issue in the world's agenda and has occupied a large space in everybody's lives as a global problem nowadays. Thus, many researchers from different disciplines have tried to understand its origins, causes, objectives, effects and means of combating it. In combating terrorism, initially hard power has been used by countries all over the world as the main strategy for a long time. Turkey also has tried this strategy and it is found to be ineffective in terms of effective countering. Then, the countries decided to try soft power as an alternative approach for countering terrorism. To some extent, the use of soft power has been found effective for combating terrorism but the desired outcome still has not been gained. With the increase of terror threats at global and regional scale, researchers started to search for more effective methods in the fight against modern terrorism, which is really complicated to combat. Then the countries, especially America, started to use smart power, which is the combination of hard and soft power. When it is realized that the use of various powers alone cannot solve today's modern terrorism problem, the importance of an alternative method, namely “Perception Management” started to be understood. Parallel to this in recent years, the change of power perception in the international system and that the use of various powers created the legitimacy problems for the actors using force have led the actors to search for a new method. Even today, it is seen that the use of hard or soft power alone in fighting against terror is inadequate to solve the problem efficiently. Therefore, a wise security policy should include military and economic power as well as smart power and perception management. Power use is only legitimate as long as it is based on a justifiable reason. However, the use of force that is not based on justifiable reason can be shown as legitimate with perception management. In this context, it can be said that the most effective and silent weapon of the states that use force at various levels is to manage perceptions. With this purpose in mind, the use of various powers and perception management in combating terrorism in the context of Operation Olive Branch will be dealt with detailed.

DETERRING VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS: DILEMMAS AND IMPLICATIONS

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, the need arose to revisit the Deterrence Theory to address several challenges such as rogue states, cyber threats and violent non-state actors (VNSAs). The recent research on VNSAs highlights its proper role in a new security environment. Deterrence has emerged as a significant strategy to counter both conventional and nuclear terrorism. Using qualitative methods, the main question the study tries to answer is: what are the limitations of classical Deterrence Theory in dealing with VNSAs? Literature fails to agree on the applicability of deterrence to VNSAs. While some scholars argue that deterrence can be applied to the VNSAs, others doubt that. The study suggests that two measures must be applied; the first one is to rephrase the assumptions of the theory towards a broader definition. The second one is to theorize certain tools for deterring VNSAs such as: such as: heavy investment in intelligence, financial campaigns, Deterrence by denial, Deterrence by Punishment, and Triadic Deterrence. Deterrence shall remain a key component in, but not the cornerstone of, national security strategies.

KEYWORDS

Deterrence Theory, Terrorist Groups, Deterrence by Denial, Deterrence by Punishment, Triadic Deterrence, National Security Strategies, Deterrence by Delegitimization.

1. INTRODUCTION

Deterrence, as a leading theoretical framework during the Cold War (David and Robert, 2006), has been subject to criticism (Koichi, 2016). Deterrence, and other terms such as assured destruction and massive retaliation, have become politically incorrect and lost respectability. The idea that the survival of Europe and the United States had depended on destroying dozens in retaliation for a nuclear attack was considered as immoral (Berk, 2004).

Deterrence has been largely neglected, both in confronting the so-called state-terrorism and also in response to threats from non-state terrorists (Berk, 2004). New opponents render deterrence a more complicated issue. These opponents include near-peer competitors, like China; regional states like Iran or North Korea; and non-state actors. It is difficult to assume that each set of actors will have the same reaction to deterrent threats.

Cyberspace poses a major challenge for deterrence (Emilio, 2013; Martin, 2009; Catherine, 2013; William, 2011; Uchenna 2014; Alex, 2011). Military force is of limited utility in deterring cyber threats. A military response to espionage or crime would be a strange departure from the international law regarding the use of force (James, 2010).

Many scholars believe that in the absence of a conflict among super powers, Deterrence Theory has lost much of its value. Deterrence Theory is less used in dealing with rogue states or terrorist groups in a manner that requires readjusting deterrence as a theory and a policy (T.V. et al., 2009).

Terrorist groups and other violent non-state actors (VNSAs) have gained a great attention, especially after the 9/11 attacks, US invasion of Iraq and the war on terrorism. In recent years, terrorism perpetrated by violent non-state actors has become in the forefront of international politics. Terrorist groups - in some cases - have engaged in provocative activities, which triggered off international conflict and interstate wars (Diane, 2006).

The paper investigates the drawbacks of Deterrence Theory in terms of explaining new forms of behavior. The main question it tries to answer is: what are the limitations of classical Deterrence Theory in dealing with VNSAs?

To answer this question, the study explores deterrence in the bipolar and unipolar international systems. Then, it briefly describes the emergence of deterrence as a prominent theory against VNSAs. Next, it outlines a number of predicaments that undermine this pattern of deterrence. Later, it concludes that the key conditions of the theory do not apply to VNSAs. Finally, the study rephrases the assumptions of the theory towards a broader definition and theorizes certain approaches for deterring VNSAs.

2. DETERRENCE IN THE BIPOLAR AND UNIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

There is no consent among literatures on a specific definition of deterrence (Paul and Bruce, 1900; John and Tejaswini, 2011). Probably, the most prominent and frequent definition is of Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, who both define it as "*The persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits*" (Alexander and Richard, 1974). Alternatively, "*it is a theory of defense that uses the threat of force to deter or prevent another party from doing something.*" (Elbridge, 2007)

The Deterrence Theory is based on several assumptions: first, states are rational actors that depend on the cost-benefit analysis in their decisions. The first assumption reflects that the theory focuses on nation-states (T.V., 2009), and excludes other non-state actors. Second, as for deterrence to succeed, the deterrent must target the adversary's high-value items. This requires the good understanding of the adversary, along with its culture, strategy, capabilities, and conditions. Third, the adversary must believe that the deterrent state will use its military power to carry out a retaliation threat (Colin, 2010). Fourth, the effectiveness of deterrence increases if the adversary perceives the red lines, which will lead to the implementation of deterrent threat. This perception requires good communication among adversaries. There is no use to surprise the adversary with an unforeseen retaliation, in a time just an apparent signal may deter a certain action in the first place (James, 2012).

Deterrence has been a standard practice in international politics, and a key component in the super powers strategies. Its importance increased after the possession of nuclear weapons when the possibilities of a massive war mounted during the Cold War. The absence of a major war between the United States and the Soviet Union reflected the success of deterrence (Patrick, 2012). War became unthinkable and irrational as the cost of war was exorbitant (Frank, 2004).

By the end of the Cold War, it seemed that deterrence had become something from the past. Since then, the rise of the rogue states, VNSAs, and the cyber threats (Susan, 2010; Dorothy, 2015; David, 2011; Kenneth, 2010; Charles, 2011; Tim, 2015) has highlighted the continuous need for deterrence, but how?

Some scholars argue that our understanding of deterrence during the period of Cold War is still valid as the bases of deterrence are still the same. The core of deterrence revolves around managing threats and controlling others' behaviors without fighting them. However, compared to the Cold War period, the objectives of deterrence have differed, as well as the targeted adversary, the context, and the ability to deter.

In the context of the Cold War, deterrence has worked mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union, the major poles in the international system. The primary goal of deterrence was preventing a nuclear war between the two parties (Stephen, 2012).

As the Cold War ended, the actors addressed by deterrence included: rogue states, VNSAs, and others. This influenced the deterrence objectives, strategies, and methods, which vary from one actor to another according to the targeted adversary.

Therefore, the statement that deterrence needs reconsideration is not surprising. The starting point is to recognize that the Cold War concepts have reflected certain circumstances and contexts that have dramatically changed. Deterrence, that has been highly effective against the Soviet Union in the past, may not be effective in addressing future adversaries (Keith, 2003).

Deterrence Theory - in this context - experiences a renaissance after nearly 20 years of relative neglect since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The theory expanded its scope of interest to include terrorism, extremism, transitional organized crime, and cyber threats. In the early nineties, doubts had been shed on deterrence, and new methods had been explored to expand and apply the theory differently, especially after 9/11 and the US war in Afghanistan in 2001 (Alex, 2014). Amid the contemporary debate, many experts have focused on how to deter VNSAs, while attaching less attention to its appropriateness in the first place.

3. THE EMERGENCE OF DETERRENCE AGAINST VNSAS

Contemporary research and studies indicate that deterring VNSAs can be located in the frame of the fourth wave of deterrence research (Amir, 2010; Jevry 2010), which sheds light on the appropriate role of deterrence now, and investigates untraditional prospects to deter rogue states and terrorism (Jeffrey, 2012). In other words, theorists and experts are trying to update or revisit deterrence based on its classical foundations to address the threats posed by VNSAs (Paul, 2008).

Generally, non-state actors can be divided into two major categories: peaceful and violent. The first category is "*the most numerous*". They abide by international law, they include non-governmental organizations, international religious organizations, MNCs, and transnational diaspora groups. There is no need to deter such actors, contrary to violent ones such as international criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and rebel groups, the main target of deterrence (Dale *et al*, 1996).

Many scholars have argued that the United States' strategy based on deterrence and containment is no longer appropriate for deterring VNSAs. In addition, terrorists who sacrifice their lives to carry out a suicide attack would not be deterred easily, by any threat of retaliation. Accordingly, the U.S. military doctrine has changed from deterrence to preemption.

The 9/11 attacks have revived the fears of a "*nuclear holocaust*", in case terrorists or extremist movements get hold of mass destruction weapons. In Afghanistan, structural designs of mass destruction weapons have been found in underground hideouts of Al-Qaeda (Mohan, 2003). In addition, in the mid-1990s, Tokyo witnessed a Sarin Gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo on Tokyo subway line (Frank and Robert, 1997) to widely disseminate destruction and mess, believing that the consequent imbalance and disorder

may result in the collapse of the political and social regime. This is a shining example to follow regarding the possibility of VNSAs to possess weapons of mass destruction in a manner that affects countries and societies alike (Wyn, 2004).

Up till September 2001, most experts have thought that nuclear terrorism (Michael, 2004; Jonathan, 2005; Graham, 2005) is not a significant danger. While others believed that the potentials of nuclear terrorism are extremely small compared to the most common forms of terrorism (Brian, 1975; Karl-Heinz, 1994; Ehud, 1998).

However, after 9/11, terrorism and organized crime have become alarming possibilities, especially for the United States (U.S. Government, 2006). They have become the most dangerous threats to the national security. Therefore, deterring them resulted in larger and partial shifts in security studies and international relations. Since then, many writings on deterrence of VNSAs have accumulated. Thus, new theories, concepts, and forms of deterrence have been suggested (Alex, 2014).

Deterrence has emerged as a significant strategy to counter both conventional and nuclear terrorism, due to their potentially devastating consequences on the one hand, and the context within which terrorist groups operate on the other hand.

The US has already embarked on a variety of strategies and policies that aimed to undermine and prevent terrorism; the most important were the counter-proliferation policies, to stop the spread of nuclear technology and materials to VNSAs as well as governments.

Other strategies have focused on eliminating terrorist threats, particularly through counter-terrorism operations amid the global war on terror. In addition, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Raphael, 2007), issued by the Bush Administration in 2007, considered deterrence as an important tool to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. It suggested new measurements for deterrence that must include deterrence of terrorists as well as their supporters.

However, there are considerable limitations on the strategy of counter-terrorism; it relies on the offensive military force, so it cannot be employed as a long-term strategy, due to its high costs. It is too difficult to defeat terrorism by targeting the perpetrators given the transnational nature of terrorism. Without addressing the root causes of terrorism, counter-terrorism strategy solely shall remain inadequate.

It is practically impossible to prevent all terrorist attacks, even when reliable intelligence information indicates a possible attack in the near future. Just as Robert Art clarifies, "*defense is first if defense has failed or has not been possible, deterrence shall have the second priority*". Given the above-mentioned characteristics of the new environment, it is not surprising to suggest deterrence (Paul, 2008; Daniel, 2003; Gilles, 2004-2005; Robert 1980; Rupert, 2007).

4. WHY IS IT DIFFICULT TO DETER VNSAS?

It is difficult to deter VNSAs for multiple reasons that can be summarized as follows:

First, there is no single approach to be applied to VNSAs, due to their variances. They vary in their motivations and characteristics. In addition, we cannot equate the international criminal organizations with terrorist or rebel groups. However, the study of terrorist groups has had the greatest attention.

It is difficult to evaluate and determine the objectives and ideologies of VNSAs as they are incompatible. They are composed of distinct factions that have multiple political objectives. Groups like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have witnessed internal disputes among its factions with respect to the goals to be achieved, specifically, whether to focus on the Western States. The state of uncertainty about the ideological

composition of VNSAs hampers the ability to adapt a collective response towards what they face (Livio and Scott, 2016).

Second, it is difficult to deter actors who are willing to sacrifice their lives, for religious and ideological motivations, that make suicide an acceptable and even necessary action. This renders terrorism a way of life; in other words, exposure of the members of these groups to gross losses shall not result in individuals' refraining from joining the said groups. This can be envisaged considering the privileges that these groups provide such as power and wealth.

Third, deterrence may not be the ideal choice to confront VNSAs, because deterrence and eradication do not fit together. The US failure to eradicate terrorist groups led to deterrence. Moreover, destroying or eradicating any terrorist groups would not result in the elimination of terrorism, given the difference between the two. Without addressing the underlying reasons behind that phenomenon, and fighting thoughts and behaviors that nourish terrorism, deterring any terrorist group - in fact - will prove ineffective.

Fourth, there are numerous types of terrorists. During the Cold War, deterrence was confined to the two super powers. However, terrorism includes several groups with different tools, and without a unified leadership in some cases. Terrorism is not one block, and it is not feasible for only one theory to apply to the different terrorist groups (Paul and Brain, 2002).

Fifth, the effectiveness of deterrence varies according to the nature of the targeted actor. Understanding how deterrence worked throughout the Cold War era is no longer useful. Unlike States, VNSAs do not exercise sovereignty over a given territory; however, they seek to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the State by threatening its ability to exercise sovereignty over its own territory. Even if possible to deter a country by threatening its ability to control its territory, yet this represents a major dilemma in the relationship between the State and VNSAs. It is often possible for VNSAs to deter States but not vice-versa.

Sixth, VNSAs lack major strength positions that can be targeted easily. For a state, targeting the capital, political leadership or the military forces will affect its national security, public well-being, and decision-making process. As the state's territory can be easily targeted and held at risk, it becomes possible to deter and control a nation. However, it is difficult to locate VNSAs or determine their strategic valuable assets due to their transnational nature (Daird and Douglas, 2001).

Such differences among States and VNSAs would make it more difficult to deter those actors. The success of any deterring strategy depends on the objectives and calculations of those actors, who cannot be definitely identified, upon designing and developing a deterrence strategy (Adam, 2012).

Seventh, deterrence is based on a hostile relationship among adversaries. Currently, US acts as if Al-Qaeda shall use nuclear weapons to attack. However, the real intentions of Al-Qaeda are not known. It is practically impossible to deter an adversary who does not contemplate an attack. More importantly, deterrence in such a case may not only be imprudent but can be more dangerous. The threat to deter a non-existent attack may lead to provoking the adversary. Al-Qaeda may consider US threats aggressive and provocative.

In fact, an attempt to deter an enemy while oblivious of his intentions can be a double-edged weapon. As deterrence may sometimes be successful in discouraging the use of force, but it could also be the main cause of encouraging such a use (Paul, 2008).

5. DO THE CONDITIONS OF DETERRENCE APPLY TO VNSAS?

Literatures fail to agree on the applicability of deterrence to VNSAs. While some scholars argue that deterrence can be applied to the VNSAs (Berk, 2004), others doubt that. The first major trend includes three sub-trends; each could be considered as an approach for deterrence.

The first approach – in the first major trend - involves indirect deterrence, which targets third parties that facilitate terrorist acts, rather than terrorists themselves. The second approach reflects a renewed appreciation for deterrence by denial, the old concept by Glenn Snyder. The third approach entails a general trend in the fourth wave toward expanding the scope of the concept of deterrence and exploring new sources that are non-military in nature, such as Deterrence by Delegitimization (Jeffrey, 2012; Livio and Scott, 2016). For example, Obama's Administration addressed the expansion of the scope of deterrence to include not only advanced conventional weapons but also missile defense. However, deterrence has focused traditionally on nuclear retaliation (Steven *et al.*, 2010).

The second major trend argues that Deterrence Theory lacks clarity on the situations in which it can initially be applied. The theory offers little with regard to its applicability, leaving policymakers uncertain about when and where strategies of deterrence are appropriate.

Alexander George and Richard Smoke, for instance, stated, "*Deterrence theory per se provides no criteria to indicate when a deterrence theory should be applied in foreign policy.*" In addition, Robert Jervis suggested, "we still lack evidence and well-grounded arguments about the bounds of the theory and the conditions under which it applies."

The endeavor to apply deterrence, regardless of its applicability, is potentially counter-productive, and costly. Policymakers may believe that if strategies are properly implemented, the outcome projected by deterrence theory will hold true. Yet, this belief in the power of deterring party to achieve successful deterrence on its own ignores the interactive nature of conflict as well as intrinsic characteristics of the adversary.

Thus, it is important to determine whether the deterrence strategies that aim to tackle VNSAs are successful, then rises the need for approximation of initial appropriateness. The question of whether it can deter VNSAs from attack shall be preceded by the question whether deterrence is an appropriate response. There is no doubt that the difficulty of defending against terrorism makes deterrence strategies understandably appealing. However, this does not mean that deterrence should simply be attempted without further analysis (Paul, 2008).

The US counter-terrorism efforts are not founded on deterrence as a strategy against terrorism. Moreover, in recent years, the US began to employ deterrence in its fight against international terrorism. Scholars started to study how some terrorist activities can be deterred, but they have not come to broad approaches on deterrence.

To sum up, to judge the applicability of the theory of deterrence to VNSAs, three important issues shall be addressed:

First, **Rationality**: many scholars have argued that terrorists, criminals, and rebels are irrational. They do not follow the cost-benefit analysis while making their decisions; they are ready to bear any cost, including death, to advocate their goals. Thus, it was thought that the threat of retaliation would be incredible by nature, and inadequate (Matthew, 2010).

But, the applicability of this condition on VNSAs is controversial; in addition, literatures do not unanimously agree on this point. Some literatures have concluded that some terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, follow the cost- benefit analysis, and value-maximizing behavior. Thus, they can be deterred (Paul, 2008).

Second, **the nature of VNSAs**: Classical deterrence theory does not apply easily to VNSAs, which vary in structures, values, and communication methods. Therefore, understanding the intrinsic characteristics of each actor is essential. Some of which prevent the applicability of deterrence, such as the identification of their locations.

Third, **Motivations of VNSAs**: One of the most important aspects related to deterrence is the strength of the adversary's motivations in using force or launching an attack that profoundly influences the chances of successful deterrence. The desire of these actors to challenge the status quo and their willingness to take risks, influence the chances of successful deterrence. However, the more intolerant the actor is, the less effective deterrence may be (Patrick, 2011; Paul, 2008).

In short, deterrence may not be applicable, because it depends on VNSAs motives, which are likely to be extreme. Moreover, these groups are fanatical in their goals; are far away from ethical standards and remain impervious to negotiation and temptation.

6. Deterring VNSAs: implications of the theory

How can deterrence be revisited to overcome the abovementioned limitations? The study suggests two measures; the first one is to rephrase the assumptions of the theory towards a broader definition. The second one is to theorize certain approaches for deterring VNSAs.

The paper argues that in order for the theory to be effective against VNSAs its assumptions should be rephrased as follows:

Both states and non-state actors can be deterred, although it is more difficult to deter VNSAs. Thus, the approaches and methods used to deter the two differ.

Most states abide by cost-benefit analysis in their decision-making process. Terrorist leaders – on the contrary – may not have anything to lose, but at least some of their financiers and supporters have something to lose. That means using indirect ways for deterrence and breaking down the terrorist systems and networks (external suppliers, supportive populations, lieutenants, etc.) into parts.

The military tools may adequately deter states, but not VNSAs, as the latter requires other supporting tools such as the diplomatic and economic tools.

There is no- one size- fits- all approach for deterring VNSAs. Each case requires situation-specific responses.

There are many contributing factors that affect the ability to deter VNSAs such as the context, the regional environment, the number of superpowers in the international system, the goals the terrorist groups seek to realize, counter-terrorism strategies, central leadership and territories VNSAs operate in and across.

Deterring states may be a core strategy to achieve the deterrent goals, but deterring VNSAs is only a key component that works along with other decisive strategies.

The abovementioned assumptions require a broader concept of deterrence that should describe actions in need of military intervention, as well as the offensive and defensive capabilities needed for credible retaliation threat. The concept should analyze different ways to deter VNSAs, including direct targeting or indirect influence through a proxy actor. It means generally influencing counter-terrorism operations.

Symmetric approaches, such as engaging in long-term conflicts, are ineffective.

This broader concept requires specific means to deter VNSAs, such as:

First, heavy investment in intelligence is a must; though sharing and gathering intelligence data cannot be considered as a deterrent per se.

Second, an effective financial campaign based on intelligence information of how VNSAs finance themselves. The financial campaign may include: imposing economic sanctions, countering money laundering, and undermining any use of charitable organizations.

Third, Deterrence by denial: It includes the ability to prevent or minimize damage in any potential attack, thus alleviating its consequences. This requires the capacity to respond to any use of chemical and biological weapons and radiological incidents. Partly, this requires advance preparation, acquisition of vaccines, medical and regulatory measures. Further, this requires intensifying efforts to detect and intercept suspicious shipments. It aims to convince the enemy that the attack does not really fit in time, resources and efforts required (Wynp, 2002).

Fourth, Deterrence by Punishment: VNSAs, particularly terrorist groups, may be deterred by identifying high-value targets, to make the most radical leaders consider the potential costs and benefits. It could also work through targeting regimes that assist terrorism. For example, the US war in Afghanistan in 2001 sent a message that the United States and its allies have the intention, determination, and ability to punish regimes that support, harbor or tolerate Al-Qaeda.

Fifth, an effective international legal framework can strengthen the deterrence of non-state actors. Nevertheless, the currently exerted efforts are inefficient, derailing from the deterrence effectiveness. The ultimate objective of deterrence is compelling VNSAs to recognize and accept restrictions on their behaviors. Therefore, the nature of deterrence changes per the changing nature of the international community (Patrick, 2011).

Sixth, Triadic Deterrence, it is using punishment and/or threats against a state to deter it from supporting a non-state actor, if not to compel it to stop assisting it. When does deterrence of host states succeed? The structure of complex asymmetric conflict requires attention to the relationship between the target regime and its community. The more powerful this regime is, the more effective deterrence will be. Powerful actions against VNSAs require local institutional and political legitimacy, and territorial control, which require powerful regimes to do so.

Many conflicts in the international system today involve a state, a VNSA, and another state hosting or assisting the latter (Boaz and Wendy, 2012). Examples include the US war on Afghanistan to eradicate Al-Qaeda (Wyn, 2004), as well as the Israeli attacks on Lebanon to fight Hezbollah (Vinson, 2015; Miriam, 2011; Mark 2015), and finally India's warnings against Pakistan (Marie, 2003; Debalina, 2016; P.R., 2003) in its response to the actions of Kashmiri separatists (Boaz and Wendy, 2012).

7- CONCLUSION

Deterring VNSAs requires a broad understanding of deterrence. The main focus of the theory remains unchanged, which is preventing undesirable actions. However, deterring VNSAs should include methods that transcend the traditional deterrence theory. The possibility of deterring violent ideologies, recruited militants and their supporters cannot be addressed easily by the classical theory, which focused on the sovereign nation-states.

Many VNSAs do not have the traditional assets based on the territory, which can be targeted through the threat of punishment associated with traditional state-based theory. The clear majority of VNSAs lacks a certain territory in which classical threat of retaliation could be issued. This dilemma is well known as the return address problem.

Instead of focusing on the values associated with the classical deterrence based on the State, sovereignty, spheres of influence and economic power, deterring VNSAs requires targeting the value system they follow, such as: propaganda, operational success, strategic and tactical victory, leadership, public sympathy, social acceptance, religious motives, political legitimacy, freedom of movement, safe shelter, wealth and other physical assets.

In other words, the concept of deterrence must be re-applied in different ways that go beyond the threat of punishment and behavioral manipulation. As a result of the expansion and extension of deterrence to VNSAs, a number of coercive processes have been developed. However, these processes differ from those contained in the classical theory of deterrence that focuses on the states.

In conclusion, the classical deterrence theory may be re-applied to provide practical and empirical insights to confront contemporary threats and potential conflicts. Deterrence is a key component of national security and great power politics, but it is no longer the cornerstone of states interactions as it was during the Cold War period. Applying multi-faceted means such as the direct and indirect use of force besides non-military policies, and models to confront potential enemies and future threats may increase the effectiveness of deterrence.

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WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR IN AN ERA OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

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Asymmetric warfare is becoming more prominent in the 21st century, and considering the current dynamics of the international community, this trend will not falter any time soon. In today's world, countries have advanced cyber technology and intelligence that enable them to indirectly combat their opposition. The days when wars were fought solely through military capability have been replaced by asymmetric means of combat.

After 9/11, the United States declared a War on Terror, and 16 years later - little progress has been made. One can argue that since the launch of the War on Terror, radical terrorism has increased globally. Deterring terrorism in the Muslim and Arab world has been an extensive, and at times, seemingly impossible task. The world is generally in agreement that the War On Terror is a just war, however, the matter in question is how to find an effective means of deterrence.

The strategic response of the United States has relied primarily on the use of military force and has not been entirely effective in combating al Qaeda or ISIS, a significantly more dangerous entity in Syria and Iraq. While al Qaeda's territory and support base has decreased significantly, they remain a problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, multiple cases of recruitment and expansion have been reported in other nations, such as Yemen and Syria. ISIS's continuous encouragement for coordinated and lone-wolf attacks in Europe, the Middle East, the United States, and Africa, has led various countries to join the United States in the War on Terror.

The United States and Russia advanced the War on Terror by claiming their combat efforts against terrorist groups (specifically ISIS) in Syria. Throughout the past few years, the two countries have condemned one another for failing to deter ISIS and have refused to truly cooperate in the war on terror due to their conflicting goals within Syria.

It is impossible for the United States to win the War On Terror alone; new policies in the Middle East must entail close cooperation with regional actors including: Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf States, Egypt, and possibly, Russia.

The United States primary goal is to win the war on terror. Securing Syria's stabilization is key in preventing radical terrorist groups (such as ISIS) from gaining control in a power vacuum. To achieve this, the U.S must cut ties with Syrian rebels, halt military funds to Syrian Kurds, and allow the Assad regime to take back all Syrian territory with the help of Russian aid. Syria's stabilization will be the death of the Islamic State, which will allow for the United States to campaign for ideological reform in the Muslim World. Ideological reform is the only way to truly win the war on terror, and it cannot be done without strong and stabilized governments across the Muslim World.

PROSPECTS OF ANTI-TALIBAN LASHKAR (ARMED MILITIA) IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

NIZAR AHMAD

The present study aims at investigating the role of Pakhtun's traditional institution called Lashkar (armed militia) in countering terrorism at war torn communities. Data were collected in four selected conflict-affected communities of District Dir. Sample size of 278 respondents was derived through online sample size calculator. The countering terrorists activities of Lashkar was treated as independent variables in comparison with the state of peace in the area as dependent variable and a Chi Square test was applied for measuring association between independent and dependent variables. It was portrayed that the establishment of Lashkar is strongly related with state of peace. The role of Lashkar in pushing out militants from the area, maintaining control, provision of safety and security to local people were the main significant aspects related to peace in the area. On the other hand, a non-significant association was noted between the state of peace with provision of arms to Lashkar by government and Lashkar as a symbol of peacetime. It is summed up that in event of external aggression Lashkar is playing a vital role in security and protection of the community but it is not considered the symbol of peace and harmony and the government should not facilitate provision of arms to local people for formation of such militia in future.

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE ON COMMUNITIES IN EAST GERMAN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE 1970S AND 1980S

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Abstract:

With the advent of the digital age, societies around the world are at a crossroads in terms of surveillance; past tactics, such as wiretapping, are becoming obsolete. We are hurtling towards a world in which our information is being accessed through data mining, and citizens have little or no protection from this intrusion. Moreover, citizens scarcely know how this mined information is being used. Ever-increasing draconian laws, such as the Investigatory Powers Act, which introduced new powers, allowing, for UK intelligence agencies and law enforcement to carry out targeted interception of communications, bulk collection of communications data, and bulk interception of communication making the surveillance of citizens possible on an unprecedented scale. However, the impact that this will have on the way in which we function as a society and community and the future influence on the way in which we interact and communicate with each other have yet to be determined.

The question of risk-based strategies of control and experience of those on the receiving end of surveillance and monitoring, have received relatively little attention. This paper will compare the two surveillance states, East Germany (GDR) and Northern Ireland (NI). The factors underlying the impact of surveillance on these communities will be examined in detail. A historical look at GDR and NI as examples of heavily surveilled societies provides a unique perspective on the impact of surveillance.

This paper will examine the effects of continuous surveillance on the ways in which these communities communicate and function and will reveal the long-term consequences of surveillance practices. It is also expected to influence wider debate on the issue of unlawful surveillance and its effect on our future civil liberties. According to John Gilliom, “until sufficient research is generated to make plausible sense of how differently situated people, such as prisoners, students, mothers on welfare, and middle-class professionals, speak of and respond to their various surveillance settings, it will be impossible to devise a meaningful account of what of surveillance is” (2006, p. 126).

The Context of Surveillance in Northern Ireland and East Germany

To compare surveillance strategies used in Eastern Germany (German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Northern Ireland (NI), the history of and rationale for surveillance operations in these two states must be taken into account. Both cases can be examined and analysed using Foucault's model of surveillance, in which he describes traditional models of surveillance as power flows from the surveyors (government or corporate actors) to the surveyed is described below:

In this concept, power is something possessed by an authority that is exerted over things, which can be modified, use, consume or destroy. (F1982, p.786)

For 40 years, the East German State Security Service, commonly known as the Stasi, had a frightening reputation for surveillance, infiltration, and terror in GDR. Its sole objective was to control citizens and prevent the growing tide of emigration to West Germany, which nearly caused the economic collapse of the East German communist regime. By creating an atmosphere of fear, disharmony, and mistrust, it prevented the spontaneous communication and social cohesion that were critical for change. As Foucault suggests, "People under surveillance are—as in the Panopticon—to be seen but to never know when or by whom; under control but without physical intervention" (1977, p. 204).

In contrast, the NI surveillance state was the result of civil rights protests by the Catholic minority looking to end discriminatory voting, housing, and employment policies. Their demands led to intensifying political tension and intercommunity violence between the Protestant/unionist and Catholic/nationalist communities. This, in turn, resulted in the deployment of the British Army to quell the cycles of violence, terrorist attacks, and street protests gripping the region. It aimed to end the violence and restore order through on-the-ground tactical surveillance strategies. Based on past colonial experience, the British establishment chose a coercive militarised response to what were civil liberties and rights-based issues to begin with. This provocative militarised policing exacerbated the troubles, essentially becoming a threat multiplier. Numerous similarities can be drawn with today's police forces, which are facing increasing threats from radical elements of society; O'Malley and Hutchinson suggest this by noting that "the development of police as a quasi-military form of organization and the growth of a police culture . . . which emphasizes[] a form of masculine heroism" (2007, p. 385).

The Impact and Influence of State Surveillance

Surveillance is a form of power and control that has a direct bearing on how we live our lives, interact in our communities, and participate in our political systems. As Foucault suggests, "Freedom disappears everywhere power is exercised" (1982, p. 790). This is most often at the expense of the individual, because state institutions prioritise security.

One popular hypothesis among academics is that this constant surveillance will lead to a more segregated and polarised society, as suggested by Norris and Armstrong: "It is feared that surveillance will lead to a

'vicious-circle of defence'. It is likely to make urban space segregated, polarised, more difficult to approach and stay in, less lively, less spontaneous and even 'dead'" (Norris and Armstrong, 1999, p. 92).

This section will examine the role of surveillance operations and their impact on the communities under watch. Numerous academics refer to societies that function under the governmental gaze as "surveillance societies," a phrase coined by David Lyon, and the surveillance network is defined as "societies which function, in part, because of the extensive collection, recording, storage, analysis and application of information on individuals and groups in those societies" (Lyon, 2007, p.119). From this definition, it is clear that the GDR and NI societies of the 1970s and 1980s fit into the "surveillance societies" category. However two significant differences exist: in GDR, every citizen had the potential to be impacted by surveillance operations, while in NI, operations were split between the polarised communities—that is, the Catholic Nationalists and Protestant Loyalists.

This section will take into account the fundamental differences between these two surveillance societies. In GDR, the comparison will examine the role of the state and its effect on the citizens, and regarding NI, the voyeuristic gaze from the viewpoint of the state, the catholic community, and the protestant community will be analysed. The historical experiences of these two surveillance societies will be examined by dividing the subject matter into three main areas: impact on the individual, the community, and the citizen. By undertaking a detailed examination of the literature and comparing how these two surveilled societies interacted during these periods of heavy surveillance, the hope is to gain insight into how surveillance operations will affect future generations, who will be the default targets as a result of technological advances.

1. Individual Impact

In a surveillance society, the concept of the individual is ignored to justify the state's exertion of control over the citizen. Due to the emphasis that is placed on loyalty, preference is often given to those groups that are deemed to be good or compliant citizens. As Foucault argues in *Surveillance and Power*, "The state is envisioned as a kind of political power which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I should say, of a class or a group among the citizens" (1982, p. 782). Foucault takes this a step further in *Discipline and Punishment* by showing how modern governments replaced the clumsy, inefficient power of the monarch with a system of general surveillance which "meant to produce a self-regulating citizenry with the individual exercising this surveillance over and against himself" (1979, p. 155).

The long-term impact on an individual who is under constant surveillance is fear, mistrust, and self-censorship, which have together led many of those targeted by surveillance to retreat into more private spheres. As Kirstie Ball explains in her seminal work exploring the subject of everyday surveillance, argues "subject appears in the panopticon: as a mere shadow or outline only assumed to be reflexive, internally focused and self-regulating" (2009, p. 644).

In GDR, self-censorship became a self-protection measure that people applied to all facets of life because they believed that everything they said was being monitored. As Bruce explains,

"East Germans also practiced self-censorship in other, more private areas, including mail and telephone, where it would be very unlikely for East Germans to speak openly for fear of Stasi interception" (2010, p. 156). This form of self-censorship also affected the citizens of NI, often as a result of the ever-increasing violence in both the community and the private spheres, rendering people unable to communicate, speak, and interact freely. As Dermot Feenan points out, "The only others with such mobility were the police and army." Within his developing awareness of a "culture of political surveillance and confessional communities, he adds, "I had to constrain the body as well as the voice. Finally, in order to know, I had to become expert in demonstrating that there were things, places, and people I did not want to know" (2002, p. 148).

The literature examining the issues in both GDR and NI emphasises how a sense of mistrust dominated how citizens interacted with each other and how this impacted their ability to express their opinions liberally while living in the confines of a surveillance society. In the case of GDR, Barbara Miller argues as follows:

Although IM (unofficial informers) had not only been physically omnipresent, they had helped to create a general atmosphere of distrust and conspiracy which had ensured that many a critical sentiment was never voiced lest it should be reported to higher powers. (1997, p. 253)

In both GDR and NI, many testified that a cloud of suspicion and fear hung over communities as a result of the constant state of surveillance. Philipsen notes this in his work documenting the GDR revolution: "This was an ever present fear; somehow it permeated all walks of life; this haunting fear that you could be arrested anytime right off the street. The Stasi heard everything, knew everything, were everywhere, and everybody knew that" (1998, p. 158). In GDR, the Stasi myth also produced a certain discourse fuelled by a mixture of fear and small acts of defiance and resistance, such as mocking the alleged eavesdropping on telephone lines or speculating on perceived spies among colleagues.

In their work on surveillance societies, David Lyon and Gary Marx make continuous reference to the theory that in a securitised state, everyone is perceived as a risk, and this notion usual takes the place of the reasonable-cause model of policing: "Reasonable cause gives way to categorical suspicion where, for example, police may stop and search vehicles in a given locality" (Lyon, 2003, p. 89). This concept of reasonable cause played a crucial role in policing practices in NI and GDR and prevented many citizens from accessing their rights to due process.

In NI, the violent backdrop against which people lived often compounded this fear of surveillance. Feldman discusses this issue in *Political Terror and the Technologies of Memory*:

The risks of violent recourse, imprisonment, being on the run, or equivalent retaliation were negligible for Sean. By simply living a life of non-involvement in Belfast he could also, at any time, become the object of loyalist assassination, police interrogation and torture, and shoot-to-kill "arrests." (2016, p. 59)

Whyte examined the work of Rosemary Harris, an anthropologist who studied a rural community near the NI border and observed the sense of mistrust on both sides of the divided community: "She found that, despite a careful courtesy in everyday relations, deep mistrust and grotesque misconceptions existed on both sides of the community divide" (Whyte, 1976, p. 273). This sense of fear often had long-lasting mental health consequences. Regarding GDR, Bruce states, "Certainly, there were real, long-term mental health consequences similar to post-traumatic stress syndrome to having been a Stasi target and which are being treated in dedicated clinics in Germany today" (2010, p. 150). In his report regarding NI Policing, Wilson came to a similar conclusion that a combination of being under constant watch of state powers, along side increasing violence lead many to suffer lasting mental health issues: "24 per cent of women and 17 per cent of men in Northern Ireland have a mental-health problem—rates over 20 per cent higher than in England or Scotland, due to excess unemployment, social deprivation and the 'troubles' overhang" (2016, p. 137).

Many theorists argue that constant surveillance has a chilling effect on people's ability to speak freely and may stunt their development; people within communities also lose the ability to interact freely. Until the consequences of surveillance are seen, the true extent of its power cannot be understood:

Citizens cannot, in effect, legitimate laws that result in the mass and pervasive surveillance of the population based on the potential that one person may be a danger; such surveillance practices would stunt the individuals' development and the development of the communities that individuals find themselves within, as people limit what they say to avoid experiencing the (unknown) consequences of their speech. (Parsons, 2015, p. 16)

Due to this atmosphere of mistrust and the inability to express their true selves, during this period of pervasive surveillance during the 70's and 80's people resisted telling the truth, as Kevin Myers describes in *Watching the Door*:

Everyone lied in Northern Ireland . . . Everyone, without exception: republicans, loyalists, soldiers, police—everyone. Lying is easy in such a place. It is the default mode to which everyone turns when there is no consensus about truth. In the absence of an agreed reality, truth is whatever you're having yourself. (2008, p. 117)

This can lead to the blanket acceptance of a regime—many refer to this as the institutionalisation of the individual—due to the state's exertion of its dominant power over its citizens. Foucault argues as follows:

Forms of institutionalization: these may mix traditional pre-dispositions, legal structures, phenomena relating to custom or to fashion (such as one sees in the institution of the family); they can also take the form of an apparatus closed in upon itself, with its specific loci, its own regulations, its hierarchical structures which are carefully defined, a relative autonomy in its functioning (such as scholastic or military in-situations); they can also form very complex systems endowed with multiple apparatuses, as in the case of the state, whose function is the taking of everything under its wing, the bringing into being of general surveillance, the principle of

regulation, and, to a certain extent also, the distribution of all power relations in a given social ensemble. (1982, p. 792)

The impact of this surveillance and repression was often supported by intimidation and physical repercussions for those who expressed an alternative opinion to the state. This was the case for both NI and GDR. In NI, the physical intimidation was more blatant, but in GDR, there was a subtle, psychologically erosive effect that occurred over time through interference with people's life choices. In his analysis of NI, Feldman finds that although one might not have been involved in the violence, one could have become unwittingly embroiled in it.

In GDR, the surveillance state and the subsequent intimidation often led to the intentional breakdown of the targeted individual. The surveillance of the targeted individual entraps not only him or her but also the surrounding relationships and everyone with whom the person communicates, thereby granting the surveyor the potential power to exert an influence over the targeted individual's close relationships. As Justice Brandeis puts it, "The tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call him" (Ohm, 2009, p. 1445).

In a surveillance state, the control exerted upon citizens often forces them to become compliant, and the need to adapt to the regime and live a normal life becomes a survival mechanism. Parsons takes this further, arguing that this constant state of control through surveillance leads to the dissipation of social bonds; hence, in the need to live a normal life, citizens learn to adapt and accept the limits of the surveillance state, complying with and working within its limits: Surveillance "weakens the bonds needed for populations to develop the requisite relationships for fostering collective growth and inclusive law-making" (Parsons, 2015, p. 2).

Citizens' compliance through the use of physical and physiological methods of control in both NI and GDR was essential to the securitisation strategy of both states. In NI, citizens' compliance was fundamental to restoring law and order, and in GDR, it was vital to guarantee the state's stability and survival. The individual, therefore, ceases to exist in the eyes of the state and is replaced by a set of judgments based on a set of behaviours and partial information that someone with control and power has deemed hostile. These judgments are often made in the background without the knowledge of the targeted person or any form of context being taken into account:

Past activities can be queried to determine the relative hostility of a person, their intentions, or their past activities and communications partners, and without a person being able to rebut or contextualize their past behaviours. They are effectively always subject to secret evaluations without knowing what is being evaluated, why, or the consequences or outcomes of the evaluations undertaken. (Parsons, 2015, p. 3)

Many citizens attempting to lead normal lives in surveillance societies remain largely unaware of the true extent of the pervasive nature of surveillance operations. This is often because no one person can be identified as the watcher. As Bell points out in her exploration of surveillance and everyday resistance, "It may also be the case that individuals are ambivalent towards surveillance because there is sometimes no

identifiable ‘watcher’ or perceivable ‘control’ being asserted” (2009, p. 3). . What ensures discipline simultaneously erodes confidence, and guilt and embarrassment guarantee (self-)control. As Tabor writes, “The very idea of surveillance evokes curiosity, desire, aggression, guilt, and, above all, fear—emotions that interact in daydream dramas of seeing and being seen, concealment and self-exposure, attack and defence, seduction and enticement” (2001, p. 135).

In GDR, as a result of the covert characteristic of surveillance operations, many who were unaffected by the Stasi were unaware of the extent to which it had penetrated and controlled civil society. It was not until the wall came down and the Stasi files on the surveillance operations carried out during this period, were open that the full scope of Stasi operations became known

2. Community Impact

In pre-digital eras, it was normal to snoop, eavesdrop, gossip, and otherwise furtively gather information about people in whom one was interested. In John Locke’s *Eavesdropping: An Intimate History*, he chronicles countless examples of people overhearing others, peering through keyholes or over ladders, and snapping photographs on the street, all of which are part of what he calls “the lifelong quest for all humans to know what is going on in the personal and private lives of others” (2010, p. 6).

Foucault used the concept of *capillaries of power* to demonstrate that social surveillance assumes the power differentials evident in everyday interactions rather than the hierarchical power relationships assumed in much of the surveillance literature “capillaries of power” that flow between networks and individuals. In this model, power is ever-present, fluid, and at work in the mundane day-to-day activities that make up human life (Foucault, 1977, 1982).

The extent to which government surveillance permeated the everyday lives of GDR citizens has been well documented. Many studies have noted the withdrawal from public life of targets of surveillance because they no longer felt they could trust their neighbours; insecurity and indifference followed. This erosion of confidence in the support of one social network ultimately led to a breakdown in the traditional sense of community, as Helen Nissenbaum describes in *Privacy in Context*.

The norms that can be violated are themselves developed based on force of habit amongst persons and their communities, their conventions, as well as a “general confidence in the mutual support” of information flows that “accord to key organizing principles of social life, including moral and political ones.” (Nissenbaum, 2009: 231)

The impact of surveillance does not automatically mean a complete shutdown of communication with others; rather, it has an altering effect on the types of conversations citizens are willing to have, as they feel less free to express their true thoughts publicly. Cohen suggests the following in *Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object*:

While the monitoring of such communications will not end all conversations, it will alter what individuals and groups are willing to say. Such surveillance, then, negatively affects communicative processes and can be critiqued on its capacity to stunt or inappropriately limit expressions of private or public autonomy. (2000)

Noting the breakdown in community bonds in GDR, Bruce suggests that for many, “the idea that there was a sense of community in East Germany that has since evaporated is common in some circles of East Germany today” (2010, p. 157). Further, when describing life in the GDR in his book *The File*, Timothy Garten Ash depicts this sense of suspicion and insecurity, which becomes an everyday fact of life: “‘Suspicion is everywhere,’ I wrote. ‘It strikes in the bar, it lurks in the telephone, it travels with you in the train. Wherever two or three are gathered together, there suspicion will be’” (2009).

This atmosphere in GDR was compounded by the general perception that the enemy was everywhere, as Mary Fulbrook, noted academic historian, observed in her work on the GDR and twentieth-century dictatorships: “There was a more general atmosphere of suspicion and on occasion wellgrounded fear with East Germany too in context where the class enemy was held to be everywhere” (1992, p. 323).

Communities often became built on and around the sanctuary of the church, and numerous dissident groups, usually comprising oppressed and harassed young Christians, sprang up from these open spaces. One example is the case of Protestant pastor Christian Führer, a leading figure and organiser of the 1989 Monday demonstrations in GDR, which eventually led to its collapse in 1990. The church mostly remained independent from the state, allowing people this elusive freedom; however, it became infiltrated by Stasi informers, resulting in vocal members becoming surveillance targets and limiting their life choices:

Young Christians in particular generally preferred to lead their social life within the circles of the “Young Parish Community” (*Junge Gemeinde*) members of which were subjected to considerable harassment in the early 1950s, with negative consequences for plans to study or pursue careers in the GDR. (Fulbrook, 1992, p. 333)

The regime made a conscious attempt to fabricate and manipulate public opinion at all levels of community activity. The division created amongst East Germany citizens not only affected the wider communities but also had a corrosive effect on personal and family bonds. As Major states, “the sudden amputation of the two halves of Berlin sliced through innumerable personal bonds and family ties” (2010, p. 127).

As a result of the lack of trust in the wider community, many ordinary citizens often had to change their outward political views out of fear of denunciation and backlash for voicing any opposition to the political regime. According to Fulbrook, “Political instability and radical changes of regime meant that Germans frequently had to change their outward allegiances or at least adapt their behaviour patterns in order to pursue what they had constructed as their personal life projects” (1992, p. 9).

In NI, this fractured society of Catholics and Protestants caused these divided communities to become more entrenched in their own groups. In many cases, these communities provided protection from the on-going violence that the state failed to provide which allowed for extreme elements within the community to exert control over the community.

A system of internal vigilance and social control: in order to successfully “watch the enemy”. The central argument here is that the inter community conflict in Northern Ireland fostered external surveillance of the “Others” community and in turn necessitated and facilitated the internal surveillance of one’s own community. (Zurawski, 2005, p. 499)

This created a power shift from state to community; this system of community surveillance in NI reflects the two faces of surveillance that Lyon (2001) identifies: care and control, where these communities through exerting their control provided much a much needed sense of security. “The effect on the watching, intelligence and surveillance were paramount for these systems, which served as social control and an instrument of power as well as a life insurance for the people in these neighbourhoods”; any outside influence was seen as a threat; and “to watch your own was part of the strategy for social order within the community. Any activities that might have threatened its integrity had to be controlled and eventually sanctioned” (Zurawski, 2005, p. 505).

Thus developed an environment in which everyone was watching everyone. Zurawski explains:

While watching the other was important and for some people involved a necessity, it also meant that at the same time they were being watched by themselves—not only by the perceived enemy, but also by their own communities. Being a traitor or an informer to the police was among the biggest fears for many and among the most important reasons for suspicion of the police and thus for establishing “alternative” systems of justice and policing within the community to “watch your own.” (2005, p. 504)

Tim Pat Coogan, a renowned reporter for the *Northern Ireland Troubles*, observes, “For one thing, I have noticed that the various communities that were under attack are much more closely knit than ever before. You have young people, and elderly people, all closely knit” (2002, p. 103). This ultimately had a divisive effect on building understanding, trust, and community cohesion, which further fuelled the segregation of Catholics and Protestants. This encouraged the “them and us” mentality that dominated the mindset of the working-class communities on both sides of the divide. “In all of these working-class streets, there of course existed a strong sense of ‘them and us’ and a concomitant fear that the ‘them’ would be returning to stage a Clonard-style repeat performance” (Coogan, 2002: 124). This community division was used as an instrument to mobilise community support for the extremist agenda for both loyalists and republicans. The timing of the punishments meted out by these groups was carefully planned to garner maximum attention and reinforce their strategic goals. Feldman points out the following:

The PIRA will manipulate the timing of punishment violence in order to mobilize community support revealing that paramilitary punishment is a mnemo-technique reserved for special times and

political moments dedicated to the performance and display of cathartic communal memory on the bodies of others. (2016, p. 65)

This led to these tight-knit communities closing themselves off and making themselves inaccessible to any outside contacts. This siege mentality, which resulted from a lack of trust in the security forces, enabled intercommunity bias because alternative voices and opinions were not encouraged. From his time undertaking research which involved a prolonged participant observation studies in the nationalist and republican parts of Belfast during periods of high-level political conflict, Burton indicates that there were “physical dangers as well as challenges in accessing tight-knit communities,” also noting “his developing awareness of a ‘culture of political surveillance’ and ‘confessional communities.’” He reports, “I had to constrain the body as well as the voice. Finally, in order to know I had to become expert in demonstrating that there were things, places, and people I did not want to know” (Burton, 1979, p. 79).

In 2012, a wide-reaching study was conducted in NI on the attitudes of citizens currently living under the shadow of the peace walls; this study revealed that although the atmosphere among communities is improving, people are not prepared for the wall to come down immediately. Most believe that the peace walls should come down in the future (58%). More concerning is the fact that over a fifth of the respondents living closest to the peace walls (22%) thought that they should remain as they are. This atmosphere of fear and distrust remains in the background psyche of these communities. Byrne, Gormely-Heenan, and Sturgeon suggest the following:

These attitudes were underpinned by expressed fears of potential “loss” of community; a fear of violence; and a fear that the police would be unable to maintain law and order in the event of the “constant problems” that might result from the walls being removed. Indeed, 17% of respondents living closest to the walls said that they would try to move away if the walls in their areas were to come down. (2015, p. 17)

Criminological theories of informal social control also extend the role of “surveillance” by local residents and the “norms of conduct” by which residents are regulated. Brewer and Rodgers (1997) conclude that “political violence” has ironically protected NI from some of the “worst vagaries of community breakdown and dislocation witnessed in Britain’s inner cities” (1997, p. 216).

As was the case with NI, the modern surveillance state runs the risk of creating polarised communities, especially when profiling individuals becomes a normal method of surveillance and security. Graham takes this a step further, suggesting that this control through surveillance will have an effect on community and societal behaviours, as people have to make compromises when navigating these controlled spaces: “Surveillance is used to monitor the groups, whose visual appearance is interpreted as somehow deviant, producing a particular type of ‘normative space-time ecology’” (1998, p. 491).

In NI, the idea of the “Other” was accelerated by pre-existing ethnic, religious, and political differences. Therefore, in a surveillance society, what was diverse now became polarised, divided, and radicalised. Similar comparisons can be drawn from the perceived Islamist threat today. Norris argues that the power

provided by systems and techniques of surveillance encourages and fuels community division: “It is a ‘powerful tool in managing and enforcing exclusion’” (2003, p. 267). This gives rise to the justification of the securitisation of these communities, as Starr et al. suggest, as surveillance “gives rise to a security culture; which can have devastating impacts on inclusivity, solidarity, bonds of friendship and community” (2008, p. 262).

3. Societal Impact

The political and societal impact of surveillance has a direct bearing peoples relationship with the political system, and this, in turn, affects our attitudes to how we interact and engage with government institutions. As Lyon points out in *Surveillance After September 11*, “Surveillance has become a routine and mundane feature that is embedded in every aspect of life and operates in a wide range of agencies well beyond the confines of the central state” (Lyon, 2001).

With the increasing use of surveillance techniques in modern security and policing strategy, the state’s control over these institutions appears to have grown, unlike the case of GDR and NI; however, this power does not appear to be wielded to the same extent in contemporary society. Foucault makes the following observation:

It is certain that in contemporary societies, the state is not simply one of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power—even if it is the most important—but that in a certain way all other forms of power relation must refer to it. But this is not because they are derived from it; it is rather because power relations have come more and more under state control (although this state control has not taken the same form in pedagogical, judicial, economic, or family systems). (1982, p. 793)

Despite the ever-increasing intrusions into the private sphere via new invasive technologies and laws, the impact this will have on the way in which we function, as a society remains unclear. In a surveillance state, the control exerted upon citizens often forces them to comply with policies and actions that would be opposed under a free system. This has a chilling effect on socially beneficial behaviour, which results in the deterioration of our interaction with state institutions, hampering our ability to vocalise any concerns regarding the way in which our state is governed. As Parsons suggests, surveillance “weakens the bonds needed for populations to develop the requisite relationships for fostering collective growth and inclusive law-making” (2015, p. 3). In keeping with Hirschman in *Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action*, in which he offers critical insights into the understanding of collective action. His findings maintain that, “Realizing that efforts to change public life are either forbidden or unrewarded, people will predictably withdraw from public affairs and pursue individual interests until such a time as an opening becomes available” (Hirschman, 1982: 101).

Surveillance can be used to justify the censorship of voices that do not conform to the self-serving narratives. As Marx argues, the surveillance of protesters conducted by the United States authorities could “seriously distort the life of a social movement; they can serve as mechanisms of containment, prolongation, alteration, or repression” (1974, p. 403).

Much of the justification behind current surveillance practice is based on the perception that it improves behaviour and creates safer public spaces, as Bentham envisaged. In *The New Transparency: Police Violence in the Context of Ubiquitous Surveillance*, Ben Brucato makes a similar finding: "This preventative power, provided by the visibility cameras produce, recalls Bentham's claim that 'behaviour improves when people are strictly observed'" (2015, p. 48). Foucault draws similar conclusions regarding the deep connection between surveillance and the state security apparatus, identified by Stephen Pfaff: The "[a]uthoritarian model of social organisation in which absolutist states enlisted police powers in the service of political security and popular welfare. He goes on to argue that in a surveillance state, these systems of repression work in tandem to exert control over "A secret police dedicated to uncovering the hidden threats to the regime from within and without took an increasingly prominent place alongside conventional agencies of social control" (Pfaff, 2001, p. 401).

The need to live a normal life despite the repressive regime became the main focus of the people living in GDR. Major recognised this need to blend in or live under the radar in a society in which citizens are under scrutiny and stated "that the population had to 'come to an arrangement' with the regime and 'make the best of their situation', simply because they had no other choice" (2010, p. 159). Political establishments and police, who were provided with big budgets to ensure that strict party loyalty was enforced. Their only allegiance was to the GDR's regime, which they aimed to protect and uphold whether or not it was beneficial to society: "The ministry had an annual budget of 4 billion marks 27 separate divisions entrusted with matters ranging from party loyalty to economic surveillance and oversaw the operations of the formally separate civilian police in the Ministry of the Interior" (Pfaff, 2001, p. 393).

The close relationship between the state and the police was one of the greatest assets utilised by the governing powers of the GDR, and can be considered as one of the main reasons the system of repression lasted for almost four decades. In his work titled *The KGB and the Control of the Soviet Bloc*, Popplewell describes this deep-rooted connection between the state and police:

The close intertwining of Party and secret police apparatus was one of the main reasons why the East German regime endured for so long and with so little popular opposition. This unity between Party and security organs lay at the heart of the Stasi's work. In MfS documents, the Stasi and the Party were presented as the vanguard of society. To echo the Stasi's own words, both were meant to lead society and to shape it. (1998, p. 276)

The overt and pervasive nature of this surveillance was so divisive that it successfully silenced the voice of any dissent. Popplewell adds the following:

The most important role of the local secret police of Eastern Europe was thus to spy upon their own populations. Generally speaking, the "secrecy" of these agencies was not the key to their success. Rather by their very ubiquity they were designed to cow all potential opponents within their societies. (1998, p. 255)

The system depended on the maintenance of mystique around the state's actions. When this veil was removed, the power that the party held disappeared, and the citizens felt empowered to make life choices and take their freedom back. Jarausch describes the re-empowering of GDR dissidents in his depiction of the negotiation of the unification talks: "Krenz's dialogue policy as well as Modrow's negotiations at the Round Table recognized the opposition groups as legitimate partners. When these changes demystified the Stasi, reducing its capacity to instil fear, its power evaporated" (2014, p. 76).

Everyone in GDR society was viewed as a hostile element whose trust had to be earned, thus enabling this state of perpetual paranoia. This paranoia led to the misreading of the dissented voices, who ultimately wanted to make changes within in the system rather than destroy it completely. This misreading of popular sentiment proved to be counterproductive, resulting in the downfall of GDR: "Fundamental misunderstanding of system-immanent dissenters like Havemann, Biermann, and Bahro as agents of foreign subversion instead of as idealists trying to democratize socialism" (Jarausch, 2014, p. 76).

In GDR, once the fear of those in power diminished, people felt that they could finally come together to voice their opinions and concerns publicly. The peaceful revolution, which saw the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the overthrow of the GDR government, occurred without a single bullet being fired, and as Albrecht describes in *The Role of Social Movements in the Collapse of the German Democratic Republic*, there was "no single window broken during the Leipzig autumn" (1996, p. 161).

It can be said that the stability of the state and the maintenance of the regime were because of the combination of the cooperation with the elite, the containment of dissent, and the isolation of potential opposition. The survival of GDR depended on the success of the forced compliance of its citizens. The following is outlined in Miller's work on GDR:

Various analyses of the average citizen's behaviour in the GDR have been proposed since 1989. Psychologist Hans-Joachim Maaz describes the East German psyche as having been characterised by a split personality . . . This split in personality enabled East Germans to betray their private convictions in public, and explains why, for example, well over 90% of the population went along with the farcical voting procedure. (1997, p. 187)

In NI, by comparison, many citizens in these communities that were under siege looked to radical alternatives as they sought safety. Communities became the social environments from which paramilitaries emerged and by means of which they sustained their support. For many, the state and the army became a symbol of the discrimination and violence that dominated NI communities: "Catholic west Belfast became an occupied zone. Public buildings such as schools, recreational halls, even blocks of flats and football grounds including the Casement Park GAA ground, were all occupied by soldiers" (Coogan, 2002: 187).

Between 1973, and 1999, there were 2,168 "punishment" shootings and beatings. Between 1982 and 1999, the RUC recorded 1,427 "punishment" beatings, which were often carried out with the knowledge of state security forces:

Alleged forms of collusion were said to include: the illicit disclosure of security information, such as photo montages (created by the military as a recognition tool for the security forces and including the date of birth and sometimes the home address of a terrorist suspect); facilitation of acts of terrorism; failure to provide adequate protection or to warn people at risk; failure to vigorously investigate terrorist incidents and provision of weaponry to terrorist groups. (Cochrane, 2013, p. 78)

As Pfaff suggests, in a surveillance society in which the state virtually eliminates the public sphere, informal ties become critically important. He states that “these groups often provide the only opportunity for genuine participation in public life and an opportunity to define actual interests and needs that are otherwise prohibited or ignored by the regime” (Pfaff, 2001, p. 397).

The targeting of peaceful demonstrations alongside the disenfranchisement of the Catholic population led many to believe that engaging with the state was futile: “What had happened in Derry had been merely a legal rerun of what the RUC had done in October 1968 to trigger off the entire conflict—i.e. trapping the demonstrators in a confined area and then attacking them—no further comment is necessary” (Coogan, 2002: 177).

The fact that the Catholic population had very little say in the day-to-day operations of the state made these communities opt out of engaging in government institutions: “One of these ‘established local authorities’ was Fermanagh County Council. At the time of the publication of the Macrory Report, it had thirty-five Unionist councillors, while the Catholic majority was represented by only seventeen” (Coogan, 2002: 143).

The gerrymandering of voting boundaries in NI further created a barrier to Catholic participation in the democratic process. The voting practices in both NI and GDR were untimely probative to citizen participation in state governance. As Flusty points out in his work on building paranoia, this segregation and disenfranchisement of citizens is counterproductive to a health society: “Via segregation, purification and exclusion of particular groups, surveillance encourages conflict. The urge for security ‘has generated a defensive arms race’” (1994, p. 49).

In the case of NI and GDR, both systems of surveillance had clear connections and operated hand in hand with the security services, police, judiciary, and army. Levin draws similar comparisons from the examples of many repressive regimes that exist today:

There is a clear military connection. Further, seemingly harmless surveillance technology is used in non-democratic regimes and used to police undesirable groups and movements. China, where surveillance images were used to identify the student leaders of the Tiananmen Square demonstration, provides an example of this. (2002, p. 579)

However, Foucault argues that in the modern era of the surveillance society, show of force becomes obsolete because all that is required for the state to control its citizens is for the latter to know that they are being watched, as evidenced by the systems of surveillance that existed in GDR. The “absence of force” creates the force of our times:

There is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze that each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost. (Foucault, 1980, p. 155)

The “nothing to hide” argument is one of the primary standpoints used in the debate on the need to balance privacy and security. In its most compelling form, it is an argument that people’s privacy interest is generally minimal to trivial, thus making the balance against security concerns a preordained victory for security: “When surveillance and sousveillance are both treated equally—a more appropriate state—one can say that there is ‘equivallance.’ More typically, however, there is ‘inequivallance’” (Boiler, 2013).

The individual is shaped by society, and the good of both the individual and society are often interrelated rather than antagonistic. Therefore, it is vital that democratic institutions protect the individual as much as the state. Solove states the following: “We cannot think of ourselves save as to some extent social beings. Hence we cannot separate the idea of ourselves and our own good from our idea of others and of their good” and “Dewey contends that the value of protecting individual rights emerges from their contribution to society” (2008, p. 761).

As Norris writes, “Rather than promoting a democratic gaze, the reliance on categorical suspicion further intensifies the surveillance of those already marginalized and further increases their chance of official stigmatization” (2003, p. 266). Moreover, if surveillance is seen as “an extension of discriminatory and unjust policing, the consequential loss of legitimacy may have serious consequences for the social order” (Norris and Armstrong, 1999, p. 151).

Unchecked powers of surveillance are inherently toxic and corrosive to healthy democratic growth and progress. If a cost–benefit analysis is conducted, the enormous investment in surveillance ultimately benefits a tiny number in power and stalls normal healthy growth in society. It eventually leads to such dysfunction that it becomes unsustainable, leading to the collapse of the state, as in GDR, or to increasingly violent retaliation, as in the case of NI. These outcomes often have worse consequences for all stakeholders than the perceived threats in the first place.

Conclusion

While the era of the modern surveillance state provides many with a sense of security, some fear that the danger lies in the potential for local communities to be governed exclusively in the name of security. Marc Schuilenburg suggests that “[t]he punishment of harmful behaviour is only important when it leads to a

reduction of risk" (2015, p. 37). Therefore, surveillance techniques used as part of a wider security strategy may create a disenfranchised population due to stereotype-induced profiling. It can be argued this was the case in NI, where the majority-Catholic population was seen as the potential threat. Conversely, in GDR, every citizen who spoke out in defiance of the state was viewed with suspicion; in other words, everyone was a potential target. It can, therefore, be argued, as Deleuze suggests, that in surveillance societies, such as NI and GDR, there is a shift from Foucault's disciplinary enclosure to a fluid "control society" (1995, pp. 178–179), leading to "ceaseless control in open sites" (1995, p. 175).

When examining the NI and GDR contexts, both surveillance state systems had the same aim of rooting out all opposition and controlling dissent and dissonance through voluntary or forced compliance: "The function of the secret police in such regimes is not only to root out opposition and discourage dissent but to regulate the political and moral conduct of both ordinary citizens and functionaries of the state" (Pfaff, 2001, p. 400). While in NI, the secret police were not prevalent, the British Army carried out a similar function under the guise of preventing terrorist attacks and restoring law and order.

The literature reveals that long-term surveillance in these two societies had a lasting impact on individuals, communities, and the society at large. It broke down social and community bonds, as mistrust, fear, and suspicion dominated people's lives for so long. In this atmosphere of saturated surveillance, silence, invisibility, and anonymity became weapons of survival. From these two examples of surveillance societies, we see that surveillance can create chilling effects on free speech and free association, which are essential for democracy to thrive. Even the surveillance of legal activities can inhibit people from engaging in the judicial system itself, as in the cases of NI and GDR, where the people's faith in legal institutions was severely reduced.

In both NI and GDR, surveillance became a part of day-to-day life, its presence becoming a normalised and accepted intrusion into the private sphere of the citizenry. As Foucault suggests, "The broadly shared experience of being watched has been normalized, such that publics have internalized the surveillant gaze of the state" (Foucault, 1979). However, as Pfaff argues in his work the limits of surveillance, its acceptance is not guaranteed long term, as evidenced by the historical experiences of NI and GDR: "Such a regime may secure compliance so long as its power seems unassailable, but once its authority is threatened it may suddenly experience a revolt that is a more accurate reflection of the popular sentiments" (2001, p. 21). Pfaff also provides a stark warning to governing powers, noting that "[f]or the most part, policymakers should focus on past examples of harm, but they should not ignore undeniable indicators of future harm" (2001, p. 21).

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